Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1360, BRAZIL ON U.S.-BOLIVIA DIALOGUE, ARGENTINA,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BRASILIA1360.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1360 2009-11-24 18:20 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO7444
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1360/01 3281820
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241820Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5460
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0056
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0011
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0004
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 0003
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0010
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0018
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 0129
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 0057
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0101
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001360 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR WHA, WHA/BSC, WHA/AND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR AR BR BL PY
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON U.S.-BOLIVIA DIALOGUE, ARGENTINA, 
PARAGUAY 
 
REF: SECSTATE 114036 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, reason 1.4(b) and 
 (d) 
 
1. SUMMARY.  In a meeting November 19 with PolCouns, 
Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE) South America 
1 (Southern Cone) Department head Minister Joao Luiz Pereira 
Pinto (protect) described Brazil-Bolivia relations as 
frustrating and indicated a continuing interest in trilateral 
counternarcotics efforts with the United States after the 
elections.  Pinto described Brazil's efforts to engage a 
difficult Argentine government more intensely in light of 
current trade disputes, and expressed no concern about the 
recent changes of military chiefs in Paraguay.  End Summary. 
 
- - - BOLIVIA: BILATERAL FRUSTRATION, TRILATERAL INTEREST - - 
- 
 
2. (C) During a friendly discussion November 19, PolCouns 
delivered points reftel to Pereira Pinto regarding our 
continuing dialogue with Bolivia.  Pinto was grateful for the 
information and expressed continued interest in finding ways 
to cooperate after the Bolivian elections.  Pinto described 
the current Brazil-Bolivia relationship as frustratingly 
difficult to manage, noting Bolivia has no ambassador in 
Brasilia, that Brazilian offers of assistance have gone 
unanswered, and that where Bolivia has agreed to training or 
consultations, it has sent unqualified candidates or 
low-level officials with no authority to make decisions. 
 
3. (C) PolCouns asked whether press reports of three recent 
intercepts by the Brazilian Air Force (BRAF) of drug aircraft 
coming from Bolivia into Brazil signaled greater intelligence 
sharing.  Pinto said that he did not believe so, but 
acknowledged that information sharing between the BRAF, 
federal police, and MRE  was not good, and that there was no 
systematic effort to collect statistics on what was coming 
across the border. 
 
4. (C) Pinto's principal preoccupation with Bolivia stemmed 
from a Brazilian federal deputy's effort to block the 
donation of four helicopters to Bolivia--Brazil's sole 
response to a request by Bolivia for assistance after DEA was 
expelled.  The problem arose out of concern that the Bolivian 
government was forcing Brazilians resident in Bolivia to 
leave the country.  According to Pinto, although Bolivia had 
two years ago required the few hundred Brazilians to move out 
of a fifty-kilometer band along the border, they had been 
offered resettlement within Bolivia.  However, Brazil's 
"roving consulate" (a van that offers consular services to 
the dispersed Brazlian population in the border area) has 
recently found that, with the situation deteriorating, most 
Brazlians now prefer to return to Brazil. 
 
5. (C) Comment: Although we find that Brazilian diplomats 
posted abroad are often much more amenable to working with 
the United States than their counterparts in Brasilia, in 
this case, it appears that there is broad and high-level 
interest in working with the USG.  Even the normally prickly 
head of the MRE transnational crimes department has conceded 
a need to work together on this issue.  Nonetheless, we will 
need to proceed carefully on the law enforcement side to 
avoid activating Brazilian sensitivities over sovereignty and 
any appearance of a less than fully equal partnership.  End 
comment. 
 
- - - ARGENTINA: FOR A TROUBLESOME NEIGHBOR, MORE ATTENTION - 
- - 
 
6. (C) With Argentine President Kirchner having visited that 
morning, Pinto told PolCouns that the visit had been 
important to "reduce tensions."  But the Argentines did not 
understand that Brazil could not overlook in an election year 
trade barriers that might not otherwise have been a 
significant issue.  Pinto did not have kind words for the 
GOA, describing Kirchner's government as "authoritarian 
without any of the tools of authoritarianism." He noted that, 
whereas Brazilian polling showed Argentine media and academic 
opinion had become much more positive with regard to Brazil 
over the past year, government opinion--for which, he said, 
 
BRASILIA 00001360  002 OF 002 
 
 
read the Foreign Ministry--was still  overwhelmingly 
negative.  Suffering from problems of its own making, he 
said, the GOA was seeking to blame Brazil. 
 
7. (C) For Pinto, the most notable development of the 
Lula-Kirchner meeting had been the agreement to meet even 
more frequently--every 90 days, with a commission of the 
Brazilian ministers of foreign affairs, trade (MDIC), and 
finance, and the Argentine ministers of foreign affairs, 
economy, industry meeting every 45 days.  Comment: The 
strategy bears a remarkable resemblance to Lula's approach 
with Venezuelan President Chavez, with whom he also holds 
quarterly meetings.  As the potential for conflict with 
neighbors rises, Lula sees personal, presidential-level 
contact, combined with more frequent ministerial-level 
contacts, as the best way to reduce tensions and minimize 
conflicts, particularly where resolution of the problems 
might not be possible at lower levels or in the short term. 
End comment. 
 
- - - PARAGUAY: BUSINESS AS USUAL - - - 
 
8. (C) Asked about how Brazil saw the recent replacement of 
military chiefs in Paraguay, Pinto said that Brazil did not 
see any cause for concern.  Because the Paraguayan Minister 
of Defense is not the most senior official in the chain of 
command, he said, it frequently creates rivalries that need 
to be managed.  For Pinto, the issue of most concern 
continues to be the handling of thousands of so-called 
"Braziguayos," Brazilians who have settled, often illegally, 
in Paraguay and whose status and rights are a constant 
irritant in relations. 
JACKSON