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Viewing cable 09BANGKOK2505, Thailand Hopes for Nuclear Power by 2020

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BANGKOK2505 2009-10-01 08:47 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO9153
PP RUEHCHI
DE RUEHBK #2505/01 2740847
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010847Z OCT 09 ZDK UR SVC 8056
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8462
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 7078
VIENNA IAEA
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002505 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IAEA TRGY ENRG TH
 
SUBJECT: Thailand Hopes for Nuclear Power by 2020 
 
REF: Bangkok 3711 
 
BANGKOK 00002505  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Thailand's 2007-2021 Power Development Plan (PDP) 
calls for nuclear production of electricity by 2020.  Newly-revised 
goals call for 1,000 MW from nuclear power in each of four years 
beginning in 2020, which would account for about five percent of 
total electricity use.  Authorities admit that their public relations 
program has so far been lacking, even though they expect that gaining 
public acceptance will be key to the program's success.  The next 
milestone will be completion of a feasibility study by Burns and Roe 
(Asia) in May 2010.  Thailand, a member of IAEA, would welcome 
additional international interaction, especially assistance from the 
United States, in the development of its program. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------- 
Progress towards Nuclear Energy 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) In a recent meeting with Econoff, officials from Thailand's 
Nuclear Power Project Development Office (NPPDO) outlined the 
progress of Thailand's nuclear energy program and the role nuclear 
energy will play in the future of the country.  More ambitious 
projections have been revised down to 1,000 MW for four years 
beginning in 2020.  This would be roughly five percent of Thailand's 
energy needs, and officials are hopeful that the program will 
continue to make progress and reach its immediate goals, such as the 
completion of the feasibility study by Burns and Roe (Asia) in May 
2010. 
 
3.  (SBU) The feasibility study will answer several significant 
questions, substantially determining the direction of the program. 
First, Burns and Roe has created a list of fifteen potential 
construction sites by using criteria from the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and will submit five from that list to the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT).  EGAT will then 
choose three sites from the list of five and submit that list to the 
Cabinet.  Second, the feasibility study will provide guidance on what 
technology would best suit the program.  Thai officials have not yet 
decided whether they will build a pressurized water reactor, a 
boiling water reactor or another system.  Finally, the study will 
analyze the cost of construction and operation.  NPPDO officials said 
that they see the costs of reactor construction rising throughout the 
world and they will press Burns and Roe to provide accurate cost 
estimates for construction in the out years. 
 
4.  (SBU) NPPDO officials told Econoff that Thailand has a long 
history of interest and research in nuclear science.  In fact, this 
is the third significant effort to develop nuclear power for 
electricity production.  The first plan was shelved in 1976 after the 
discovery of natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand.  The second plan 
was stopped in the late-1990s by the Asian economic crisis.  NPPDO 
officials cited this history as an advantage for Thailand.  They 
asserted that these prior preparations make realistic the training of 
a needed workforce for a 2020 production date. 
 
5.  (SBU) Thailand's Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP) has operated a 
1.2 MW nuclear research reactor near Bangkok for more than forty 
years.  Chulalongkorn University, Thailand's leading educational 
institution, has a graduate program in nuclear engineering, with 
about thirty graduates per year.  NPPDO officials said that the 
university would begin an undergraduate program and expand the 
graduate program if Thailand decides to "go nuclear" in 2011, and 
that Thailand has "advanced and sophisticated" programs in related 
subjects, such as nuclear and radiation science in the fields of 
medicine, agriculture, and industry. 
 
6.  (SBU) The Royal Thai Government (RTG) has received frequent 
contact and visits from vendors and regulators from many countries, 
including the United States, France, China, Japan, Belgium, Russia, 
and the Republic of Korea.  Officials anticipate that these 
relationships will become more focused and concrete after the study 
is complete and the details of the selected technology become clear. 
NPPDO officials told Econoff that they are very interested in any 
kind of international support and guidance and would like to be 
included in the international discussion about nuclear energy. 
 
--------- 
Obstacles 
--------- 
 
7.  (SBU) With regard to government support, NPPDO officials noted 
that their work has not been hampered by politicians in any way, that 
their budget has remained intact in spite of the economic downturn, 
and that Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva chairs the National Energy 
Policy Council (NEPC) himself, unlike in previous administrations. 
Nevertheless, the Abhisit government has yet to express support 
publicly for the program. 
 
BANGKOK 00002505  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
 
8.  (SBU) Although Thai officials are generally positive about the 
work that NPPDO, EGAT, and other relevant organizations have 
accomplished, they noted that significant public outreach is needed. 
They told Econoff that groups, especially in rural areas, protest 
plans for the development of any kind of major infrastructure 
project, such as a conventional power plant, and that a nuclear 
reactor would no doubt be a lightning rod for these sentiments. 
 
9.  (SBU) Senator Lertrat Ratanavanich, the chairman of the Senate's 
Energy Standing Committee, shared similar reservations with us about 
future public reaction.  He anticipates significant protest from 
non-governmental organizations, and believes that Abhisit's Democrat 
Party would be unlikely to give strong public support to the nuclear 
program in the current, fragile political situation for fear of 
supporting anything that would be unpopular with the public.  The 
Senator believes that the nuclear power program will ultimately go 
forward, but 
the 2020 goal for nuclear power may be  optimistic and that 2025 
might be more realistic. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Nuclear Power as Part of the Energy Solution 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) The Ministry of Energy estimates that demand for energy 
and specifically electricity will roughly double in Thailand by the 
year 2025.  Thailand's energy strategy has identified increasing 
energy demand and the need to diversify energy sources.  Today, 
Thailand relies heavily on natural gas which contributes as much as 
70 percent of all electricity in the country. Natural gas comes 
primarily from two sources: Two thirds from Thai extraction from the 
Gulf of Thailand and one third from imports from Burma.  NPPDO 
officials speculated that the gulf reserves would only last another 
twenty years. 
 
11.  (SBU) Moreover, there is growing concern that the natural gas 
supply from Burma may not be reliable.  This vulnerability received 
particular attention last August, when the gas pipeline from Burma's 
Yadana field was shut down for two hours shortly after the RTG 
publicly criticised Burma for the imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi. 
To avoid a blackout in western Thailand, EGAT released water from the 
Srinakarin Dam, causing flooding in the province of Kanchanaburi. 
Burmese officials say the timing was coincidental, citing technical 
problems, but Thai businesspeople and the press speculated that it 
was a political gesture.  Whether the interruption in service was 
intentional or not, the event focused public attention on the 
vulnerability of Thailand's gas supply from Burma.  NPPDO officials 
dismissed the idea that the Burmese government would use the gas 
supply as a political weapon, saying it would be like "Russia turning 
off the gas to Europe," but they agreed with public sentiment that 
Thailand is too dependent on natural gas, especially from potentially 
unreliable neighbor. 
 
12.  (SBU) The energy policy of the Abhisit administration stresses 
environmentally-friendly sources that will provide price stability 
and security.  NPPDO officials said that nuclear energy is attractive 
because it satisfies these goals.  They believe that public support 
can be built though proper education, including alleviating concerns 
about safety. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
13.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The NPPDO, EGAT, and OAP officials who met with 
us are serious scientists and professionals committed to the creation 
of a nuclear power program.  They have a practical sense of the 
political and economic situation in Thailand and are earnestly trying 
to navigate the obstacles in front of them.  Although they are 
justifiably worried about public reaction to nuclear development and 
the most difficult tests are yet to come, these officials are 
optimistic that a nuclear power program can be set up in Thailand. 
Energy development is among the most serious challenges facing the 
country in the next few decades.  Officials working on nuclear 
development here would welcome assistance from the United States, 
their long-time ally, in technical, regulatory and commercial realms. 
END COMMENT.