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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1210, BRAZIL LACKS STRATEGY IN HONDURAS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1210 2009-10-02 10:56 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO0003
OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHBR #1210/01 2751056
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021056Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5171
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA IMMEDIATE 0158
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE IMMEDIATE 9991
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO IMMEDIATE 8254
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO IMMEDIATE 4613
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SOCI BR HO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL LACKS STRATEGY IN HONDURAS 
 
BRASILIA 00001210  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Steve Liston, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d 
) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Brazil, which had pinned much of its hope for 
a quick resolution of the Honduras crisis on the success of 
an OAS or Costa Rica President Arias, mission to 
Tegucigalpa, now seems at a loss of how to protect its 
Embassy in Tegucigalpa and negotiate itself out of the 
standstill in Honduras, domestic crisis. Brazil has vowed to 
ignore Micheletti,s ten-day ultimatum for the release of 
Zelaya, yet fears the repercussions its embassy will face, 
and is looking to the UN Security Council for help.   End 
summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
BRAZIL SITTING ON ITS HANDS AND WAITING 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Brazil,s Ministry of External Relations (MRE) Head of 
Mexico and Central America Division First Secretary Renato de 
Avila Viana in September 28 and 30 meetings said that Brazil 
was ignoring the ten-day ultimatum the Micheletti government 
gave the Brazilians for turning over Zelaya, however, greatly 
fears the repercussions its Embassy in Tegucigalpa will face 
once the ten days have passed. Viana thinks that the 
Micheletti government is looking to buy as much time as 
possible, which is why they barred the OAS delegation from 
entering the country, but time is what Brazil does not have 
in this situation while its Embassy houses Zelaya and is 
under constant threat by the Honduran security forces. 
According to Viana, the Brazilian Embassy in Washington 
received a bomb threat via telephone call against the 
Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa; Viana said the United 
States Secret Service is working with the Brazilian Embassy 
in Washington to trace the call. 
 
3. (C) Viana said he was no longer confident that the OAS 
will be able to enter Honduras and begin a negotiation 
between the Micheletti and Zelaya factions in the near 
future, and it is evident that President Arias is trying to 
untangle himself from the Honduran situation as well. 
According to Viana, Brazil does not yet have a new strategy 
to deal with the Honduran crisis taking place in their 
embassy and is now looking to the Security Council to take a 
strong stance on the situation to lead to greater 
international assistance. Viana said that the MRE is only 
focused on engaging the USG and Spanish government on the 
issue of Honduras. His office at the MRE has been turned into 
the Honduras situation room, running from nine in the morning 
until eleven at night, every day, but they were only 
processing information on the situation and not planning for 
the resolution of the crisis. 
 
4. (C) Brazilian Senators Eduardo Azeredo (PMDB-Minas Gerais) 
and Heraclito Fortes (DEM-Piaui), chairman and member of the 
Senate External Relations and National Defense Committee 
respectively, told PolOffs on September 30 that Brazil is not 
able to deal with the situation in Honduras and needs USG 
assistance. Fortes said "We are not ready for this. Not in 
Honduras. We don,t even have an Ambassador. It is just one 
officer and his driver." Azeredo stressed that the United 
States "should not separate itself" from its recent tradition 
of taking a strong role in promoting democracy in the region. 
He believes that the USG is trying to take a more 
non-interventionist role, but said that this is not the time 
to stay on the sidelines. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
COSTA RICA SHYING AWAY FROM INVOLVEMENT IN HONDURAS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) In a September 28 meeting with Poloffs, Costa Rica 
Ambassador to Brazil Jorge Alfredo Robles Arias said that, 
while Costa Rican President Arias has the will to help 
mediate the situation, he will not make any effort to that 
end until he sees both the Micheletti and Zelaya camps 
willing to come to the negotiating table. Robles explained 
that Arias will not risk his international prestige unless 
both sides are willing to move forward. Robles said that the 
Brazilian government had yet to contact his embassy for 
information on Arias, potential role in the crisis and that 
Costa Rica had no contact with the Micheletti government. 
 
6. (C) Robles emphasized that Zelaya,s return to power was 
an unconditional demand made by Costa Rica and the rest of 
the region. Robles explained that it was after Secretary 
Clinton suggested that Arias become involved in the 
 
BRASILIA 00001210  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
resolution of the crisis in Honduras that he offered up the 
San Jose accord. According to Robles, all items in the accord 
are ultimately negotiable, with the exception of Zelaya,s 
return to the presidency. Robles repeatedly pressed for the 
U.S. position on Zelaya,s return to power, questioning if 
the U.S. Congress, lack of support for Zelaya could lead to 
decreased pressure from the United States on Honduras and the 
international community to act. PolCouns told Robles that the 
United States had notchanged our position with regard to the 
need for a peaceful resolution under the frameworks already 
laid out. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
POORLY PLANNED OAS MISSION DERAILED 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Robles and Viana both confirmed that four out of the 
five OAS representatives sent to Honduras were barred from 
entering the country on September 27. Robles claimed this was 
because of a lack of strategy by the OAS, which sent a small 
group of representative who lacked status and diplomatic 
credentials without giving Honduras previous warning of their 
arrival. Only the Chilean representative of the five sent was 
allowed to enter Honduras, most likely because of his 
experience in the region, according to Robles. Viana said 
that there are actually two OAS representative in Honduras 
right now, the Chilean and the second highest ranking 
Brazilian representative to the OAS. The Brazilian 
representative, Viana explained, was going as part of the 
derailed mission but flew into Tegucigalpa before the five 
other members of the OAS delegation who encountered problems. 
Viana also noted that the Brazilian,s entry into Tegucigalpa 
was aided by the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa. 
 
8. (C) Viana claimed that the Spanish government was also 
struggling to reestablish their presence in Honduras. The 
Spanish Ambassador and two other diplomats have been barred 
from entering the country until Spain recognizes the 
Micheletti government, a situation Viana said the Spanish are 
very troubled by. According to Viana, the Carter Center,s 
Friends of Democratic Charter are also planning to send a 
delegation to Honduras next week, however, he believes they 
will also struggle to enter the country. 
 
9. (C) Comment: It is notable that Viana, Robles, and Azeredo 
all expressed concern that the United States might waiver in 
its current stance, and that the OAS and regional mediators 
alone cannot make inroads with the Micheletti and Zelaya 
factions.  Having been vocal in its support for Zelaya,s 
return and dragged--almost certainly without advance 
warning--into an unaccustomed place at the center of the 
crisis, Brazil appears to be at a loss as to what to do next. 
 It is remarkable that the GOB has apparently made no effort 
to reach out within the region or taken a more assertive role 
in seeking a resolution.  Instead, planted firmly in the back 
seat, it appears Brazil is looking to the United States, the 
OAS, and the United Nations to safeguard its interests and, 
it hopes, navigate toward a long-term solution. 
KUBISKE