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Viewing cable 09BOGOTA3362, TELLING COLOMBIA'S STORY: FROM FAILING STATE TO STABLE ALLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BOGOTA3362 2009-10-23 14:19 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3362/01 2961421
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231419Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0471
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0112
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0442
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0468
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS BOGOTA 003362 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EAID PHUM PREF PTER MARR SNAR ETRD
ASEC, CO 
SUBJECT: TELLING COLOMBIA'S STORY: FROM FAILING STATE TO STABLE ALLY 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) The Ambassador challenged the Embassy's Country Team to 
critique and refine Post's strategic mission during the annual 
offsite meeting on October 5.  The Country Team developed several 
objectives for the coming year, including:  articulating and 
promoting the USG message on human rights issues in Colombia; 
making the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) more 
operational in support of Colombia's National Consolidation Plan 
(PNC); addressing the ubiquitous need for more police as the 
country transitions to a post-conflict environment; using 
programming and other resources to encourage rule of law and good 
governance practices and to confront pervasive corruption; and 
improving our reporting and briefing materials to better portray 
Colombia's successes and failures.  End Summary. 
 
COUNTRY CONDITIONS: THUMBNAIL OVERVIEW 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The Country Team assessed that the possible reelection of 
President Uribe for a third term in 2010 will dominate all 
political issues in the coming year.  While other qualified 
candidates have emerged, none is considered to have a realistic 
chance should Uribe run again.  Political and human rights scandals 
that have plagued the Uribe Administration -- such as the GOC 
electronic surveillance of the Supreme Court -- would likely 
continue to haunt a third term. 
 
3. (SBU) The Colombian public is becoming increasingly concerned 
about economic conditions, particularly unemployment.  Colombia's 
economic growth in 2009 is expected to slow to between to 0 and 
negative 0.5 percent for the year, although the financial sector 
remains solid.  Interest rate cuts and greater emphasis on export 
diversification, infrastructure investments and competitiveness 
will be essential to return Colombia's economy to sustained growth 
in the long term.  The strong Colombian peso is negatively 
affecting Colombian exports while helping to offset high tariffs on 
U.S. products.  President Uribe remains deeply concerned about 
passing the FTA before the elections in May of 2010. 
 
4. (SBU) Colombia's regional relationships have become strained due 
to the fallout over the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(DCA).  Relations with Venezuela are rockier than normal, but there 
are encouraging signs of a rapprochement with Ecuador. 
 
5. (SBU) The overall security conditions in Colombia continue to 
improve, though the military's momentum against the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has slowed over the past year as 
the FARC have switched to asymmetrical tactics.  Coca cultivation 
is more dispersed and migrating to more permissive environments 
such as national parks, indigenous communities and border areas. 
Emerging criminal groups (BACRIM) present an increasing threat in 
many parts of the country, causing disturbing spikes in violence as 
they battle with other illegal groups for control of the lucrative 
drug trade. 
 
OUR FIRST PRIORITY: STRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) Despite progress on human rights in Colombia, serious 
concerns remain.  Over the coming year, Post plans to continue to 
raise the profile of human rights issues in our strategic 
communication, reporting, programming, and engagement with senior 
GOC officials. 
 
7. (SBU) More specifically, the Ambassador instructed the Country 
Team to develop a human right agenda with the Government of 
Colombia (GOC), identifying the key areas for improvement and our 
suggested talking points.  The Country Team noted the need to:  a) 
attack impunity by encouraging the GOC to prosecute current and 
past human rights abuses; b) push for the implementation of the 
Colombian military's well-defined human rights regimen; and c) 
counter the GOC's tendency to stigmatize human rights NGOs and 
human rights defenders.  (Note:  Septel will expand on these points 
and propose follow-up actions. End note) 
 
CSDI:  TRANSITIONING FROM PLAN COLOMBIA 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) We reviewed progress to date under the Colombia Strategic 
Development Initiative (CSDI), which was conceived during the 
previous year's offsite as the successor to Plan Colombia.  CSDI is 
the Embassy's inter-agency plan to support the GOC's National 
Consolidation Plan (PNC) to expand state presence to areas 
previously controlled by illegal armed groups.  We have formed a 
CSDI executive committee comprised of section and Agency heads from 
USAID, the Narcotics Affairs Section, the Military Group, and 
Political in order to facilitate inter-agency coordination. 
Presently, the Embassy is using existing funding to implement 
priority projects. 
 
9. (SBU) CSDI is initially focused on the following areas: 
Meta/Buenaventura (in Central Colombia), Tumaco/Narino (in the 
South), and Montes de Maria (in the North).  Two additional areas, 
Choco/Uruba and Catatumbo/Bajo Cauca, could be ready for some CSDI 
programs over the next 12 months, which would generally give the 
CSDI broad coverage of the impoverished Pacific Coast.  The 
civilian lead of the PNC has yet to take full charge of 
consolidation efforts, leaving the Ministry of Defense 
organizationally in front.  Other obstacles include the need for a 
comprehensive security strategy to transition from military to 
police in consolidated territories; more focus on alternative 
development, social programs, and judicial reform to complement the 
ongoing counternarcotics strategy; stronger presence of the justice 
sector and human rights promotion in CSDI areas; and increased 
funding commitments from GOC civilian ministries. 
 
MEASURING SUCCESS 
----------------- 
 
10. (SBU) We reviewed lessons learned under Plan Colombia and 
discussed the need to develop a more holistic and accurate metric 
with which to measure our progress under CSDI.  Rather than 
focusing solely on hectares of coca/poppy eradicated and on drug 
seizures, metrics should be expanded to include other indicators 
such as:  hectares converted to licit production, individuals who 
have switched to legal economic alternatives, and population 
 
segments that have benefited from education initiatives and other 
social investments.  In other words, the metric must capture the 
whole story of our efforts. 
 
RULE OF LAW IS KEY TO SUCCESS 
----------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) The Country Team repeatedly emphasized the critical role 
played by the Colombian National Police (CNP) in consolidation.  As 
the GOC continues to recover national territory from the control of 
illegal armed groups, the vacuum is often filled by drug 
traffickers, with violent consequences for the general population. 
Police presence is crucial for establishing a community presence in 
newly consolidated areas.  Any increase in police forces must take 
into account security concerns -- especially given the FARC's 
recent announcement that it considers all PNC projects to be 
legitimate military targets.  However, while the CNP has the 
leadership capacity and organization to increase its presence 
throughout Colombia, it lacks the infrastructure, personnel and 
budget to do so. 
 
12. (SBU) Looking broadly, expanded police presence should be 
accompanied by the rest of the state entities that incorporate the 
rule of law, namely, the Prosecutor General's Office, Human Rights 
Ombudsman, and Inspector General.  We agreed to integrate these 
rule of law issues into our CSDI planning process and our overall 
strategy, resources and budget planning processes. 
 
CORRUPTION:  A PERVASIVE PROBLEM 
----------------------------------- 
 
13. (SBU) In addition to serious infrastructure deficiencies in 
roads and ports, Country Team members repeatedly identified 
corruption as a significant problem in Colombia that limits growth 
and investment.  An October 1 article in respected weekly "Cambio" 
estimated that Colombia loses as much as $2 billion to corruption 
each year, and that corruption in public contracts effectively 
doubles the annual cost of democratic security.  We plan to tackle 
corruption more directly in the coming year by increasing our 
engagement with GOC Anti-Corruption Czar Oscar Ortiz; focusing on 
good governance and rule of law initiatives, including through 
public-private partnerships; encouraging Colombia to make its 
procurement processes more transparent (for example by encouraging 
them to become a signatory to the WTO chapter on government 
procurement); and shining a light on corruption while at the same 
time identifying and working with honest GOC officials. 
 
ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS 
---------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) We discussed management challenges and opportunities, 
including the mission platform, space constraints, construction 
plans, and future staffing needs.  We considered our longer-term 
plans for the new Cartagena branch office.  The Country Team also 
agreed that we should bolster our mentoring program for entry and 
mid-level officers -- and open these opportunities up to other 
sections outside of the traditional Foreign Service community. 
 
TELLING COLOMBIA'S STORY 
------------------------ 
 
15. (SBU) We discussed ways to improve our reporting and the 
experiences we offer to visitors to Colombia.  Many Congressional 
delegations and senior-level administration visitors have been 
impressed by Colombia's progress under Plan Colombia.  At least one 
member of Congress remarked that our Country Team briefing 
materials could do a better -- and more personalized -- job of 
relating Colombia's transition from nearly failed state to a 
relatively stable U.S. partner.  Still others have commented that 
Colombia has valuable lessons to share with respect to challenges 
facing the USG elsewhere, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
We will incorporate these suggestions into our reporting and 
briefing materials, and consider other media for visitors such as a 
DVD with personal vignettes of Colombians whose lives have been 
improved through USG assistance. 
BROWNFIELD