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Viewing cable 09BOGOTA3592, A NEW HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA FOR COLOMBIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BOGOTA3592 2009-11-12 18:22 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3592/01 3161823
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121822Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0822
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
UNCLAS BOGOTA 003592 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL ELAB KJUS CO
SUBJECT: A NEW HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA FOR COLOMBIA 
 
REF: BOGOTA 3027 
 
Summary 
 
------- 
 
 
 
1. (SBU) Embassy Bogota is engaged in a strategy to raise the USG 
profile on human rights in Colombia (ref).  It is just as important 
to define the substantive areas where we hope to see progress in 
the coming year.  In Post's opinion, key elements of our agenda 
with the GOC should be to: 
 
 
 
-- make progress against impunity, i.e., the investigation and 
prosecution for paramilitary crimes, extrajudicial executions, 
forced disappearances and violence against unionists, human rights 
defenders, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous; 
 
-- urge the Colombian military to implement its existing human 
rights regime; and 
 
-- counter the GOC's tendency to stigmatize human rights defenders 
as guerrilla sympathizers, which subjects them to abuse, threats 
and violence. 
 
We see the Department's new engagement with the U.S. Congress on 
Colombia as an opportunity to improve and modernize the human 
rights certification process and seek to make congressional funding 
more flexible.  End summary. 
 
 
 
IMPUNITY:  REDUCING THE BACKLOG OF CASES 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) We are concerned about ongoing human rights abuses such as 
extrajudicial executions (EJEs) and threats and violence against 
unionists, human rights defenders, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous. 
However, gross human rights abuse categories are on a downward 
trend from the peak years of 1999-2004.  There remains a need to 
resolve thousands of existing cases and bring the perpetrators of 
those crimes to justice.  Clearly, this is not a task that the GOC 
can complete in the short-run; but we should define a realistic 
expectation of what constitutes judicial progress.  NGOs 
consistently point out that an important element to ending impunity 
is the prosecution of the intellectual authors of such crimes 
rather than just the perpetrators.  While this may be possible in 
some cases, it is not in others, as there may be no evidence or 
insufficient evidence for proof in a criminal case. 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) The Justice and Peace Law (JPL) process for paramilitary 
and guerilla demobilization continues to be a difficult process 
that seeks to balance the broader concept of a search for 
historical truth with the more narrow focus of judicial 
proceedings.  In the short term, the USG should continue to press 
for resolution of the JPL process, a more effective reparation 
process for victims of paramilitary and guerrilla violence, and a 
determination by Colombia on whether it wants a "truth commission" 
or a judicial process.  The USG will also press the Prosecutor 
General's Office to significantly increase the DNA identification 
of victims' remains and return of the remains to their families. 
 
 
 
More Resources for Administration of Justice 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) The Colombian Prosecutor General's Office faces an 
overwhelming case load - not only having to address human rights 
crimes and the justice and peace process, but the significant case 
load involving narcotics and related offenses, terrorism and 
violent and organized crime.  While the GOC added about 250 
prosecutors in 2008-2009, the Prosecutor General's Office and 
Colombian National Police each need 200-300 more investigators. 
The Embassy will press the GOC for this increase in personnel and 
for this long term commitment.  DOJ and U.S. law enforcement 
 
agencies have developed programs to provide the requisite intensive 
training and assistance.  Critical issues also exist with respect 
to increasing criminal investigators and more permanent assignment 
to units involved in human rights investigations.  In addition, the 
Colombian judiciary must become more efficient in presiding over 
human rights proceedings. 
 
 
 
IMPLEMENTING MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Most international experts agree that the Colombian 
military has developed an adequate legal and regulatory framework 
for the protection of human rights and international humanitarian 
law.  However, the implementation and institutionalization of those 
policies within field units remains a challenge.  Colombian 
military has deployed operational lawyers to give legal advice to 
commanders.  We can help by continuing the MILGRP project with the 
Ministry of Defense to develop rules of engagement and rules for 
use of force by troops.  We can also strengthen the Military 
Justice System by improving the Military's handling of civilian 
deaths and in cooperating with the Prosecutor General's Office in 
these death investigations.  The Embassy will continue to press for 
the completion of an MOU between the MOD and the Prosecutor 
General's Office on how civilian death cases should be handled.  In 
addition, we have helped improve the effectiveness of the Inspector 
General of the Armed Forces, which has responsibility for 
administrative investigations and disciplinary actions. 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) In addition, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (UNHCHR), with the assistance of USAID, plans to 
establish a monitoring project to advise the Colombian military on 
progress in implementing its human rights policies.  A 
complementary effort is the Ambassador's engagement of Minister of 
Defense (MOD) Silva to renew the informal consultative mechanism 
with MOD Silva, UNHCHR, and ambassadors from key donor countries. 
 
 
 
COUNTERING STIGMATIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) The polarized nature of the Colombian conflict has created 
a difficult environment for civil society.  Human rights defenders 
and trade union leaders are often accused by the GOC of creating an 
environment that supports terrorist organizations.  The GOC's 
attitude has led to the illegal surveillance of NGOs by the DAS and 
military intelligence.  While a small portion of NGOs are allied 
with or manipulated by some illegal armed groups, we do not see it 
as a widespread occurrence, nor does it outweigh the U.S. 
commitment to promote a robust civil society in Colombia.  We are 
already taking a more public posture through increased outreach to 
NGOs, including publicized NGO meetings with the Ambassador and 
quarterly consultations.  We will also relook at derogatory 
information on human rights defenders in our own lookout systems, 
working with Washington agencies to remove hits based on spurious 
information.  Together with the Ministry of Social Protection, 
USAID has developed a public outreach campaign to confront the 
stigmatization of union members that could serve as a model for a 
public outreach strategy for human rights defenders. 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) One specific area in which the GOC can demonstrate its 
commitment to civil society is a transparent investigation into the 
illegal or inappropriate surveillance of NGOs, political 
opposition, labor groups, and Supreme Court by the Administrative 
Department of Security (DAS).  The Embassy has pressed the GOC for 
a full accounting of the crimes committed in the scandals.  We will 
consider assisting the GOC as it closes DAS and stands up a leaner, 
more professional intelligence service.  We can also support the 
UNHCHR's project to help DAS purge politically motivated 
intelligence in its files. 
 
 
 
Seeking Flexibility on Certification 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
9. (SBU) The human rights certification process attached to 
financial assistance has had a marginally positive impact by 
routinely putting human rights issues on the front burner of the 
relationship.  We support the Department's intention to engage 
Congress and NGOs on revamping our approach to Colombia, especially 
with regard to human rights.  We believe the GOC will appreciate 
clear signals from us and play a constructive role in such a 
process.  We see an opportunity to revise the certification process 
and loosen the Congressional earmarks on funding.  Specifically, we 
propose to update the certification process by: a) modernizing the 
criteria for Colombia's current reality; b) disconnecting the 
policy decision of whether to certify from the frantic 
end-of-fiscal-year deadline; and c) giving policymakers new options 
for addressing shortfalls in human rights performance other than a 
dramatic action in current legislation of a 30%-cut in military 
funding. 
 
 
 
10. (SBU) We understand from the senior policy review session held 
on October 8 that the Department intends to pursue an agreement 
with the U.S. Congress, the GOC, and NGOs on the USG approach to 
Colombia with regard to human rights.  We suggest this initiative 
seek to make congressional certification more flexible to become a 
more credible carrot-and-stick approach that will encourage better 
GOC performance on human rights - while still maintaining the 
remedial measures implicit in the certification process as proposed 
in para 9.  This change will better enable us to continue 
re-orienting Plan Colombia programs to the Colombia Strategic 
Development Initiative (CSDI), a whole-of-government approach to 
countering illegal drugs and illegal armed groups.  One of our 
objectives is to use CSDI to expand rule of law programs (community 
policing, improved criminal investigation, human rights ombudsmen, 
increased numbers of prosecutors and judges, and court proceedings) 
in specific consolidation zones where state presence is weak. 
Increased flexibility for funding dedicated to human rights, law 
enforcement, eradication, and rule of law would greatly facilitate 
this effort. 
BROWNFIELD