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Viewing cable 09ABUJA2019, 2009-2010 NIGERIA INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ABUJA2019 2009-11-05 06:39 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Abuja
VZCZCXRO9517
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #2019/01 3090639
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050639Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7422
INFO RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 2244
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ABUJA 002019 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/W, INL/AAE, INL/C, INR/AA 
 
E.O 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SNAR KCRM KCOR KFIN EAID ASEC NI
SUBJECT: 2009-2010 NIGERIA INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL 
STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR), PART I, DRUGS AND CHEMICAL CONTROL 
 
REF: STATE 097230 
---------------- 
I. Summary 
----------------- 
 
1. (U) Nigeria remains attractive to drug traffickers. Heroin and 
cocaine transit Nigeria on their way to markets in Europe, and the 
heroin transiting Nigeria has a significant impact on the United 
States. During the past year, authorities have arrested increased 
numbers of drug couriers at Lagos International Airport, which may 
indicate that drug traffickers are increasingly using Nigeria's land 
and maritime ports of entry to transship drugs to neighboring 
countries for outward shipment to European and American markets. 
The increase in low-level drug couriers or "mules" to Europe, 
especially to Spain, can be attributed, in part, to the economic 
downturn and the desperation of individuals for quick money. The 
mules often ingest about a kilo of cocaine and try to smuggle it to 
their destination.  Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) has 
intercepted drug couriers from Latin America (MMIA), particularly on 
flights from Brazil, at Lagos Murtala Mohammed International. NDLEA 
has detected many couriers through the use of modern scanning 
equipment donated to Nigeria by the U.S. State Department anti-drug 
assistance program. In particular, authorities detected the first 
drug courier attempting to board a Delta flight to Atlanta with the 
USG-donated Digital Body Scanner at the Lagos international airport. 
Because of this deterrence factor, DEA and NDLEA report that 
traffickers are circumventing the machines by travelling through the 
porous land borders and flying out of neighboring countries' more 
vulnerable airports. The USG donated drug detection kits to the 
NDLEA for use at all Nigerian ports of entry to enhance the drug 
agency's capacity to conduct interdiction activities. 
 
2. (U) Nigerian organized criminal networks remain a major factor in 
moving cocaine and heroin worldwide. Many of these organizations are 
not based in Nigeria, but evidence exists that large quantities of 
cocaine and heroin transit Nigeria to markets in the West. In 
addition to drug trafficking, some of these organizations engage in 
advance-fee fraud, and other forms of fraud against U.S. citizens 
and businesses, including document fabrication, illegal immigration, 
and financial fraud. They have extensive documented ties to 
criminals in the United States, Europe, South America, Asia, and 
South Africa. Nigerian poly-crime organizations exact significant 
financial and societal costs, especially among West African states 
with limited resources for countering these organizations. Poor 
economic conditions for the vast majority of Nigerians, including 
widespread unemployment and underemployment, contribute 
significantly to the continuation and expansion of drug trafficking. 
A large number of universities closed for months due to a prolonged 
dispute between the federal government and professors, which 
resulted in more students opting to become drug couriers. Widespread 
corruption in Nigeria makes the traffickers' task easier. These 
factors, combined with Nigeria's central location, along the major 
trafficking routes and access to global narcotics markets, provided 
both an incentive and mechanism for criminal groups to flourish, and 
for Nigeria to emerge as a major drug trafficking hub. 
 
3. (U) The only drug cultivated in significant amounts domestically 
Q3. (U) The only drug cultivated in significant amounts domestically 
is Cannabis Sativa (marijuana). Nigerian-grown marijuana is the most 
common drug abused in the country. It is exported to neighboring 
West African countries through Nigeria's vast porous borders and 
then shipped to Europe. However, it is not shipped in significant 
quantities to the United States. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN 
Drug Convention. 
 
--------------------- 
II. Status of Country 
--------------------- 
4. (U) The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) is 
responsible for the enforcement of laws against illicit drug 
trafficking and abuse. It also plays the lead role in demand 
reduction, drug control policy formulation and implementation in the 
country. Cooperation among Nigeria's law enforcement agencies is 
weak. For instance, although all law enforcement elements operate at 
Nigeria's international ports of entry, joint operations between 
them are virtually non-existent. Lack of inter-agency cooperation 
partially explains the dearth of apprehensions of major traffickers 
or the absence of consistent interdiction of major shipments of 
contraband. No single law enforcement agency in Nigeria has adequate 
resources to combat the increasingly sophisticated international 
criminal networks that operate in and through the country itself; 
inter-agency cooperation is necessary for success. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
III. Country Actions against Drugs in 2009 
----------------------------------------- 
 
ABUJA 00002019  002 OF 005 
 
I. Summary 
----------------- 
 
 
---------------------- 
A. Policy Initiatives: 
---------------------- 
 
5. (U) The National Drug Control Master Plan (NDCMP), in place since 
1999 outlines Nigeria's counter-narcotics policy. This plan assigns 
responsibilities to various government ministries and agencies as 
well as NGOs and other interest groups. In addition, the Master Plan 
outlines basic resource requirements and timeframes for the 
completion of objectives. Unfortunately, many goals remain 
unfulfilled. In the past, the Nigerian Government has been open to 
criticism for not adequately budgeting for necessary drug law 
enforcement by NDLEA. For 2009, the budget for NDLEA is 4.62 billion 
naira (equivalent to $30 million) with no amount allocated for 
training of NDLEA staff. Most money will go to upgrades of NDLEA 
infrastructures, particularly the regional training academy in Jos. 
 
-------------------------- 
B .Law Enforcement Efforts: 
-------------------------- 
 
6. (U) In the past year, NDLEA's most successful interdictions have 
taken place at Nigeria's four international airports, with the 
majority of hard drug seizures (e.g., cocaine and heroin) at Lagos 
Murtala Mohammed International Airport. In addition, authorities 
have apprehended increasing numbers of drug couriers at Abuja Nnamdi 
Azikiwe International Airport.  This year, NDLEA has produced more 
arrests at these international airports. The Embassy sent commanders 
from theses strategic locations to the International Law Enforcement 
Academy (ILEA) in Gaborone, Botswana for basic airport interdiction 
and drug unit commander training. The agency continues to apprehend 
individual drug couriers transiting these airports and the land 
borders, including airport employees involved in drug rings but no 
major drug traffickers and financiers. Digital Body scanners donated 
by the U.S. State Department's anti-drug assistance project play 
critical roles in detecting greater numbers of couriers. These "body 
scanners" have operated at Lagos, Kano, Port Harcourt and Abuja 
International Airports since about March 2008. Many observers 
believe that if Nigeria introduced a vigorous anti-drug enforcement 
regime at its five major seaports and porous land borders, such 
efforts would yield significant drug seizures. 
 
7. (U) As noted above, marijuana remains the main drug abused by 
Nigerians as it is cultivated locally. In the past year, NDLEA 
continued to emphasize a high-profile campaign to destroy the annual 
marijuana crop before it reaches domestic drug abusers. Marijuana 
remains the largest drug seized by the NDLEA. A total of 482.74 
hectares of marijuana farmland was destroyed between April 2009 and 
September 2009. Between October 2008 and August 2009, the various 
NDLEA commands apprehended 6,186 narcotics suspects and seized 
77,500.38 kg of cannabis, 220.17kg of cocaine, 24.27 kg of heroin, 
and 485.19 kg of psychotropic substances, of which authorities 
intercepted 64.7 kg of ephedrine at Murtala Mohammed International 
Airport in Lagos en route to South Africa. The NDLEA detected and 
interdicted ephedrine shipments and other precursor chemicals, 
including a 100 metric ton shipment of acetone from South Africa to 
prevent diversion. Overall, the NDLEA seized 78,230 kg of drugs. 
 
8. (U) Although Nigeria's main domestic drug abuse problem remains 
Q8. (U) Although Nigeria's main domestic drug abuse problem remains 
cannabis, cocaine has now emerged as one of Nigeria's most 
challenging drug abuse problems. Some of the most significant 
seizures in the last year involved cocaine shipments from South 
America; some cocaine seized in Nigeria seems to have been refined 
in West Africa, not trafficked as cocaine from Latin America. Drug 
traffickers take advantage of lax enforcement in Nigeria and other 
countries in West Africa to "warehouse" bulk quantities of drugs, 
until they can be moved to developed countries by drug mules. 
Moreover, trafficking drugs is made easier because it is so 
difficult to effectively police Nigeria's extensive porous borders 
and cultural links among border communities. 
 
9. (U) Asset seizures from narcotics traffickers and money 
launderers, while permitted under Nigerian law, had never been 
systematically utilized as an enforcement tool until this year. 17 
drug related money laundering cases remain under investigation. Five 
properties and currency (1,147,050 USD; 3,000 British Pounds; and 
6,000,000 Naira) have been temporarily forfeited to the NDLEA 
pending the outcome of investigations. However, NDLEA's failure to 
apprehend and prosecute major traffickers and their associates is 
 
ABUJA 00002019  003 OF 005 
 
I. Summary 
----------------- 
 
often due to the lack of capacity of NDLEA to assemble successful 
cases against the higher echelons of sophisticated organized 
criminal gangs. At other times, the problem rests with Nigeria's 
courts, which struggle with intimidation and corruption. 
 
------------------ 
C. Corruption: 
------------------ 
 
10. (U) Corruption plays a major role in drug trafficking in 
Nigeria. The large proceeds from illicit drug trafficking empower 
criminals to use bribery to protect their operations. Nigerian 
authorities have indicted several individuals for corruption, 
including one lodged against a former Chairman and Chief Executive 
of the NDLEA. The trial which began in September has made steady 
progress under the firm courtroom management by no-nonsense judge. 
This trial demonstrates the current NDLEA Chairman's dogged 
determination to enforce the law even against those in NDLEA's own 
ranks. The Government of Nigeria does not, as a matter of policy, 
encourage or facilitate illicit drug production, nor is it involved 
in laundering the proceeds of illicit drugs. Nonetheless, corruption 
remains endemic among government officials at the federal and state 
levels. To ensure that drug traffickers receive and serve stiff 
sentences, the NDLEA requested that the National Assembly amend 
Nigeria's narcotics law to provide for minimum sentences of 3-years 
in jail with no option for paying fines.  Although the amendment was 
initial introduced to the National Assembly in 2007, the Bill did 
not become law before the 2007 elections and changeover in 
legislators. The NDLEA will need to introduce a new bill in the 
current session. NDLEA will also seek a provision to allow NDLEA and 
the Nigerian Immigration Service to seize offenders' passports 
during pre-trial and post-conviction periods to prevent them from 
travelling abroad. 
 
-------------------------- 
D. Agreements and Treaties: 
-------------------------- 
 
11. (U) Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 
UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 
Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. 
Nigeria is a party to the UN Convention against Corruption and the 
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and its three 
protocols. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty, made applicable to 
Nigeria in 1935, provides the legal basis for U.S. extradition 
requests. The United States and Nigeria also have a Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty (MLAT), which entered into force January 14, 
2003.The GON continues to work on a mechanism to process U.S. 
extradition requests more expeditiously. The U.S. has two 
outstanding drug extradition requests, one pending since June 2004. 
A court addressed the two requests in May and June, but both cases 
continued to experience delay tactics by defense attorneys. A 
dedicated prosecutorial team handles all U.S. extradition cases 
before a designated Federal High Court judge. Nigerian law still 
affords the defendant many options to delay proceedings, especially 
with interlocutory appeals that require adjudication before cases 
may proceed.  In the past year, NDLEA cooperated with international 
drug enforcement efforts and conducted a joint operation with 
Interpol and the Belgium Police, leading to the arrest of a drug 
QInterpol and the Belgium Police, leading to the arrest of a drug 
courier and seizures of 5.5 kilograms of cocaine, 74, 800 dollars in 
currency, three vehicles and land deeds. 
 
-------------------------- 
E. Cultivation/Production: 
-------------------------- 
 
12. (U) Cannabis is the only illicit drug produced in any 
significant quantity in Nigeria; it is cultivated in all of 
Nigeria's 36 states. Major cultivation takes place in central and 
northern Nigeria and in Delta and Ondo states in the south. 
Marijuana, or "Indian Hemp" as it is known locally, is sold in 
Nigeria and exported throughout West Africa and into Europe. To 
date, there is no evidence of significant marijuana exports from 
Nigeria to the United States. The NDLEA has continued to pursue an 
aggressive and successful eradication campaign. 
 
-------------------- 
F. Drug Flow/Transit: 
-------------------- 
13. (U) Nigeria is a major staging point for Southeast and Southwest 
 
ABUJA 00002019  004 OF 005 
 
I. Summary 
----------------- 
 
Asian heroin smuggled to Europe and the United States and for South 
American cocaine trafficked to Europe. Cocaine smuggling through 
Nigeria increased during the last year. While Nigeria remains 
Africa's drug transit hub, there are indications that the preferred 
methods of trans-shipment have changed. The NDLEA unit, at Lagos 
Murtala Mohammed International Airport, searches select passengers 
and carry-on baggage, preferring to focus on travelers, who fit 
profiles as possible drug couriers. USG donation of Digital Body 
Scanners has bolstered NDLEA efforts. The scanners ensured that drug 
couriers face greater likelihood of detection at the international 
airports. In the past year, U.S. and U.K. officials trained NDLEA 
officers to improve their skills in intelligence gathering and 
profiling of potential drug couriers under an airport interdiction 
program. This training paid immediate dividends with large cargo 
seizures in the past year.  Many traffickers became more aware of 
the presence of scanners and began to conceal drugs in cargo 
shipments of goods, such as light fixtures, confectionary commercial 
products, and food packages. The scanners enabled Nigerian law 
enforcement to perform quick, non-invasive searches of suspected 
drug traffickers to locate illegal drugs. The U.S. also purchased 
three additional scanners and four new drug/explosives-detecting 
"Itemizers" for Nigeria's international airports in Abuja, Kano, 
Lagos, and Port Harcourt. The procured equipment allowed Nigerian 
law enforcement personnel to improve identification and detection 
capabilities, especially as it regards drug couriers transiting 
Nigeria's airports. Nigeria's sea ports and land borders remain 
vulnerable and efforts should be made to increase interdiction 
efforts at these locations. 
 
------------------------------------- 
G. Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction: 
------------------------------------- 
 
14. (U) Local production and use of marijuana have affected Nigeria 
for some time. According to the NDLEA and NGOs, however, abuse of 
harder drugs (such as cocaine and heroin) seems on the rise as both 
types of drugs remain readily available in many larger cities. The 
NDLEA Demand Reduction Directorate reinvigorated its school oriented 
programs within the past year focusing on creating awareness of the 
dangers of drug abuse and trafficking. Other demand reduction 
programs targeted various groups, including youths, drivers, 
commercial sex workers, community leaders, and transport workers, 
and staff at various organizations. The U.N. Office of Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) and NDLEA celebrated the International Day against 
Drug Abuse and Illicit Drug Trafficking on June 26, by vigorously 
pursuing demand reduction programs at the tertiary, adult, and 
non-formal education sectors. The NDLEA invigorated its counseling, 
treatment, and rehabilitation drive, counseling, and rehabilitating 
1,257 drug dependent persons in the past year. Private treatment 
centers handled more severe cases of dependency. NDLEA focused on 
collecting drug data and researching methods to develop effective 
drug control strategies by conducting a public survey to collect and 
analyze drug abuse data. The study indicated that younger unmarried 
males topped the list of drug abusers and that cannabis remained the 
Qmales topped the list of drug abusers and that cannabis remained the 
most abused drug. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
---------------------------------------- 
 
--------------------- 
A. Policy Initiatives: 
--------------------- 
15. (U) U.S.-Nigerian counter-narcotics cooperation focused on 
interdiction at major international entry points and 
professionalizing the NDLEA and other law enforcement agencies. The 
State Department Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL) Office in Nigeria and the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) worked closely with the NDLEA and other 
narcotics-related agencies to train Nigerian law enforcement to 
coordinate, plan, and implement internal and regional interdiction 
operations. NDLEA officers received training at the regional, 
INL-funded International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) on border 
interdiction. At all levels, USG representatives enjoyed excellent 
access to their counterparts, with both sides wanting to strengthen 
relationships. 
 
------------------ 
B. The Road Ahead: 
------------------ 
 
ABUJA 00002019  005 OF 005 
 
I. Summary 
----------------- 
 
 
16. (U) Federal funding for Nigerian law enforcement agencies 
remained insufficient and erratic hindering planning by these 
agencies and demonstrating little commitment by authorities to law 
enforcement. Unless the GON increases funding, little progress will 
occur particularly over the long term. The GON will require 
sustained political will and continued international assistance to 
confront drug trafficking and to enhance broader law enforcement 
capacity. 
 
17. (U) USG counternarcotics assistance to Nigeria since February 
2001 now totals over 3 million dollars. Despite some successes, the 
Nigerian National Police Force (NPF) lacks public trust and 
confidence, with organized crime groups continuing to prey on 
citizens. INL's office in Nigeria continued to facilitate 
interaction between the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) and the NDLEA 
to improve interdiction at the vulnerable seaports and land borders. 
Even with support from international donors, NDLEA officers received 
relatively little training due to insufficient budgets. NDLEA, 
however, sought to focus significant funding to re-establish its 
training center in Jos. Once the academy is fully operational, NDLEA 
will require all officers to undergo re-training at the basic level 
and mid-level before qualifying for promotion under anew promotion 
system. 
 
18. (U) The U.S. government will continue to engage Nigeria on 
counternarcotics, money laundering and other transnational crimes 
focusing on selected institutions, such as the NDLEA and NCS, which 
have skilled, professional leaders. The underlying institutional and 
societal factors that contribute to narcotics-trafficking, 
money-laundering, and other crimes in Nigeria remain deep-seated, 
requiring comprehensive, collaborative efforts by all levels of law 
enforcement and government. Progress can only occur through 
Nigeria's own sustained effort and political will, with continued 
support from the international community. 
 
SANDERS