Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BANGKOK2821, GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO CRITICISMS OF MIGRANT WORKER

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BANGKOK2821.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BANGKOK2821 2009-11-05 03:03 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO9401
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHBK #2821/01 3090303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050303Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8829
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 7239
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 002821 
 
Department for EAP/MLS DSmith, DRL/IL MJunk, GTIP CChan-Downer, and 
DOL/ILAB for Brandie Sasser 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB PHUM BM TH
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO CRITICISMS OF MIGRANT WORKER 
REGISTRATION PROGRAM, BUT PROBLEMS REMAIN 
 
BANGKOK 00002821  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified.  For Official Use Only. 
 
Ref: Bangkok 1376 (Thai Government Plans Migrant Amnesty) 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: In July of this year, the Thai government began 
implementing an amnesty program for illegal migrant workers in 
Thailand.  Employed migrants from Laos, Cambodia, and Burma may 
apply for temporary work permits and must have their nationality 
verified by their government.  Those who fail to regularize their 
status through participation in the program will be subject to 
deportation.  Observers in civil society and some of Bangkok's 
resident UN agencies acknowledge the program as a positive step 
taken by the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to protect migrants by 
bringing them into the formal labor market, with related benefits 
such as access to health insurance.  Nonetheless, the Thai 
government's implementation of the program has been met by 
criticism: poor communication to migrant communities, 
under-regulation of private companies involved, high fees, and 
unrealistic deadlines, among others.  The RTG has modified aspects 
of the program to benefit migrants in response to media and NGO 
criticism, but problems remain.  Ultimately, even the critics agree 
the Burmese government, by its refusal to allow nationality 
verification within Thailand, is to blame for a system that could 
lead to the exploitation of migrants.  Nonetheless, there are at 
this point no known cases of severe exploitation (including human 
trafficking) of participating migrants.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Comment: This migrant worker amnesty/registration program 
represents the RTG's latest effort to deal with an illegal 
immigration problem largely inevitable given that Thailand's 
generally open economy and society is surrounded by much poorer and 
more repressive neighboring countries.  We will continue to stay in 
close contact with government officials to encourage continued 
flexibility in the implementation of its plans and guard against the 
possibility that poor implementation could lead to exploitation of 
migrant workers.  End comment. 
 
3.  (SBU) In July 2009, the RTG began implementing a massive worker 
registration/amnesty program.  Originally scrapped over concerns 
about protecting jobs for Thai workers during the global economic 
crisis, the amnesty went forward after surveys showed there were 
many jobs Thai workers still were not willing to fill.  This latest 
effort to regularize its migrant work force is proceeding in 
accordance with Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with the 
governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Burma.  The amnesty covers 
irregular workers from those three countries employed in specific 
sectors of the economy (e.g., those who entered Thailand illegally 
and who may or may not have work permits depending on whether they 
participated in the last amnesty in 2004 and have since renewed 
their work permit).  Speaking of the initiative on October 5, Prime 
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva noted, "We realize that the most 
effective way to protect these migrants is to legalize their status 
and bring them into the formal labor market," according to the 
media. 
 
4.  (SBU) Despite this latest attempt to effectively and humanely 
deal with its complex, illegal immigration problem, the Thai 
government's implementation of the amnesty program continues to draw 
criticism.  (Note: reftel provides background on the history of 
Thailand's migrant worker amnesty programs and an explanation of the 
rationale behind this latest round.  End note.).  Concerns within 
the migrant labor community (including a fear of deportation, 
exploitation, or both) had led to a proliferation of rumors and 
unofficial information about the nature of the registration program. 
 Through a series of formal meetings and informal conversations with 
Thai government officials, Post has sought to clarify details of the 
amnesty program and has advocated for continued improvement in its 
implementation.  Post has also been in close, continual contact with 
interested non-governmental organizations and UN agency 
representatives in Bangkok. 
 
The Complex Process Explained 
----------------------------- 
5.  (U) The amnesty program entails a multi-step process, including 
verification by foreign governments of the nationality of 
participating migrant workers.  As detailed in reftel, employers 
must first register their illegal workers with the Thai Ministry of 
Interior (for a fee of 80 baht per person or approximately USD 
2.40).  Workers must then receive a health check (600 baht) and 
purchase mandatory health insurance (1,300 baht) through the 
Ministry of Health so that they may have access to the 
government-sponsored healthcare system. 
 
6.  (SBU) The Ministry of Labor then issues workers, for a fee, a 
work permit that affords them the right to temporarily stay and work 
in Thailand (permits are available for periods of three months, six 
 
BANGKOK 00002821  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
months, one year, or two years for fees on a sliding scale: 450 baht 
for three months, 900 baht for six months, 1,800 baht for one year, 
and 3,600 baht for two years).  The permit does not afford permanent 
residence rights; registered workers are subject to deportation when 
their permit expires.  The Thai government's intent, as per the MOUs 
with its neighbors, is for all future migrant workers to enter 
Thailand through a formal labor importation process.  (Note: 
According to a 2009 report by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), in 2008 1.8 million migrants were working in 
Thailand, of whom only half a million held work permits.  Of the 
total 535,732 registered in 2007, 91 percent were from Burma.  End 
Note). 
 
7.  (SBU) Nationality verification is required for all workers from 
Laos, Cambodia, and Burma who have not yet had their citizenship 
confirmed by their government, even if the worker already possesses 
a work permit.  At present the deadline for completing this step is 
February 28, 2010, after which, should the plan hold, non-Thai 
migrant workers in Thailand would be either regularized or subject 
to deportation.  Citizens of Laos and Cambodia have generally 
completed this step through processing centers (static and mobile) 
set up by their governments throughout Thailand with budget support 
from the Thai government.  Those from Burma must complete this step 
through one of three centers established along the Thai-Burmese 
border at: Ranong (Thailand) - Koh Song (Burma), Mae Sot (Thailand) 
- Myawadi (Burma), and Mae Sai (Thailand) - Ta Kee Lek (Burma). 
Establishing the Burmese centers just over the border in Burma was a 
compromise after years of negotiations between the Thai and Burmese 
governments.  (Thailand wanted Burma to agree to an in-Thailand 
system such as Laos and Cambodia agreed to.  Burma wanted migrants 
to travel back to their home areas within Burma.)  Prior to 
traveling to one of the centers, Burmese migrants provide 
applications with biographic data to the Thai government which then 
forwards the information to the government of Burma.  Once the GOB 
verifies the information, it informs the Thai government, which then 
informs employers who often arrange for the transport of their 
workers to one of the centers. 
 
8.  (SBU) The Thai Labor Ministry then makes an appointment for the 
migrant at the border processing centers and provides the migrant 
with papers authorizing him/her to travel to the border (migrant 
workers are not generally allowed to travel outside their province 
of employment without authorization).  On the day of the 
appointment, the worker receives a "delivery letter" at the Thai 
border center and reports to Burmese authorities at the accompanying 
Burmese center.  Burmese authorities then verify the nationality of 
the migrant and provide them with a temporary passport (costing 
3,000 Burmese kyat, equivalent to USD 3). With passport in hand, the 
worker crosses back into Thailand and purchases a visa (500 baht/USD 
15) as well as an additional work permit to cover any time not 
already covered by their existing permit. 
 
Mounting Concerns 
----------------- 
9.  (SBU) The registration process, and especially the accompanying 
nationality verification process for Burmese migrants, has drawn 
criticism from civil society organizations.  On September 16, a 
group of three organizations sent a joint letter of concern to the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants. 
(Note: Laboff passed it on September 18 to counterparts in the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Labor, and Social Development 
(MSDHS).  End Note).  The same organizations, which includes the 
State Enterprise Workers Relations Confederation (Thailand's largest 
public laborer organization), sent a complaint letter (with 
recommendations) to Prime Minister Abhisit on October 5.  In an 
October 30 meeting with LabOff, a grass-roots migrant labor activist 
who played a major role in developing the letter summarized his 
major concerns and recommendations as follows: 
 
- Information: the Thai government has done a poor job of providing 
information on the amnesty program directly to migrant workers, 
relying instead on employers and provincial government officials to 
relay the information to them.  In the absence of authoritative 
information regarding the process and its associated fees, migrants 
are more prone to over-charging and potentially other forms of 
exploitation.  The Thai government should provide improved 
information to migrants more widely, especially in the Burmese 
language. 
 
- Brokers/facilitators: the requirement that Burmese migrants must 
travel to the Thai-Burma border encourages the use of private firms 
by employers and migrants to assist them in completing the 
nationality verification process.  The firms are under-regulated, 
thereby putting migrants at risk of exploitation via over-charging 
or, at worst, human trafficking.  Private firms involved in the 
process should be better regulated. 
 
BANGKOK 00002821  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
- Fees: migrant workers generally earn, at best, minimum wage (which 
varies by province but ranges from approximately 148 to 203 baht per 
day).  As such, fees associated with the amnesty process are a 
burden on migrants who will likely be held responsible for the full 
cost of their processing.  This is especially true if migrants are 
held responsible for the costs of labor brokers, which reportedly 
charge between 4,000 to 10,000 baht for services (e.g., round-trip 
transportation to the border centers, assistance with filling out 
forms, etc.).  Fees should therefore be lowered and capped. 
 
- Deadline and Deportation: While approximately one million migrants 
have registered with the Ministry of Interior and approximately 
850,000 have applied for renewed or new work permits, only a few 
thousand Burmese migrants have successfully completed the 
nationality verification process.  With the February 2010 deadline 
fast approaching, it is clear that it only a relative handful of 
migrants will be able to complete the nationality verification 
process before it arrives.  As such, the deadline should be extended 
and migrants who have begun the process should not be subject to 
deportation. 
 
10.  (SBU) The expressions of concern by civil society organizations 
have led others to take notice.  Local press has run articles and 
opinion pieces critical of nationality verification in recent weeks. 
 In addition, representatives of the United Nations anti-human 
trafficking project (UNIAP) and International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) told econoff on October 29 that the United Nations 
will be looking at the issue.  They confirmed that the UN Thematic 
Working Group on International Migration will undertake research on 
the nationality verification process with the goal of providing 
recommendations to the Thai government on how to improve it. 
 
Thai Response to Realities and Criticism 
---------------------------------------- 
11.  (SBU) Acknowledging the slow pace of progress of the illegal 
worker amnesty, and in light of the concerns expressed about it, 
Thai authorities have been taking steps to modify the program.  A 
MOL Department of Employment (DOE) representative confirmed to us 
October 6 that the DOE had forwarded a proposal to the Thai cabinet 
to extend the deadline for work permit applications to allow 
migrants more time to apply (the previous deadline passed on August 
29).  DOE also recommended that the children of migrant workers be 
allowed to register as dependents of workers (spouses need to apply 
separately for work permits).  In a meeting on October 27, DOE 
Director General Jirasuk Sugandhajati explained to Embassy officers 
that the cabinet had not yet taken up the recommendations for 
decision but hopefully would soon do so.  In response to our 
statement of concern over the Burmese nationality verification and 
its February 28 deadline in particular, the Director General noted 
Thai authorities were considering an extension and would determine 
whether to do so as the deadline grows nearer.  (NOTE: we spoke 
again of this matter on November 3 to a DOE official who explained 
that in order to estimate how many Burmese migrants intend to 
complete their nationality verification, the MOL has asked migrants 
to submit by November 20 a form documenting their intent.  It is 
unclear whether migrants that do not do so will be allowed to 
complete the process.  End Note). 
 
12.  (SBU) In the same meeting, the Director General also responded 
to our questions on the use of private firms to facilitate the 
nationality verification of Burmese and the fees associated with the 
amnesty process in general.  While not required, employers (and 
migrants) can use the services of private firms, he explained. 
While the Thai government has not as a matter of policy recommended 
any firm over another, it has communicated to the Government of 
Burma (and provincial level MOL offices) the bona fides of at least 
three firms after the Burmese government inquired about them.  With 
regard to fees, the Thai government has not sought to cap the fees 
such companies charge but instead explained that market competition 
will help control costs since employers and workers will naturally 
contract with those companies providing the best services for the 
lowest fees (a DOE employee also noted there are no legal grounds 
for the government to set prices for private services in this area). 
 However, the DG explained that, recognizing the difficulty migrants 
may have in covering fees, the Labor Minister issued a regulation 
lowering the visa fee for Burmese going through the nationality 
verification process from 2,000 to 500 baht (the regulation went 
into force on October 27).  Stating that employers (and not just 
proponents of workers) have raised complaints with him, DG Jirasuk 
noted cases in which employers have put out money for laborers to 
register only to have the laborers quit soon after. 
 
13.  (SBU) In response to our statement of concern that Burmese 
migrants do not appear to have full and authoritative information on 
the nationality registration process, the DG noted that, upon his 
 
BANGKOK 00002821  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
recommendation after observing the process at the Mae Sot center, 
the Ministry would soon distribute to employers and provincial DOE 
offices a manual on the process with improved information on the 
steps it entails, the forms and other documents it requires, and the 
government fees.  Showing us a copy of the draft manual, he noted it 
will be available in Thai, Burmese, and English. 
 
Improvements to Program Not Likely Enough 
----------------------------------------- 
14.  (SBU) Observers have noted the positive steps taken by the Thai 
authorities to modify the registration/nationality verification 
process to benefit migrant workers.  When queried by Laboff October 
29 and 30, both IOM and civil society representatives acknowledged 
that the amnesty program ultimately should improve the rights of all 
workers in Thailand.  They pointed to the lowering of fees, 
inclusion of child dependents, and extension of the deadline for 
work permits as positive moves for which the Thai government should 
be credited.  One activist noted another example of Thai authorities 
acting responsively to civil society concerns: the apparent policy 
reversal by the Ministry of Transportation (made public October 30) 
to change existing policy and allow migrant workers to both register 
ownership of motorcycles and apply for drivers licenses.  He also 
noted that Ministry of Labor offices at the provincial level have 
organized buses to assist the transport of migrants to border areas. 
 As such, even some Burmese ethnic minorities have completed the 
full amnesty process and are now enjoying the benefits of having 
done so (e.g., the ability to travel more freely, access to health 
care, etc.).  Importantly, when asked whether they are aware of any 
confirmed cases of severe exploitation (such as human trafficking) 
among the migrants who are participating or have participated in the 
amnesty program, no one with whom we spoke was aware of any. 
 
15.  (SBU) Nonetheless, observers, and especially migrant labor 
advocates, remain concerned.  They point out that uncertainty within 
the migrant labor community - and particularly among Burmese ethnic 
minorities - is high, and that lack of clarity will likely keep many 
from completing the nationality verification process.  One contact 
characterized the Thai government's implementation of the amnesty 
program to date as "miserable" and that there remain enormous 
practical obstacles to successful completion of the program.  He 
also noted with exasperation the apparent announcement of the 
November 20 filing deadline for the nationality verification intent 
form as proof that Thai authorities continue to make key decisions 
on the amnesty program without fully considering how they will be 
communicated to migrant workers and what impact the decisions will 
have on the workers' well-being. 
 
Burma: The Heart of the Problem 
------------------------------- 
16.  (SBU) Perhaps the one point on which all with whom we have 
spoken are in full agreement is that the Government of Burma is to 
blame for the particular difficulties imposed on Burmese migrants in 
the  migrant worker registration process.  As our contacts explain 
it, the GOB's reported insistence on not allowing for the 
verification of its national's citizenship on Thai soil -- as is 
done for Laotians and Cambodians - required the development of a 
complex system that potentially creates opportunities for 
exploitation.  As one civil society representative put it, "most all 
of the problems flow from there.  Were Burmese centers opened within 
Thailand, everything else would fall into place."  Unfortunately, 
all with whom we spoke are equally skeptical that the Burmese 
government would agree to change the system.  As such, civil society 
organizations are targeting their criticism and recommendations at 
the Thai government as the only way to ease the burden on migrant 
workers and make them less vulnerable to exploitation. 
 
17.  (SBU) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Rangoon and 
Consulate Chiang Mai.