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Viewing cable 09CARACAS1444, GBRV STRATEGY ON COLOMBIA-DCA DISPUTE BECOMING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CARACAS1444 2009-11-10 20:46 2011-04-06 00:00 SECRET Embassy Caracas
VZCZCXRO4996
OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHCV #1444/01 3142046
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 102046Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3970
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
id: 234175
date: 11/10/2009 20:46
refid: 09CARACAS1444
origin: Embassy Caracas
classification: SECRET
destination: 09CARACAS1144|09CARACAS1207|09CARACAS1430|09CARACAS1443
header:
VZCZCXRO4996
OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHCV #1444/01 3142046
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 102046Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3970
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE

----------------- header ends ----------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001444 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2029 
TAGS: PREL PINS MARR MCAP MOPS VE
SUBJECT: GBRV STRATEGY ON COLOMBIA-DCA DISPUTE BECOMING 
CLEARER 
 
REF: A. CARACAS 1443 
     B. CARACAS 1430 
     C. CARACAS 1207 
     D. CARACAS 1144 
 
Classified By: Acting Pol Counselor Rolf Olson, for reason 1.4 (d) 
 
1. (SE) Summary: Following President Chavez's November 8 
urging that the Venezuelan public "prepare for war" to defend 
the country against anticipated Colombian-U.S. cross-border 
aggression (Ref A), the Venezuelan government (GBRV) and its 
local allies issued a series of supportive and similarly 
bellicose statements that nonetheless affirmed that Venezuela 
is the aggrieved party in this dispute. Vice Foreign Minister 
Francisco Arias Cardenas, the most senior GBRV official to 
speak publicly on November 9, sought to steer the narrative 
away from a bilateral showdown between Colombia and 
Venezuela. He focused instead on the threat posed by "the 
elephant in the china shop" -- the United States -- and 
asserted that the quality of future Colombia-Venezuela 
relations would "hinge on the status of the bases." In 
response to the Colombian government's (GOC) stated intention 
of taking the matter to either the U.N. or the OAS, Arias 
instead demanded that the GOC address fellow members of 
UNASUR in order to provide "the security guarantees the other 
members have demanded." The shape of the GBRV strategy on 
this subject is becoming clearer: portray Venezuela as the 
victim, cite the U.S. as the ultimate source of conflict, put 
the onus on Colombia to withdraw its support for the DCA as a 
way to forestall regional conflict, and attempt to do all 
this in a forum that would likely be friendlier to GBRV 
arguments. End Summary. 
 
2. (SE) On November 9, the Chavez administration and its 
local supporters issued statements defending President 
Chavez's November 8 rhetoric regarding a possible war with 
Colombia. The President of the Foreign Relations Commission 
in the National Assembly (AN), Roy Daza, stated that the 
threat posed by the "North American military bases" in 
Colombia "obliged" Chavez and all Venezuelans "to take 
appropriate measures" in response. Fellow AN Deputy Iris 
Varela affirmed that Colombia had already committed "acts of 
war" ("ataques de guerra") against Venezuela through support 
of paramilitary groups along the border. The ruling United 
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) called on its members to 
"join the militia" ("convertirse en milicianos") to defend 
"against a U.S. attack from the occupied bases in Colombia." 
The Chavez-allied Fatherland For All party (PPT) echoed these 
sentiments: "We are convinced this Colombia-based strategy is 
aimed at disrupting and destroying the united advance of our 
peoples and our governments." (Comment: The statements of the 
PPT spokesman, Simon Calzadilla, were disappointing since 
just days earlier he had participated as one of four PPT 
deputies in a cordial meeting with Embassy Poloffs, in which 
Poloffs had explained the DCA and what its provisions did and 
did not contain. Calzadilla had seemed satisfied by this 
explanation at the time, and in fact had asked: "Why haven't 
you explained this so well before? This doesn't seem like 
such a big deal when it is laid out in detail." End Comment.) 
The country's Communist Party (PCV) struck a similar chord, 
arguing that "it is the United States that is fostering this 
war. Such a war would be convenient for the Empire, not for 
the Colombian or the Venezuelan governments." 
 
3. (SE)  The GBRV's Foreign Ministry added its voice to the 
mix by issuing a rebuttal to the GOC's November 8 
Presidential statement, blasting it as "immoral" and 
"hypocritical." Referring to Colombia's March 1, 2008 attack 
on FARC camps in Ecuador, the statement accused the GOC of 
committing "the only act of war registered in the recent 
history of our continent." While ridiculing Colombia for 
having "ignored the regional bodies responsible for this 
subject" in previous opportunities, the statement relayed the 
GBRV's willingness to discuss the issue in an international 
forum, citing the South American Defense Council (SADC) as 
one possible venue. 
 
4. (SE) Vice Foreign Minister for Latin America Francisco 
Arias Cardenas has been the most senior GBRV official to 
speak publicly since President Chavez's November 8 remarks. 
In separate media interviews on November 9, Arias placed 
blame initially on President Uribe for having played politics 
with regional security: "The call to war was made by Uribe in 
order to win a new term." But Arias also emphasized that the 
GBRV ultimately assigned blame to the U.S.: "We are neither 
looking for a war provoked by Venezuela, nor for a war 
provoked by Colombia or the Colombians." Arias added: "The 
true provocation and cause of such a war would be" the DCA 
itself, by virtue of the U.S. presence on the bases. Signing 
 
CARACAS 00001444  002 OF 002 
 
 
the DCA with the U.S. was, Arias added, "like bringing an 
elephant into a china shop." He asserted that the quality of 
the Colombia-Venezuela relationship would "hinge" on the 
issue of the bases. ("La relacion depende de las bases 
militares.") In response to the GOC's stated intention of 
taking the matter to multilateral bodies such as the U.N. or 
the OAS, Arias instead demanded that the Colombian government 
"should respond to UNASUR in order to provide the security 
guarantees that the other member countries demand." (Note: 
Per Refs C and D, Chavez publicly portrayed the August UNASUR 
deliberations on the DCA issue in Bariloche as a victory, and 
in mid-September challenged President Obama to meet with 
UNASUR leaders to explain the DCA. Additionally, 
GBRV-friendly Ecuador currently holds the rotating Presidency 
of UNASUR. End Note.) 
 
5. (SE) Comment: The GBRV appears to have chosen its 
strategic path as this issue appears headed for some sort of 
international hearing. First, reiterate that Venezuela is the 
aggrieved party in this dispute, and is only preparing itself 
for a conflict brought on by others. Second, assail the U.S. 
as the dark force behind Uribe's ill-advised policies, and 
use the USG's own documents as proof of "the Empire's plans." 
(Ref B) Third, take advantage of the region's distinct 
aversion to armed conflict; this involves putting the onus on 
Colombia to renounce its support for the DCA as the most 
neighborly action possible, as well as the easiest way to 
forestall a potential military confrontation. And fourth, if 
possible, have the public debate on this subject take place 
in an environment that is more likely to have GBRV allies 
echoing these arguments, such as UNASUR/SADC. End Comment. 
DUDDY 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================