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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1230, QOM REPORT GETS THE BRAZILIANS THINKING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1230 2009-10-07 17:30 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO4655
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBR #1230/01 2801730
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071730Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5193
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0502
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 0008
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8269
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4628
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0338
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0187
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001230 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR P; PARIS FOR US MISSION UNESCO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP BR IR
SUBJECT: QOM REPORT GETS THE BRAZILIANS THINKING 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 1170 
     B. BRASILIA 1103 
 
BRASILIA 00001230  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affairs Lisa Kubiske for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  During an October 1 meeting with poloff, 
Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE or Itamaraty) Central Asia 
(including Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) Director 
Ricardo Luis Pires Ribeiro da Silva acknowledged that the 
September 24 report to the IAEA on the Qom nuclear facility 
challenges Brazil's prevailing outlook that Iran is building 
a nuclear program primarily for civilian purposes.  Pires 
shared his readout of President Lula's September 23 meeting 
with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at UNGA, and 
emphasized that neither Lula nor Itamaraty knew anything 
substantive about the Qom report in advance of the meeting. 
Pires said that Itamaraty was particularly concerned that 
Israel would strike against the Qom facility quickly, even 
before sanctions could be agreed upon, if the Geneva talks 
did not appear to produce tangible results.  In follow-up 
correspondence, Pires praised the USG for holding extended 
talks with Iran in Geneva.  End summary. 
 
Qom Nuclear Facility 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Pires, who had a chance to review the September 24 
IAEA presentation talking points several days in advance of 
the meeting and confer with senior MRE officials about them, 
noted quickly and often that the Qom enrichment plant is 
different in nature from the Natanz enrichment plant.  While 
he believed that Qom production levels could be viewed as 
suitable for research rather than weaponmaking, Pires feared 
that Israel would see the facility as an imminent threat even 
if access to IAEA inspectors were granted.  He said the GOB 
believes Israel has a date in mind for bombing the facility 
if the Geneva talks fail or if strong sanctions are not 
established, and sought USG assurances that Israel would not 
take action soon.  Pires reiterated support for the current 
USG approach to Israel-Palestine negotiations, but wondered 
if we were taking a harder line on Iran to keep the Israelis 
happy so that they would make concessions on West Bank 
settlements. 
 
3.  (C) Iran can be convinced to agree to a thorough IAEA 
inspection of the Qom facility, Pires said, though he 
acknowledged that this would not necessarily resolve concerns 
about the facility's ultimate use.  He believed that Russia 
would ultimately side with the United States, United Kingdom, 
and France on the core approach to Iran's nuclear program, 
including a future decision to impose sanctions, which would 
place pressure on China to follow suit.  He suggested that 
Brazil will be watching Russia closely for clues about how to 
position itself on the issue in the UN.  Pires characterized 
Iran's recent missile launch as "really stupid" and 
needlessly provocative to Israel especially, but also to 
countries like Russia, India, and Turkey.  He believed there 
was a good chance that Iran had received technological 
upgrades from North Korea since their last missile launch. 
 
Lula and Ahmadinejad at UNGA 
---------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Pires also shared MRE's readout of President Lula's 
one-hour meeting with Ahmadinejad at UNGA on September 23, 
emphasizing several times that Lula told Ahmadinejad that 
IAEA access to all nuclear facilities will be needed to show 
that they will be used for civilian energy purposes.  He said 
that Lula emerged from the meeting enthusiastic about 
developing further commercial relations with Iran and 
skeptical about reports of nuclear weaponmaking, as reported 
in the press.  Pires emphasized, however, that Lula was not 
aware at the time of the forthcoming report to IAEA about the 
Qom facility, or at least not about the report's content. 
Pires also said that Lula asked Ahmadinejad about the 
Holocaust toward the end of the meeting.  According to the 
GOB report, Ahmadinejad acknowledged that it did, in fact, 
occur, and then went on a diatribe about Germany and the 
creation of the state of Israel.  Pires described Lula's 
response to a reporter's subsequent question on Ahmadinejad's 
recognition of the Holocaust as "unfortunate and not 
representative" of the discussion at the meeting. 
 
 
BRASILIA 00001230  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Other Issues: Visitors, UNESCO 
------------------------------ 
 
5.  (C)  MRE reconfirmed that Israeli President Shimon Peres 
will visit Brasilia on November 11.  He said that no dates 
had been confirmed for visits by Ahmadinejad or Palestinian 
President Mahmoud Abbas, but said that the Ahmadinejad visit 
will happen in late November, which would push back the Abbas 
visit into December at earliest. 
 
6.  (C) Pires also spoke briefly about Brazil's decision to 
back Egyptian candidate Farouk Hosni over Irina Bokova for 
the UNESCO Director General (ref B).  Several local 
publications have criticized the GOB position on this matter, 
calling it a "diplomatic defeat" dictated by Lula's desire to 
strengthen relations with Iran and the Middle East.  These 
same reports, apparently based on leaked sources from 
Itamaraty, also questioned why Brazil did not make the case 
to promote one of its own, UNESCO Deputy Director-General 
Marcio Barbosa.  When asked about the matter, Pires smiled 
wryly, shook his head and said, "these are the things we have 
to do sometimes." 
KUBISKE