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Viewing cable 09ASTANA1761, KAZAKHSTAN: POLITICAL ANALYST DISCUSESS "HAWKS AND DOVES"

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1761 2009-10-02 05:27 2011-04-28 09:30 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Astana
VZCZCXRO9808
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1761/01 2750527
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 020527Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6497
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1992
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1361
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2060
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1012
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1423
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1547
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001761 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM SOCI KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  POLITICAL ANALYST DISCUSESS "HAWKS AND DOVES" 
AROUND THE PRESIDENT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland:  1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Independent political analyst XXXXXXXXXXXX 
believes that the elites surrounding President Nazarbayev are split 
into two camps -- the "hawks" and the "doves."  The hawks, or the 
"old guard," believe that the international community can do little 
but accept Kazakhstan "as is" because of its vast natural resources 
and strategic geopolitical position.  The doves, or relatively 
progressive forces, strive to create some image (if not always 
reality) of progress on liberalization.  In his view, Kazakhstan's 
political system has grown into a "caste system" that is hard to 
penetrate without the necessary family connections, and President 
Nazarbayev is growing insulated and aloof.  He told us that business 
and political elites are growing increasingly "nervous," as they 
strive to discern what is happening and what it means for them and 
the country's leadership.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE HAWKS AND THE DOVES 
 
2. (C) Independent political analyst XXXXXXXXXXXX told the DCM on 
September 22 that the political elite surrounding President 
Nazarbayev is solidly split into two camps -- "the hawks and the 
doves."  Hawks are those who believe that Kazakhstan will be accepted 
by the international community "as is" because of its vast natural 
resources and strategic geopolitical position.  The doves are those 
"who at least want to create the image of progress," especially for 
foreign audiences.  President Nazarbayev makes all the major 
political decisions, but his decisions depend on which group has his 
ear.  Kazakhstan's implementation of the "Madrid Commitments" 
illustrates this dichotomy, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.  In his view, former 
Foreign Minister Tazhin had Nazarbayev's full backing when he 
committed at the 2007 OSCE Ministerial to liberalize Kazakhstan's 
laws on political parties, elections, and the media.  However, "the 
hawks got the President's ear" and convinced him that any major 
legislative changes would destabilize the country's political 
situation.  As a result, "all you got were cosmetic changes," said 
XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
 
3.  (C) The hawks, in XXXXXXXXXXXX’s view, are the "old guard" -- 
remnants of the Soviet power machine who remained close to President 
Nazarbayev as he rose to power.  XXXXXXXXXXXX, and other contacts, named 
Akhmetzhan Yesimov, the mayor of Almaty, and Nuratay Abykayev, First 
Deputy Foreign Minister, as "the head hawks."  Yesimov, who is 
rumored to be Nazarbayev's distant cousin, has served as the Deputy 
Prime Minister, the Minister of Agriculture, and was Kazakhstan's 
Ambassador to Belgium from 1998 to 2001.  Abykayev, whom one 
interlocutor called "the gray cardinal," was Kazakhstan's Ambassador 
to Russia from 2007 to October 2008.  Before that posting, he served 
as the Speaker of the Senate, Head of Presidential Administration, 
and Chairman of the Committee for National Security (KNB).  Some 
analysts allege that Abykayev was the master-mind behind the 2006 
unresolved killing of opposition leader Altynbek Sarsenbay-uly and 
his two associates, although the connection has never been proven. 
Both Abykayev and Yesimov have had ups and downs in their careers, 
but Nazarbayev has always kept them among the top political elite. 
Other people who fall into the conservative camp are the former chief 
of Presidential Administration Vladimir Nee, Daniyal Akhmetov, the 
former Minister of Defense, and Presidential Advisor Yermukhambet 
Yertysbayev.  (NOTE: Yertysbayev on occasion comes out with liberal 
public statements, but our NGO contacts believe he does this more to 
create a media sensation rather than to express his own liberal 
motivations.  END NOTE.)  The current chairman of the Committee for 
National Security (KNB) Amangeldy Shabdarbayev is also believed to be 
a staunch conservative, although the organization itself, according 
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, is not a strong force onto itself, but rather a tool 
"for the highest bidder," And, reportedly includes in its top ranks 
both hawks and doves. 
 
4.  (C) The doves, in the view of XXXXXXXXXXXX and others, are the 
younger generation of Kazakhstan's political and business leaders, 
including those with strong business links to the West.  Several 
interlocutors named Prime Minister Karim Masimov and Timur Kulibayev, 
President Nazarbayev's son-in-law, as the "forward-thinking" camp. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that "Kulibayev's people are everywhere" -- Energy 
Minister Sauat Mynbayev, Temir Zholy president Askar Mamim, the owner 
of KazKommertsBank (KKB) Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, and the majority of 
the Cabinet are thought to be in his camp.  In a July 21 conversation 
with the Ambassador, Jay Johnson, Managing Director of Chevron's 
 
ASTANA 00001761  002 OF 003 
 
 
Eurasia Business, noted that Kulibayev is significantly expanding his 
role and influence.  Johnson noted that Kulibayev has gone from 
occupying a ceremonial role as chairman of KazEnergy, to become 
Deputy Chairman of Samruk-Kazyna, and Chairman of KazMunaiGas (KMG), 
KazAtomProm, and KazakhMys.  Johnson said he is consolidating his 
power and control over the economy, although he noted that Kulibayev 
still maintains a relatively low political profile.  "That's been his 
M.O.  He's always in the background.  He's rarely the number one guy, 
out in front."   [COMMENT:  We hasten to add that none of our many 
interlocutors, across the political spectrum, are willing to say that 
Nazarbayev is positioning Kulibayev as "successor."  END COMMENT.] 
 
POLITICAL CASTE SYSTEM 
 
5.  (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX alleged that the Kazakhstani political system -- the 
several score top figures who rotate among the top economic and 
political jobs within the system -- has calcified into a rigid "caste 
system" that is impossible to penetrate unless one has the necessary 
family connections.  He discounted the role of the younger, 
Western-educated elites, who, he says, may "curse the rigid regime" 
in private but can do little to change the system.  (NOTE:  The 
government's scholarship program "Bolashak" has educated close to 
6,000 Kazakhstani students at Western universities, and many of them 
have returned to take positions in the government and in the private 
sector.  END NOTE.) 
 
6.  (C) We heard similar ideas from XXXXXXXXXXXX, independent 
economist and former opposition politician who held several 
high-level posts in the Kazakhstani government in the 1990s. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that in the 1990s, Nazarbayev surrounded himself 
with "competent individuals" willing to tell him the truth. 
However, in recent years, he has grown "insulated and removed." 
 
7.  (C) Several interlocutors also alleged to us that  "government 
has grown unpredictable."  Chevron's Jay Johnson commented on the 
general mood of the government to the Ambassador and said, "There is 
such a fight going on now.  People are scared to death.  There is 
such anxiety and uncertainty about what will happen in 2012 (NOTE: 
when presidential elections are scheduled to be held.  END NOTE) that 
it has started to affect our projects."  Johnson said that even 
mid-level bureaucrats are intimidated by the recent round of firings 
and prosecutions.  "They see (former KMG president Serik) Berkitbayev 
go to jail, (former KazAtomProm president Mukhtar) Dzhakishev go to 
jail, (former Minister of Defense Daniel) Akhmetov get fired. 
They're just terrified to do or sign anything."  He said the 
mid-level officials he deals with on a daily basis are afraid of 
being held responsible if things go south. 
 
GENTLEMEN, PLACE YOUR BETS 
 
8.  (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Kazakhstan's political and business 
elite are preoccupied with the question of Nazarbayev's successor. 
"The elites are very nervous," he said, "because they do not know who 
to bet on."  XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that the old guard would back whomever 
Nazarbayev chose, and the successor would certainly need this backing 
to survive.  However, the business elites, "the young and ambitious," 
do not know with whom to align themselves, and the Presidential 
Administration is not offering any clues.  XXXXXXXXXXXX used the example 
of Russia's oligarchs and Putin -- "Abramovich backed Putin when he 
first came to power, while Berezovsky and Khodorkovsky thought they 
could operate independently.  Everybody here wants to be Abramovich 
[super-rich and mostly living abroad] and to avoid Khodorkovsky's 
fate" [in prison in Siberia]. 
 
9.  (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX sees three possible scenarios for the succession: 
first, election of the successor, with Nazarbayev willingly stepping 
aside; second, nominal appointment of the successor, while Nazarbayev 
maintains the real power and continues to rule from the sidelines; 
finally, Nazarbayev's unexpected death without a clear successor, 
which forces the elite groups to maneuver for power.  The third 
option is the worst for Kazakhstan, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.  A vicious fight 
for control of property and power would surely follow. 
 
10.  (C) COMMENT: We fully agree that the circle of Nazarbayev's 
advisors has its progressive liberals and its retrograde dinosaurs. 
This dichotomy has existed since Kazakhstan's independence, and 
Nazarbayev has deftly managed a balance between the two groups. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX’s version of how the hawks see the outside world may help 
 
ASTANA 00001761  003 OF 003 
 
 
explain why Kazakhstan sometimes stalls on democratic reform and 
liberalization.  However, the old guard, while still powerful, is not 
omnipotent, and in dealing with the Kazakhstani government, we work 
to strengthen and encourage the role of the progressive liberals. 
The best way to do that, four our long-term interests -- especially 
since Nazarbayev is not immortal -- is through high-level engagement. 
 END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND