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Viewing cable 09BOGOTA3408, Lack of Clarity and Increasing Polarization as Elections

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BOGOTA3408 2009-10-28 16:04 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3408/01 3011607
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281604Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0537
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0129
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0459
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0485
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS BOGOTA 003408 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
USAID FOR LAC/SA EDWARD LANDAU & DAVID JOHNSTON, LAC/RSD ERIC KITE, AND DCHA/DG MARISSA LEMARGIE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV EAID PREL PREF PHUM OAS CO
SUBJECT: Lack of Clarity and Increasing Polarization as Elections 
Approach 
 
Summary: 
 
 
 
1. (SBU) USAID carried out an elections assessment in September in 
anticipation of the upcoming 2010 presidential and congressional 
elections in Colombia.  The main conclusions were:  there is a lack 
of clarity surrounding the elections that has contributed to a 
sense of paralysis among key actors; political debate has been 
reduced to whether or not President Uribe will run for a third 
term, which has contributed to a climate of polarization within the 
country; there is the perception that the Uribe Administration is 
actively campaigning and that power has been consolidated with the 
executive branch to the detriment of democratic institutions; and 
access to free and fair voting, particularly for vulnerable 
populations, remains problematic.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
2. (U) The USAID Elections Assessment Team met with over 30 
representatives of NGOs, the media, Congress, the business sector, 
academia, internally displaced persons (IDP) organizations, student 
groups, political parties, donors and international organizations, 
and several GOC entities involved in the electoral process.  The 
assessment report will be completed by November 1, 2009. 
 
 
 
Uncertainty & Polarization 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) A lack of clarity on the regulatory rules governing the 
presidential reelection referendum and recent legislative changes 
governing political party affiliation have created uncertainty 
regarding the "rules of the game" and a sense of paralysis among 
key actors.  For example, those surveyed generally agree that there 
is not enough time for the Constitutional Court to review and rule 
on the proposed referendum for a third term for President Uribe. 
Nevertheless, most believe that some kind of accommodation will be 
made to ensure it goes forward.  Likewise, it is unclear whether 
and when the "Ley de Garantias," which establishes that the 
President must announce his candidacy six months before the 
elections (November 30, 2009) and limits the way public funds and 
media can be used, will apply given that the referendum will not 
have occurred. 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) Public debate is generally viewed to have been reduced to 
whether or not the referendum will pass, whether or not President 
Uribe will run and whether individuals or entities are "pro" or 
"anti" Uribe.  The perception among civil society groups and some 
media outlets is that the space for public debate is increasingly 
limited and this could lend itself to election-related violence. 
 
 
 
Government in Campaign Mode 
 
& Weakening of Institutions 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) There is a general perception that President Uribe is 
using public forums (Consejos Comunitarios) and public funds (e.g., 
Accion Social programs) to conduct a campaign.  At departmental and 
municipal levels, people believe that public officials are aligning 
themselves with Uribe's "U" Party to ensure they receive vital 
public funds and benefit from Uribe's popularity. 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) There is a general perception that President Uribe has 
consolidated state power within the executive and that democratic 
institutions have either been co-opted or are at risk of being 
co-opted.  Likewise, the strength of traditional political parties 
has deteriorated.  Many people perceive Uribe as the State and the 
 
 
only option for the future success of Colombia, particularly given 
rocky relations with Venezuela and Ecuador. 
 
 
 
Illegal Armed Groups & Corruption 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) There is a variance of opinion regarding the extent to 
which illegal armed groups will try to influence these elections. 
However, tactics are likely to include illegal campaign 
contributions, coerced voting, abstention campaigns, and targeted 
violence.  It is believed that corruption will be a prevalent theme 
in these elections, particularly at municipal and departmental 
levels. 
 
 
 
Access 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) Access to free and fair voting, particularly for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), remains problematic.  There 
are long delays in obtaining national identification cards and, in 
poor communities, vulnerable populations are either threatened or 
offered bribes to vote for specific candidates. 
 
 
 
Planned USG Assistance 
 
 
 
9. (U) USAID will provide, through the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI), a sub-grant of $100,000 to the NGO Mision de 
Observaci????n Electoral (MOE) to conduct observation in 12 
departments on the day of congressional elections and a sub-grant 
of $40,000 to Transparencia por Colombia (TPC), the national 
representative of Transparency International, for the development 
of a new version of its Clear Accounts software.  This software 
will be used by political parties to prepare and file financial 
disclosure forms for the elections.  Finally, USAID is supporting a 
campaign, through the International Republic Institute (IRI), to 
encourage Afro-Colombians and IDPs to participate in the elections. 
 
 
 
10. (U) The Political Section is planning to organize U.S. Embassy 
delegations to participate in electoral observations, in 
conjunction with OAS and other international donors where possible. 
The Political Section is also closely monitoring the development of 
election-related reforms and the reelection referendum process, and 
is in constant communication with all national political parties 
and their candidates. 
 
 
 
11. (U) The international community's "Friends of Democracy" group 
in Bogota plans to organize periodic meetings with the GOC and 
other stakeholders to discuss elections-related issues.  The 
Swedish Government and the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) are providing 
funds for MOE's operational costs.  Currently, USAID is the only 
donor providing assistance to MOE for elections observation. 
However, it is expected that other international donors will step 
up to provide support. 
 
 
 
12. (SBU) USAID is considering dedicating funding to the following 
activities through NDI and IRI: 
 
a) increase capacity of election watchdog groups, in particular to 
monitor campaigns and media usage; 
 
b) strengthen the capacity of political party poll watchers; 
 
 
c) provide funds to Congreso Visible, a Colombian watchdog 
organization that gathers and publicizes information about 
congressional candidates; 
 
d) increase long-term domestic observation in key regions of the 
country at least three months prior to elections; 
 
e) encourage domestic observation at all levels of the process 
(polling station, central tabulation, and electoral dispute 
processes); and 
 
f) increase the number of departments where domestic observation 
will be conducted. 
BROWNFIELD