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Viewing cable 09BANGKOK2544, Wanting to be Cooperative, Thailand Concerned about

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BANGKOK2544 2009-10-05 10:08 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO1588
PP RUEHCHI
DE RUEHBK #2544/01 2781008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051008Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8506
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 7097
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002544 
 
ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KHLS EWWT ETRD TH
 
SUBJECT:  Wanting to be Cooperative, Thailand Concerned about 
Upcoming U.S. Requirement for 100 Percent Cargo Scanning 
 
REF:  BANGKOK 2321 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY and COMMENT:  Concerned about potential obstacles 
to Thai exports to the United States, the Thai MFA hosted a seminar 
on the implications of U.S. regulations on maritime freight 
security, specifically the requirement to scan all containers "100 
percent" by July 2012 per the 9/11 Act.  Although implementation 
details of the Act remain in internal USG debate, USG officials 
allayed fears that radiation detection, already operational at the 
Port of Laem Chabang, is dangerous or a hindrance to trade, during 
an MFA-sponsored conference September 21-23.  Concerns remain, 
however, about the slow pace of X-ray scanning and the potential to 
create serious bottlenecks, especially if U.S.-bound containers need 
be scanned at every port of call en route.  END SUMMARY and 
COMMENT. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The "Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007" (Section 1701) (9/11 Act) indicates that by July 1, 
2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will require 
that 100 percent of containers bound for the United States must be 
scanned by nonintrusive imaging equipment (X-ray) and radiation 
detection equipment.  The Royal Thai Government (RTG) has been a 
willing participant in recent container security initiatives.  The 
Thai have already instituted the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI), Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and the 
Megaports Initiative (MI).  In recent months, the RTG has expressed 
concern that the requirement of "100 percent" scanning could be a 
serious impediment to port operation and trade, and that the RTG 
would not be able to implement the initiative by July 2012 
(reftel). 
 
-------------------------------- 
The 100 Percent Scanning Seminar 
-------------------------------- 
 
3.  (U) On September 21-23, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Department of American and South Pacific Affairs, (MFA) hosted a 
seminar on the "U.S. Laws and Regulations Concerning the 100 Percent 
Scanning of Containers to the U.S."  The seminar consisted of 
presentations and a question and answer period on the first day, and 
tours of the Port of Laem Chabang (LCP) and the Port of Bangkok 
(BKP) on the next two days respectively.  Representatives from U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration attended the 
seminar to present policy and technical perspectives on maritime 
cargo security measures.  Representatives from Royal Thai Customs 
(RTC) and the Port Authority of Thailand (PAT) gave presentations 
which provided background and discussed how their organizations 
would be affected by 100 percent container scanning implementation. 
 
4.  (SBU) Mr. Apirath Veinravi, Acting Director General of the 
Department of American and South Pacific Affairs, opened the 
seminar, but the main speakers were USG officials.  Mr. Daniel 
Stajcar, Director of CSI, provided a thorough review and explanation 
of CSI, the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), and discussed the 
differences between these programs and potential implications of the 
implementation of a "100 percent" scanning requirement.  He 
explained that the 9/11 Act allowed the Secretary of DHS to delay 
the start date of this requirement and would likely do so.  Ms. 
Katherine Crouch, DOE/NNSA Regional Manager for MI in South and 
Southeast Asia, gave the context for understanding global trade 
security measures, the necessity for protecting global commerce, and 
how MI implements its nuclear detection mission with its partner 
countries irrespective of the destination of the cargo.  Dr. Charles 
Massey, DOE/Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Senior Technical 
Advisor to Megaports, made the final presentation of the morning and 
discussed the "Practical Implications of Using Radiation Detection 
Equipment at Laem Chabang Port." 
 
5.  (SBU) During the afternoon session, the following offices from 
the RTG and organizations from Thai industry presented briefly:  the 
National Economic and Social Development Board, the Port Authority 
of Thailand, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives, the Thai National Shippers Council, the Thai 
Federation on Logistics, the Thai National Freight Forwarders 
Association, the Bangkok Shipowners and Agents Association, the 
Board of Trade of Thailand, and the American Chamber of Commerce. 
The speakers generally expressed concern about the "100 percent" 
scanning requirement for reasons such as traffic congestion at the 
port, operational and maintenance costs, readiness to comply with 
the mandate, training of personnel, and rescanning of containers at 
transshipment points or on entry to the U.S. 
 
BANGKOK 00002544  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
6.  (SBU) On the second and third days of the seminar, RTC and PAT 
officials presented background on their offices and offered their 
perspective on the difficulties of implementing "100 percent" 
scanning.  They then led tours of Thailand's two principal ports in 
the Bangkok area:  LCP and BKP.  LCP has operated radiation 
detection equipment since March 2009, and both ports have X-ray 
capability, although this is used primarily for imports.  The tours 
put the issues in context, both in terms of what the RTG is already 
doing to comply with container security initiatives and what 
physical and logistical difficulties the ports will face if they are 
obliged to scan every container that passes through their ports 
bound for the U.S. 
 
7.  (SBU) The audience of the seminar consisted largely of members 
of the local business community, both Thai and American, as well as 
interested members of the RTG from a variety of ministries.  The 
level of familiarity with freight legislation varied significantly, 
from experts in the field to members of the business community who 
had only a passing knowledge of these regulations.  Very few of 
those in attendance had seen the actual workings of the ports, and 
this alone succeeded in clarifying some of the issues. 
 
------------ 
Achievements 
------------ 
 
8. (SBU) Many of the questions posed to USG representatives were 
based on basic misunderstandings about the different security 
initiatives and about the realities of operating X-ray or radiation 
detection equipment.  The audience saw that MI's radiation portal 
monitors (RPM) are not at all dangerous, and that trucks can pass 
through them in a matter of seconds, with very little delay to port 
traffic.  RTC officials spoke positively and knowledgably about the 
MI program, and by the end of the tours the audience expressed very 
little concern that the Megaports Initiative was a safety risk or an 
undue burden to the port.  Audience members told us that the reality 
of the RPMs was much different and much better than they had 
previously believed, and that the benefit in security terms for 
Thailand and international shipping obviously outweighed the 
associated costs. 
 
----------------------- 
However Concerns Remain 
----------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Two concerns raised by Thai representatives were more 
serious and recurrent than the others at the seminar.  The first 
regards logistics.  The port tours made clear that performing a 
nonintrusive X-ray scan is much more difficult and costly than a 
radiation scan.  X-ray facilities at LCP, for example, have a 
throughput rate of 4 containers per hour.  The audience understood 
that not only would LCP require many more X-ray machines, but that 
they would require models which could perform the scan in the same 
manner as the RPMs, i.e. as the trucks drive through them at a slow 
speed, entering the port.  With the models they have now, the driver 
must leave his truck inside the scanner, while he exits and waits 
outside.  This style of X-ray machine will never be able to handle 
the heavy traffic of a port like LCP. 
 
10.  (SBU) The second concern regards the possibility that a 
container would be scanned multiple times before reaching its final 
destination.  Audience members inquired whether containers would be 
scanned in transshipment, and asked if the USG could require that 
containers only be scanned at their last stop before heading 
directly to the U.S., or could be exempt from a second scan in 
transshipment if the point of origin was in compliance with all 
regulations.  Similarly, audience members asked whether 
fully-scanned containers would have a "green lane" at the point of 
entry in the U.S. and be able to enter without delays or 
re-scanning. 
 
11.  (SBU) Several participants inquired whether the USG considered 
Thailand a "high risk" country, and in the case that Thailand is not 
high risk, whether its good standing as an ally of the U.S. can make 
its shipping industry exempt from these future regulations. 
 
--------------------------- 
Outlook for the Near Future 
--------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Although participants expressed reservations and several 
legitimate concerns, the mood of the seminar was not negative.  RTG 
officials and private sector representatives agreed that security 
initiatives were valuable and that those in place already were not 
intrusive.  Representatives from the export and shipping industries 
 
BANGKOK 00002544  003 OF 003 
 
 
were divided on how to proceed.  Some lamented the rising cost of 
exporting to the U.S., while others said that Thailand would benefit 
by being proactive and should develop their facilities before the 
U.S. or any other country mandates security requirements.  Port 
officials told us privately that they are interested in installing 
RPMs at the Port of Bangkok, and inquired whether the USG could 
provide any of the necessary equipment for proper X-ray scanning as 
well. 
 
13.  (U) The MFA and the PAT closed the seminar and expressed 
appreciation for USG attendance and participation.  MFA 
representatives indicated that this seminar is likely to be the 
first of many engagements on this issue within Thailand and further 
requests for U.S. representation are likely to be made to support a 
clear understanding of U.S. security requirements.  They reiterated 
that their goal is to balance trade with security while negotiating 
a path forward. 
 
JOHN