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Viewing cable 09ABIDJAN647, REGIONAL BUREAU COLLECTIVE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ABIDJAN647 2009-11-02 13:44 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Abidjan
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAB #0647/01 3061344
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021344Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5495
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0066
UNCLAS ABIDJAN 000647 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, CA/VO/KCC 
ACCRA FOR DHS 
FRANKFURT FOR RCO 
INFO: REGIONAL BUREAU COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC IV
 
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY (REVISED) Q ABIDJAN, COTE DQIVOIRE 
 
REF:  08 STATE 74840, 09 State 57623 
 
1. Following is AbidjanQs fraud summary for April 2009 through 
August, 2009. 
 
2. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Cote dQIvoire has been a divided country 
since a 2002 failed coup attempt evolved into an armed rebellion 
that split the country in two.  Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and 
New Forces leader Guillaume Soro signed the Ouagadougou Political 
Agreement (OPA) in March 2007, and a new government was formed with 
Soro as Prime Minister (PM).  Implementation of the accord is 
ongoing, with elections scheduled for late 2009, but The Ivorian 
government has not regained full control of the northern part of the 
country which remains under the de-facto control of the New Forces. 
 
 
Presidential elections are currently scheduled for November 2009, 
but preparations are behind schedule.  Although the unstable and 
unpredictable security environment that led to previous evacuations 
no longer prevails, Americans traveling to Cote dQIvoire should 
follow political developments carefully, as there is potential for 
violence in the run-up to, and aftermath of, elections. 
 
3. NIV FRAUD: The most common types of NIV fraud referred to the FPU 
are related to fraudulent documentation. During this reporting 
period, AbidjanQs FPU investigated 22 cases associated with NIV 
applications.  In one case, a student presented a fraudulent 
scholarship letter from the government of Cote dQIvoire signed by a 
representative of the mayor in the embassyQs district. Additionally, 
there were a handful of A or G visas referred, many with relatives 
posing as governesses or butlers to obtain G5 status in which there 
was no employer/employee relationship. Further, a case involving an 
invitation to Ministry of Education officials from an unauthorized 
member of the Ivoirian Mission to the United Nations in NY revealed 
a breach so serious that it reached the level of the Prime Minister 
and the offender was recalled from overseas diplomatic service. 
 
Fraud refused at the window: Based on a survey of one month's 
refusals, post estimates there are up to three times more fraudulent 
documents per month than referred. These include merchants and 
traders applying to purchase merchandise, often in New York, where 
some are known to have been selling smuggled African goods on the 
N.Y. market scene or on the streets while in the United States. With 
the "suspect documents" feature in new software version, intake 
assistants tracked about 117 cases with suspicious documents 
indicating common, though low-complexity, fraud. In one case, an 
advisor in the Ministry of Finance submitted a bank statement in 
support of his B1/B2 application, showing a balance of over $10,000 
while verification of the statement revealed that the actual balance 
was only about $150.  It is not known why the applicant submitted 
the fake bank statement. 
 
4. IV FRAUD: Marriage fraud and fraudulent child/parent 
relationships are the most common trends in IV cases, and usually 
take the form of fraudulent marriage or divorce documents. Abidjan 
FPU investigated several cases associated with IV applications, 
including a random verification of DNA collection procedures.  These 
revealed five fraudulent claims of relationship, approximately a 7% 
ratio fraudulent to bona fide, compounded by the fact that DNA tests 
showed that the QauthenticQ birth certificates in some cases were 
fraudulent.  Post also had negative DNA in four alleged parent/child 
relationships. 
 
5. DV FRAUD: Adjudicators routinely refer marriage and educational 
credentials to FPU for verification due to the high incidence of 
fraud associated with DV applications. The Fraud Prevention Unit is 
tracking the emergence of a new trend among fraudulent documents: 
fraudulent results printed on genuine paper. This type of fraud has 
expanded to bank statements and other official documents.  To gauge 
the extent of this emerging trend, post referred a significant 
portion of claimed-to-be authentic educational and marriage 
documents to FPU this quarter.  Of the cases referred, 4 were found 
to be fraudulent. While a relatively small number, it will provide 
post with a baseline to judge any further growth in this emerging 
trend.  During September, in the final stretch leading to the DV 
2009 program end, the FPU needed to focus all efforts and resources 
on the expedited verification of documents submitted in support of 
Diversity Visa (DV) applications.  FPU succeeded in expediting all 
investigations to aid legitimate applicants, but many of the lower 
priority cases, where fraud was very likely involved, could not be 
completed in time.  The unit consulted with Embassy Accra about the 
increasing trend of Ghanaian DV winners with new spouses scheduling 
interviews in Abidjan rather than in Accra.  Embassy Accra reported 
they have uncovered a marriage fraud ring which is currently under 
investigation by Ghanaian authorities.  The increased applications 
from Ghanaian applicants, a 50% increase in interview appointments 
versus last DV year, suggests a trend of applicants from Ghana 
trying to evade inspection in Ghana. 
 
6. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Although Abidjan has not yet 
detected cases of confirmed fraud in passport and CRBA cases, every 
case must be scrutinized for a real relationship between parent and 
child, and hard evidence of physical presence that meets 
transmission requirements.  Few passport renewal cases are routine. 
The incidence of QaccidentalQ births in the U.S. to Ivoirian mothers 
experiencing Qunexpected complicationsQ while in the U.S. for 
tourism is the norm, with expectant mothers giving birth on 
Medicaid, while friends and relatives lead them to believe there is 
a free birthing fund, which includes Qfree citizenshipQ for their 
children.  U.S. citizen minors are brought home to be raised as 
Ivoirians, but entitled to emergency services and other benefits. 
Frequently, parents come in to renew passports issued to infants up 
to 15 years prior with piles of photos to prove relationship. 
Parents never document the children as Ivoirians for fear of losing 
U.S. citizenship.  Grown children then attempt to meet requisite 
transmission requirements for their own offspring, often with 
minimal documentation.  Some eventually move to the United States as 
adults and petition whole villages of relatives.  The Consular 
Section is currently conducting a census of all registered citizens 
to better determine its population make up, expected to be in large 
majority at this time dependent children being raised in Cote 
dQIvoire of non-citizen parents. It is also exploring with GOCI 
officials the countryQs laws on dual nationality which are vague and 
contradictory. While ACS adjudicators have resolved most passport 
and CRBA cases through extensive interviews, photos and other means 
to prove relationship, it has not ruled out the possibility of DNA 
in particularly troublesome cases where strong fraud indicators 
exist. 
 
7. ADOPTION FRAUD: No adoption cases to report this quarter. 
 
8. USE OF DNA TESTING: Officers routinely suggest DNA testing to 
prove the relationships in family-based immigration cases. The visa 
categories most susceptible to fraud are IR2 and Visas 92/93. It is 
not uncommon for a parent of a child born out of wedlock to petition 
for him or her after never having lived with the child. In these 
cases of unconventional relationships, it is difficult to solicit 
adequate information and convincing evidence of a qualifying 
relationship without resorting to DNA.  Post is currently designing 
a new collection procedure for DNA pursuant to the instructions in 
09 STATE 097431.  It is anticipated that the new collection and 
handling procedures will take significant time to implement and 
oversee in the event that a collection facility has to be built or 
otherwise modified, and due to the diminished number of cleared 
Americans. 
 
9. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD: Marriage fraud and fraudulent 
child/parent relationships are the most common trend in Visas 92/93 
cases. DNA is often recommended, particularly in cases of Liberians, 
whose documentation is generally unavailable or unverifiable. 
 
10. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERROTIST TRAVEL: 
Post is unaware of any organized alien smuggling at this time 
although we regularly have DV applicants claiming derivative status 
for a  stranger or a relative and who are refused under 
212(a)(6)(E). 
 
 
 
 
11. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: There have been no formal DS 
criminal fraud investigations in Abidjan in this six month reporting 
period. RSO has assisted, however, on numerous occasions, with 
turning over the investigation of malfeasance at the Ivoirian Post 
and Telecommunications, and in visa cases where there were fraud 
indicators. 
 
12. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AND CIVIL REGISTRY: If 
a document for investigation originates in the southern, 
government-controlled part of the country, it is possible to verify 
its authenticity by visiting the issuing city hall and comparing it 
with the relevant page in the register. In the northern half of the 
country still under the control of farmer rebels, it has proven 
nearly impossible to authenticate civil documents due to the 
destruction of so many civil registers. At present, (within the last 
6 years) any civil documents from the New Forces controlled northern 
region must be considered suspect, as verification of any such 
documents is impossible. 
 
13. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: For the most part, 
local authorities have given their cooperation with no obstructive 
attempts at extracting compensation for their trouble, although the 
Consular Section has noted a few cases of airport official 
suggesting that QgiftsQ would be welcome when assisting American 
citizens detained upon entry without Ivoirian visas due to a hastily 
and poorly implemented visa policy early in this period. 
Fortunately, however, the Consular Section has persisted in the last 
year in developing close and fruitful relationships with a variety 
of working-level and high-level ministry and law enforcement 
officials.  This has been of great benefit in the sectionQs 
increased ability to cooperatively cross-vet cases with relatively 
effective results of officials where malfeasance is suspected. 
 
14. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: Advance Fee Scams: The number of 
advance fee scams is rising in the Abidjan consular district. On 
average, the Consular Section receives 2-3 inquires per week in 
relation to a scam of this type. In most cases, FPU can readily 
determine the fraudulent nature of such scams and properly advise 
the inquirer. On a time-permitting basis, the FPU has investigated 
some of the more sophisticated schemes. Some appear to be connected 
to, or simply revisions of, a recurring scam. The FPU and the RSO 
offices collaborate closely to share information on fee-scam 
activity. 
 
Abidjan is closely monitoring two recent visa scams. First, several 
cases coming through postal workers at the main Abidjan post office 
are under investigation. Postal and cyber caf employees at the 
central post office have been representing themselves as U.S. 
Embassy representatives in exchange for additional fees.  One postal 
worker committed theft and fraud when he took cash for a SEVIS fee 
from a prospective studentQs father, then borrowed a credit card 
from a colleagueQs acquaintance to generate a receipt, then refunded 
the fee to the credit card. This generated an alert message from DHS 
to the University and to the studentQs parent, who cooperated with 
the Consular Section, and witnesses in separate postal scam cases in 
taking the malfeasance to the police.  Although the investigation by 
the Judicial Police is still ongoing, the section has reached out to 
the new Post Office Director for assistance and is currently 
launching an anti-fraud public awareness campaign in the media. 
 
The second visa scam is regional and involves a company calling 
itself Quality Agency Burkina.  The agency is apparently furnishing 
its clients with employment documents, EIN numbers and other 
information to be provided at a visa interview and is using cover of 
well-known American companies such as Colgate Palmolive and 
Herbalife.  They are also using spoof emails in which the QU.S. 
Consular Section AbidjanQ recommends this company to prospective H1B 
applicants.  They are using the former ConsulQs name and a state.gov 
email address for him to respond to inquiries.  They are also using 
public consular email addresses for which we respond to public 
inquiries (consularabidja@state.gov and also 
abidjanconsular@state.gov) to email clients. 
 
15. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The FPU has been inadequately staffed due 
to an EFM position, vacant since May 2008, and since the 
reprogramming of one vice consul in February 2009 to another 
critical needs post.  The sole Consul and Vice Consul have been so 
busy with routine production and management activities that they 
have been unable to give this area as much time and attention as it 
merits.  Also, we began new DNA collection procedures on Friday, 
October 30 per State instructions which we estimate will take a 
minimum of 8 Q 10 hours of officer time per month for these 
additional fraud prevention activities. Based on the new LE visa and 
passport production rotation, which involves four local line 
assistants and a supervisor, we have not been able permanently to 
assign a second LE assistant to anti-fraud activities to assist the 
one fraud investigator. Reinstatement of the officer position and an 
additional local staff member would greatly enhance our ability to 
commit the time necessary to this important work and to keep up with 
increased fraud activity in Abidjan. 
 
16. Abidjan looks forward to working closely with FPP on taking its 
anti-fraud efforts, previously heavily reliant on documentary fraud, 
in a more preventative direction using technology and tools such as 
Text Alerts and preventative analysis. 
 
 
 
STANLEY