Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09CAIRO1977, EGYPT: POLITICAL ACTIVISTS SUGGEST CHANGE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09CAIRO1977.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CAIRO1977 2009-10-19 08:03 2011-06-06 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
Appears in these articles:
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/464227
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #1977/01 2920803
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190803Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3907
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 001977

SIPDIS

NEA/ELA FOR SHAMPAINE AND PINA
NSC FOR KUMAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT:  POLITICAL ACTIVISTS SUGGEST CHANGE
UNLIKELY TO COME IN ELECTIONS, URGE CONTINUE U.S. PRESSURE
AND ADVOCATE FOR "TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT."

REF: CAIRO 1140

Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Key Points

-- Political activists at an Ambassador-hosted lunch were
pessimistic that the upcoming elections would offer
opportunities for real change.

-- Most agreed that voter apathy and low voter turnout in
previous elections can be explained by the absence of a
"political culture," pressure from security services, and a
lack of confidence that either the NDP or the opposition
could effect needed change.

-- One participant advocated an opposition boycott to send
the message the election process is flawed.  Several called
for international monitoring.  Others advocated for a
caretaker government that would lead the transition to
democracy.

-- The group reflected the general perception that U.S.
support for democracy in Egypt has waned.  Several
participants urged that the U.S. avoid the impression of
support for Gamal Mubarak's succession to the presidency,
suggesting any signal would be read as an explicit
endorsement.

2. (C) Comment:  General pessimism, sometimes veering into
cynicism, about the upcoming election season and complaints
about possible U.S. support for Gamal Mubarak's succession
are common themes of our engagement with political activists
in this context and others.  Many are nostalgic for the
political opening of 2005 and suggest GoE efforts since then
have successfully closed some of that political space.  End
Comment.

3. (C) Ambassador hosted a lunch October 4 with
representatives from opposition political parties, academics
and journalists.  Visiting National Security Council Senior
Director for Global Engagement Pradeep Ramamurthy also joined
the lunch.  Discussions focused on the state of internal
political affairs and the upcoming national election cycle.
Participants expressed pessimism that the 2010 parliamentary
and 2011 presidential elections present an opportunity for
real change.  A frequent public commentator on internal
political issues and foreign affairs, Dr. Hassan Nafaa, said
prospects for change were constrained by recent amendments to
the constitution that reduced the role of the judiciary and
"tailored" presidential candidate qualifications to fit Gamal
Mubarak.  He added that lack of accountability within the
current system along with the GoE's control over the election
process hampers internal watchdog efforts.

4. (C) Journalist and human rights activist Hisham Kassem
said police scrutiny limits the public's interest in politics
and strips the opposition of its technocrats who fear the
effects of their participation on their livelihood.  What
remains are those who are defiant in the face of these
tactics along with those whose politics are limited to "Down
with Mubarak" slogans.  Kassem also said without a real
"political system," power is concentrated within a presidency
that often leaves the population guessing about its
intentions.  The state should be pushed to lift its pressure
on the opposition and expand freedom of the press.  Dr.
Hossam Eissa, member of the Nasserite Party and Law Professor
at Ain Shams University went further, calling all opposition
political parties, including his own, "part of the regime."
He advocated for an opposition boycott of the elections as
the best way to send a message that the elections are not
truly competitive.

5. (C) Many noted the lack of a political culture.  According
to a nephew of the former president, Anwar Esmat El-Sadat,
(Note: A former NDP MP, Sadat now leads an NGO and the
currently unregistered Reform and Development Party.  End
Note.) the lack of a political culture is exacerbated by
pressure from the regime and opposition infighting.  He
called for international observers to help "protect our
votes."  Editor of &Democracy8 Magazine (published by the
Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies) Hala Mustapha called
for a "revival of social and political dialogue."

6. (C) Some suggested a "transitional period" was needed to
develop that culture and implement needed reforms.  Osama Al
Ghazali Harb, former NDP member, leader of the opposition
Democratic Front Party and editor of the "Siyassa Dawliyya"
(or Foreign Affairs) Magazine published by the Al Ahram
Foundation, said that because Egypt lacks a real political
system it needs a transitional period to "build it from
scratch."  Dr. Eissa said Egypt's history suggests that
change comes from within government and not as a result of
external pressure from civil society.  He called for a two
year transitional government led by a respected political
outsider like Mohammed El Baradei.

7. (C) Participants expressed concern about U.S. democracy
promotion efforts and cautioned against support for
succession.  Osama El Ghazali Harb noted the perception that
U.S. support for political activists had waned and told the
Ambassador U.S. support for democratization efforts remains
critical.  This he said includes avoiding the appearance of
supporting Gamal Mubarak.  Dr. Eissa said he and others had
been very concerned about the possibility of a meeting
between Gamal Mubarak and President Obama while in Cairo,
something they would have seen as an explicit sign of
support.  Dr. Nafaa also suggested to the Ambassador that the
U.S. avoid the appearance of supporting Gamal Mubarak.  He
added that the U.S. should understand that if Gamal becomes
president, it is because he was "imposed not elected."

8. (C) The Ambassador reiterated throughout the lunch that
the current administration had not diminished its concern for
democracy promotion, that a non-confrontational approach did
not mean that the U.S. had abandoned advocacy, and that
funding for civil society continued.  The Ambassador also
stressed repeatedly that the U.S. would not take a position
on who would be the next president of Egypt, but that we
would continue to encourage a free, fair, and transparent
electoral process.
Scobey