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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1264, BRAZIL: URIBE ALLAYS LULA'S CONCERNS OVER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1264 2009-10-26 20:53 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO0530
PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHBR #1264/01 2992053
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 262053Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5287
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0015
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 0049
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8316
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0007
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001264 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR BSC, AND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019 
TAGS: PREL MARR BR CO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: URIBE ALLAYS LULA'S CONCERNS OVER 
U.S.-COLOMBIA DCA 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 01041 
     B. BRASILIA 01084 
     C. BRASILIA 01076 
 
BRASILIA 00001264  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i. Lisa Kubiske, reason: 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Brazilian President Lula is now comfortable 
with the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), 
following a successful meeting and visit to Sao Paulo by 
Colombian President Uribe on October 19, according to 
Colombian Ambassador in Brasilia Tony Jozame. On October 21 
Jozame told PolOff that Lula took a pragmatic stance on the 
agreement and explained that Brazil initially reacted 
negatively to the DCA because it was "rejected by the 
region." Though Lula requested an additional statement in the 
agreement further clarifying that operations from the bases 
under the DCA could only be conducted in Colombia, Uribe 
explained to Lula,s apparent satisfaction that the agreement 
already sufficiently covered the issue. According to Jozame, 
a Brazilian congressional delegation will visit Colombia, 
Venezuela, and Ecuador in November and, at the GOC,s 
invitation, will stop in some of the bases covered by the 
DCA. End summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
LULA PRAGMATICALLY ACCEPTS DCA 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Ambassador Jozame told PolOff on October 21 that 
Colombian President Uribe successfully quelled Brazilian 
President Lula,s concerns over the U.S.-Colombia DCA during 
his October 19 visit to Sao Paulo. Jozame described the 
GOB,s initial reaction to the DCA, particularly from its 
Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE), as negative and 
kneejerk, at times joining instead of moderating the chorus 
created by Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador (Ref A and B). 
While WHA Deputy Assistant Secretary Christopher McMullen,s 
visit to Brazil in late August helped clear the air on the 
intent and specifics behind the DCA, some senior GOB 
officials, including FM Amorim and Presidential Advisor Marco 
Aurelio Garcia, continued to openly question and criticize 
the agreement (Ref C). According to Jozame, Lula is pragmatic 
and his acceptance of the DCA suggests it will no longer be 
an issue in Brazil. 
 
3. (C) Jozame said that during Uribe,s visit, Lula took a 
very expected and pragmatic stance on the U.S.-Colombia DCA. 
Lula is now "tranquilo" (calm) about the accord, Jozame 
explained. Brazilian newspapers quoted Lula as saying, "I 
trust in the words of Presidents Uribe and Obama" and "Brazil 
has no reason to be troubled" by the DCA following his 
meeting with Uribe. According to Jozame, Lula explained to 
Uribe that because the announcement of the DCA was a surprise 
and the reaction in the region was so negative, Brazil could 
not fully or immediately accept the agreement itself. Jozame 
said that when Uribe explained that the motivation for the 
DCA and partnership with the United States was to combat 
terrorists in Colombia and protect its borders, Lula 
responded by saying that Brazil also wants to fortify 
security along its own borders. 
 
4. (C) According to Jozame, Lula did ask that a short 
statement be included in the agreement stating that 
operations out of the bases under the DCA could only be 
conducted within Colombian borders. Uribe explained to Lula 
that such language was already in the document and understood 
because Colombia cannot sign an agreement that would infringe 
on any other country,s sovereignty. According to Jozame, 
Lula appeared to be satisfied with Uribe,s response and 
guarantee. 
 
5. (C) Jozame said Uribe,s visit with Lula went very well. 
In addition to the successful discussions over the DCA, Uribe 
also had two useful meetings in which members of the 
Colombian and Brazilian business sectors met; one of the 
meetings was public and the other private. One of the visible 
results of the meeting included a display of over 100 
Colombian paintings in the Federation of Industries of Sao 
Paulo State (FIESP) for the next two months. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
COLOMBIA MISSION IN BRASILIA CONTINUES TO CLEAR THE AIR ON DCA 
-------------------------------------- 
 
BRASILIA 00001264  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
6. (C) Jozame explained that he continues to inform the GOB 
and Latin American missions in Brasilia about the 
U.S.-Colombia DCA, in an attempt to combat the misinformation 
campaign led by Chavez and the other more left-leaning 
neighbors in the region. In meetings in August Jozame told 
PolOff he had already met with several Brazilian members of 
Congress and the leadership of the Latin American missions in 
Brasilia (Ref A). Jozame said that he had recently held a 
meeting at the Colombian Embassy with about 35 military 
attaches from embassies in Brasilia so that he and his staff 
could again clarify the details of the U.S.-Colombia DCA. 
Jozame also mentioned that a Brazilian congressional 
delegation will be traveling to Colombia, Venezuela, and 
Ecuador in November. According to Jozame, their goal in 
Colombia is to see for themselves the bases included in the 
DCA. Jozame said he is happy the Brazilians have finally 
taken the Colombians up on the invitation to visit the bases 
because all they will see at the bases are "some buildings 
and a landing strip." 
 
7. (C) Jozame shared his personal views as to why the 
Brazilians had such a negative initial reaction to the DCA, 
claiming that most of the problem came from the MRE which is 
"leftist" and "anti-Yankee" and "jealous" of any other 
country,s leadership in the region. Jozame said that the 
leadership in the MRE is very leftist and because of that 
they did not support greater cooperation between Colombia and 
the United States. Also, he believes Brazil is jealous 
because it does not like to have any issues negotiated or 
discussed without Brazil serving in a leadership role. 
 
8. (C) Comment: Lula,s open approval of the U.S.-Colombia 
DCA will make it hard for the GOB to support criticism of the 
agreement by others in the region against the agreement. 
However, as Lula admitted and several GOB officials have told 
us privately, Brazil,s initial reaction was driven by the 
reaction of others in the region "principally Venezuela" and 
by a perceived need to maintain "balance" and the ability to 
mediate between the two sides.  This dynamic is likely to 
hold sway in the future, as well, regarding issues of 
sovereignty and the sanctity of borders. 
KUBISKE