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Viewing cable 09BUENOSAIRES1244, ARGENTINA'S POSITION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BUENOSAIRES1244 2009-11-13 18:33 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXRO7810
RR RUEHAST RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHSL RUEHTM
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBU #1244/01 3171834
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131833Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0024
INFO ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0001
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 001244 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
OES/EGC FOR DREW NELSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV KGHG ENRG EIND TRGY PREL AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA'S POSITION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
REF: BUENOS AIRES 00603 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  ESTOffs met on November 12 with the GOA's 
Climate Change Negotiator, Ambassador Silvia Merega, to ascertain 
Argentina's position and flexibility ahead of COP-15 in Copenhagen. 
From our conversation with Merega, it appears that the GoA's 
position is firmly in line with classic G-77 negotiating stances. 
The GoA seems unwilling at this time to commit to mitigation 
actions, pleading a lack of technology and funds to undertake 
serious efforts, though it appears that concrete outside financing 
might be a way to move the GoA to undertake specific mitigation 
commitments.  Concerns over agricultural exports and emissions are 
dominant, leading to a focus on avoiding Border Tax Adjustments. 
Merega's tougher position may be the result of frustration with the 
slow pace of progress on climate financing mechanisms, an issue of 
primary importance to the Argentines (reftel).  Post will report 
septel on a conversation with Oscar Estrada Oyuela, Argentina's 
long-time climate change negotiator, which sheds some light on the 
GoA's current stance.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
"DON'T CHANGE THE RULES OF THE GAME" 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) Argentina's lead climate change negotiator, Ambassador 
Silvia Merega, met with ESTHCouns and ESTHOff on November 12. 
Before a single question was asked, Merega insisted on laying out 
her perspective on the climate change negotiations, stating that 
the positions she would describe were not just those of Argentina, 
but of the entire G-77.  Since most countries had ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol (KP), she said, KP should be the sensible starting 
point for any negotiations, and the distinction between Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries should be maintained. 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) Merega admitted that she is pleased with President Obama's 
stated interest in advancing climate change negotiations.  She 
feels, however, that developing countries are waiting for a strong 
U.S. commitment and are frustrated by U.S. unwillingness to 
negotiate without domestic legislation.  Merega quickly blamed the 
USG (along with the EU, Japan, and Canada) for wanting to "change 
the rules of the game," a phrase she repeated several times during 
the conversation.  She stressed that the existing Framework 
Convention is a solid agreement, noting specifically her belief 
that actions by non-Annex I countries should remain reviewable only 
if implemented with outside financing.  She takes the U.S. 
position, commonly referred to as "common but differentiated 
obligations," to mean that "everyone must do something" and that 
the U.S. and EU will decide what actions each country must 
undertake. 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) Merega stated that all the negotiating pressure is on 
China, India, and Brazil to alter their positions based on their 
individual situations.  She is concerned that these countries, in 
turn, will pressure the G-77 to accept obligations not in the 
original Convention.  Merega objected to placing any new 
obligations on developing countries when it is already clear that 
most Annex I countries will not have met their existing obligations 
under the KP by 2012. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
OPEN TO A POLITICAL AGREEMENT BUT NOT TO SCHEDULES 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Merega expressed a willingness to reach a political 
agreement at Copenhagen and to continue negotiations in 2010. But 
she was vehement that Argentina will not support any initiative 
that includes a schedule of required actions for developing 
countries.  When specifically asked about the proposal of a 
 
BUENOS AIR 00001244  002 OF 003 
 
 
schedule, she fell back on cultural differences, noting that while 
the developed world perceives schedules as "obligations," they are 
viewed by Argentines as mere "indicators." 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Merega said that the G-77 believes mitigation actions to 
be a purely domestic issue; therefore, countries should not be 
required even to declare their action plans.  "The Bali Action Plan 
must be the basis for any agreement," she said, "and the current 
U.S./EU proposals violate that plan."  When asked what the U.S. 
could do to help reach an agreement at Copenhagen, she said that 
the United States should "use its imagination" to abide by the 
Kyoto Protocol without ratifying it. 
 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR OF TOP CONCERN 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) Merega noted that Argentina is taking steps to mitigate 
emissions, including undertaking a national inventory and planning 
actions in different sectors.  She highlighted a 30-year plan by 
the Energy Secretariat, legislation to protect native forests, a 
waste disposal policy, and an inventory of glaciers.  She also 
noted that Argentina recently began work on its 3rd National 
Communication on Climate Change, which will be completed in 2011. 
"We are doing things," Merega said, adding that "we need money to 
do things, but don't want to be pressed to do A in B way in C 
amount of time." 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) Merega highlighted the agricultural sector, which is 
responsible for 45% of Argentina's emissions, as particularly 
complex to reform.  She said that Border Tax Adjustments/carbon 
taxes (BTA) are a significant concern for Argentina and that the 
application of BTA by developed countries would significantly 
hamper Argentina's agricultural exports.  She insisted that BTA 
violate Article 3 of the Framework Convention, going so far as to 
read verbatim Article 3.5, stating that "measures taken to combat 
climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade." 
 
 
 
9. (SBU) Merega stressed that reducing emissions from agriculture 
was much more difficult than for other sectors, due to the 
difficulty of disseminating technology.  When asked whether the 
proposal for a Global Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation Research would help alleviate agricultural concerns, she 
said that Argentina was more amenable to the original New Zealand 
proposal than to the new joint U.S.-N.Z. proposal.  Still, she 
called the current proposal "very interesting" and "a good starting 
point."  Reforestation is also a sensitive issue in Argentina due 
to opposing interests from the agricultural sector. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
A LACK OF REGIONAL HARMONY 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
10. (SBU) Inside MERCOSUR, Merega said, environmental subjects are 
"very messy," with no cooperation of note.  She thinks that 
generally, outside of the Caribbean countries, Latin American 
countries share many positions but have different negotiating 
tactics.  She believes that Brazil is focused on its position as a 
major player with China and India, not as part of Latin America, 
while Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, and Bolivia form a separate block 
with their own interests.  As for the rest of Latin America, she 
said, "we share positions, but have different perceptions." 
 
BUENOS AIR 00001244  003 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
COULD FINANCING BE A WAY TO GAIN ARGENTINE SUPPORT? 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
 
11. (SBU) When pushed as to where she sees Argentina fit in the 
negotiations, Merega recognized that Argentina is not one of the 
big players, such as Brazil, India, and China.  "We do not feel the 
same pressure Brazil feels, but we will see what happens in 10 
years."  She pleaded that Argentina does not have the technology or 
budget to undertake significant mitigation actions.  She noted that 
Argentina is open to using international funding, which she 
acknowledged does trigger reporting and verification requirements. 
In her view, however, the existing system is sufficient and there 
is no need for a Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) 
schedule or a register.  "Why should we be obliged to apply the 
same standards when we are using our own funds?" she asked.  Merega 
initially gave no hint as to how the bridge could be gapped, but 
when ESTHCouns suggested that the GoA might be more amenable to a 
NAMA/schedule proposal if it were a condition for guaranteed 
financing, she stated that this would be a possibility. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
COMMENT:  ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION, BUT NOT LEADERSHIP 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
 
12. (SBU) Our discussion with Ambassador Merega was notable for its 
lack of tangible positive negotiating points and requests.  Merega 
dedicated many of her comments to complaints about the unfair U.S. 
and EU negotiating positions and arguments that Argentina should 
not have to make any commitments to mitigation.  Our perception was 
that the GoA has placed itself firmly in the G-77 camp, with few 
ideas beyond traditional negotiating positions.  Our impression was 
that Merega was frustrated with the slow pace of progress with 
climate financing, an issue of primary importance to Argentina 
(reftel).  Merega's inflexibility wavered only when she was 
presented with the idea of concrete financing in exchange for 
developing country mitigation commitments.  It seems that this 
carrot may be necessary for Argentina to consider "changing the 
rules of the game."  End Comment. 
 
 
 
MARTINEZ 
MARTINEZ