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Viewing cable 09BEIRUT1243, MARKING THE BLUE LINE: SLOW BUT STEADY PROGRESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIRUT1243 2009-11-20 06:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Beirut
VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLB #1243/01 3240601
ZNR UUUUU ZZH(CCY ADXDCE593 MSI0421 532A)
P 200601Z NOV 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6088
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 3839
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0105
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3702
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0575
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1498
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3967
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 3555
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4238
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS BEIRUT 001243 
 
C O R R E C T E D  COPY (Marking of Para 1) 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PBTS PTER PINR MOPS KPKO UNSC IS LE
SUBJECT: MARKING THE BLUE LINE: SLOW BUT STEADY PROGRESS 
 
REF: BEIRUT 512 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The UN Interim Force in Lebanon's (UNIFIL) 
121-kilometer Blue Line (BL) marking program is moving along, 
albeit slowly, with 25 of the proposed 198 markers now in 
place.  UNIFIL officials maintain that despite the slow pace, 
the demarcation prevents inadvertent violations of UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 and helps resolve 
those that do occur swiftly and peacefully, thus contributing 
to stability on Lebanon's southern border.  They explained 
that the pace of the multi-step BL marking program, initiated 
in 2007, is constrained by operational processes requiring 
precision and three-party consensus.  The current "de facto" 
BL border delineation rests on the best available data 
compiled from 1923 French and British Mandate maps and the 
1949 Lebanon-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line.  The 
viability of the BL as a mutually recognized border in the 
future is unclear given the lack of an permanent cease-fire 
agreement between Israel and Lebanon.  End Summary. 
 
THE BLUE LINE IS NOT A BORDER 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (U) In May 2000 the UN, through UNIFIL, took up the task 
of identifying a line for the purpose of certifying complete 
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, as called for in UNSCRs 425 
and 426.  While Lebanon, Israel, and UNIFIL agreed the result 
would not be considered a formal border demarcation, the aim 
was to identify a line that closely conformed to the 
internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon, based on 
the best available cartographic and other documentary 
evidence.  This line, formally called the Line of Withdrawal, 
subsequently came to be known as the Blue Line. 
 
3. (U) Much of the Israeli-Lebanese border is not disputed 
and was clearly marked on French and British Mandate maps 
developed by the Occupied Enemy Territorial Administration 
(OETA) following World War I.  The line separating the two 
mandates ran eastward from Ra's Naqoura on the Mediterranean, 
more or less horizontally, terminating just north of the 
Upper Galilee at Jisr al-Ghajar.  A joint British-French 
border commission report marking the border was approved in 
1923, several months before the countries assumed their 
mandatory responsibilities, and 38 boundary markers were 
placed along the 49-mile-long boundary.  Previous Lebanese 
governments have recognized the legitimacy of the southern 
border with Israel on many occasions, including in 1949 when 
the "Armistice Demarcation Line" (ADL) was established 
between the two states.  The ADL (also know as the Green 
Line) corresponded to the 1923 Mandate border, and the 
armistice agreement contained no clause denying that the 
existing border was an international border. The ADL was 
thereafter treated as the "de jure" international border. 
 
A PENNY OF PREVENTION 
WORTH A POUND OF CURE 
--------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) "A Blue Line-marking program is a critical step in 
implementing UNSCR 1701," declared Roxaneh Bazergan, UNIFIL 
Political Officer for the Tripartite Secretariat, in a 
November 13 update to the diplomatic corps.  To emphasize her 
point, Bazergan related several recent incidents, such as 
farmers mistaking the border line, animal herds wandering 
from one country to the other, and a mentally handicapped 
Israeli nearly sparking a confrontation by crossing into 
Lebanon.  Bazeran recounted that after the cessation of 
hostiliies between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and 
Hizballah in 2006, UNIFIL commanders determined that 
successful implementation of UNSCR 1701 would be eased if 
unintentional violations of the unmarked BL could be 
prevented.  Subsequently, UNIFIL embarked on visibly 
delineating the BL using 198 prominent points. 
 
CURRENT BLUE LINE SNAPSHOT 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) As of June 2009, Bazergan stated, 36.5 km of 121 km 
had been demarcated, with work going on simultaneously in all 
four predetermined sectors.  Of the 198 proposed BL points, 
25 barrels marking completed points have now been erected, 20 
 
are under construction, 18 more coordinates are agreed upon 
by all parties, and 6 proposed coordinates are under 
evaluation.  The IDF has nearly completed construction of a 
"technical fence" in Israeli territory south of the BL, 
Bazergan explained, to warn those approaching from inside 
Israeli territory that they were approaching the BL. 
Conversely, reaching this same fence from Lebanon in the 
north would signify that the BL has been crossed in clear 
violation of UNSCR 1701.  Bazergan added that the LAF, 
assisted by UNIFIL engineers, has begun construction of a 
road paralleling the BL on the north.  UNIFIL and the LAF 
both believe the road essential to responding rapidly to 
border incidents, she said, and it would also facilitate 
routine patrolling. 
 
CENTRIMETIC PRECISION REQUIRED 
------------------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) Bazergan emphasized that UNIFIL's BL marking program 
rests on four factors to achieve undisputed results: 
 
-- Digital coordinates are logged using a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) device. 
 
-- Measurements are presented in centimeters for 
"centrimetric precision." 
 
-- UNIFIL proposes the final points to the two other parties. 
 
-- No point is decided without consensus from all sides. 
 
The marking process moves at a glacial pace because of the 
centrimetric precision and consensus requirements, Bazergan 
pointed out. 
 
7. (SBU) When the initial staking process began in 2007, all 
parties worked together on the ground, Bazergan related. 
This mechanism initially built confidence, but it fell apart 
after the IDF began to include additional security personnel. 
 The coordinate marking process is now done by separate LAF 
and IDF teams with UNIFIL oversight in the following sequence: 
 
-- Both sides create access to the planned points by clearing 
vegetation and demining the area. 
 
-- The LAF proposes initial coordinates extracted from 
historical sources. 
 
-- The IDF and UNIFIL mark their respective points.  All 
parties must achieve measurements within 50 cm of each other. 
Coordinate stakes are marked blue for UNIFIL, yellow for the 
IDF, and red/white for the LAF. 
 
-- UNIFIL proposes a final "barycenter" or agreed upon 
coordinate, based on the three stakes, and a concrete base is 
constructed over the barycenter. The base's center must fall 
within a one-meter radius of the barycenter coordinate. Due 
to uneven terrain, base heights range from one to three 
meters to increase visibility from a distance. 
 
-- All three parties verify the base center, and a blue 
barrel is placed on it to mark completion. 
 
Blue Line demarcation cannot resolve some intractable 
problems, Bazergan pointed out, citing the complications 
related to UNIFIL's proposal for the IDF's withdrawal from 
northern Ghajar (reftel). 
 
WHAT IS THE BLUE LINE'S FUTURE? 
------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Bazergan could not predict when the demarcation 
process will be completed, but she underscored that the 
marking program contributes to stability in the south and its 
completion will be a milestone in the successful 
implementation of UNSCR 1701, despite slow progress.  She 
also declined to assess if the BL would be considered a "de 
facto" border if and when UNIFIL departed, and she stressed 
that the lack of a permanent cease-fire agreement between 
Lebanon and Israel, as well as Hizballah's presence on the 
southern border, complicates the negotiation of one. 
 
Nevertheless, she undescored, UNIFIL's efforts to mark the 
BL will lesen unintentional violations of UNSCR 1701. 
DAUGHTON