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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI1199, MEDIA REACTION: NORTH KOREA, U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI1199 2009-10-05 09:46 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0168
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1199/01 2780946
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050946Z OCT 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2441
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9418
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0836
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001199 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: NORTH KOREA, U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage October 3-5 on Typhoon Parma, which is lingering south of 
Taiwan and bringing heavy rain to northern and eastern parts of the 
island; and on the island-wide celebrations of the Mid-autumn 
Festival Saturday.  In terms of editorials and commentaries, a 
column in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" discussed Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Pyongyang in the wake of China's 
celebration of its 60th anniversary.  The article said, in the long 
run, the nuclear weapons developed by Pyongyang will bring more 
distress to Beijing than to Washington.  An editorial in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" discussed U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan and urged the Obama administration "to give positive 
consideration to the 'timing' of selling advanced F-16 C/D fighters 
and other defensive-oriented weapons to Taiwan to strengthen 
Taiwan's negotiation power with China and ensure the protection of 
Taiwan's democracy and security."  End summary. 
 
2. North Korea 
 
"[Chinese Premier] Wen Jiabao Goes to North Korea to Pay the Bill" 
 
Columnist Antonio Chiang wrote in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" 
[circulation: 520,000] (10/5): 
 
"China has demonstrated its power during the celebrations of its 
60th anniversary, and in the meantime it has revealed its lack of 
security.  The stiff expression and the Mao suit worn by the Chinese 
leaders reminded people of North Korea rather than a rising 
superpower which is trying to embrace the world.  It is interesting 
to note that immediately following China's celebration of its 
National Day, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao departed for Pyongyang for 
a three-day visit.  Wen is there to pay the bill.  North Korea is a 
burden for China's image, and also a burden for China's economy and 
security.  The diplomatic circle in Beijing moans and groans every 
time anyone speaks of Pyongyang.  It is always Beijing which paid 
the bill no matter whether it was the Chinese leaders who visited 
Pyongyang or the North Korean leaders who visited Beijing. ... 
 
"China has taken advantage of its influence over Pyongyang and built 
a sound, cooperative relationship with the United States, which has 
greatly advanced its position on the international stage.  Now 
Washington has come around to the right way of thinking and decided 
that, since China calls itself a great power in the region, it can 
simply let Beijing shoulder the responsibility of being the big 
brother!  In any case, Pyongyang is developing nuclear weapons, and 
the country that will bear the brunt is, without a doubt, Japan. 
But in the long run, it is Beijing that will feel restless due to 
deep worries [about those nuclear weapons].  Beijing's sense of 
agony and distress will surely be heavier than those of 
Washington's.  Perhaps Wen will bring back news about the Six-Party 
Talks, but returning to the negotiating table is tantamount to being 
back to square one.  Beijing is a skillful negotiator, but when it 
comes to negotiating with Pyongyang, it will be like meeting one's 
match -- [there are] no more tricks it can play...." 
 
3. "Why U.S. Should Sell F-16 C/Ds to Taiwan" 
 
The pro-independence "Taiwan News" [circulation: 20,000] 
editorialized (10/5): 
 
"The Annual United States-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, held 
last week in Charlottesville, Virginia, provided a litmus test to 
the character of the trilateral relationship between Taiwan, the 
U.S. and the People's Republic of China. ...  In a rare exercise of 
political hard ball, Taiwan's Ministry of National defense forced Ma 
to adjust his announced decision to cancel the purchase of UH-60 
Blackhawk helicopters in exchange for rescue relief helicopters back 
to the original procurement plan and intensified its pressure on 
Washington to speed up the sales of upgraded F-16 C/D fighters to 
address the yawning gap in air power in the Taiwan Strait, as urged 
by Deputy Defense Minister Chao Shih-chang in the Charlottesville 
Conference.  For its part, Beijing has reaffirmed its steadfast 
opposition against U.S. arms sales to Taiwan on each and every 
possible occasion. ... 
 
"At present, there are two main calculations in Washington's 
strategic thinking. First, the Taiwan issue was definitely not at 
the top of the agenda of the Obama administration in its first year. 
 Instead, one of Obama's prime diplomatic goals in visiting the PRC 
is to secure Beijing's implementation of a climate change agreement 
signed during July's SED as well as discussing a wide range of 
issues with Hu to lead up to next summer's SED.  Moreover, 
Washington has been carefully observing Beijing's attitude and 
response to Ma's touted 'goodwill' approach and is concerned over 
whether a decision on the F-16 C/D Block jet fighters would 
jeopardize the apparent cross-strait rapprochement. 
 
"Since Ma's domestic support was hammered by his KMT government's 
poor handling of the typhoon crisis, the extent to which Beijing 
 
sees Ma's leadership as weakening will deeply influence the KMT 
government's bargain chips in upcoming cross-strait negotiations. 
Both factors mitigate against an early decision by Washington to 
sell the upgraded F-16 C/D fighters to Taiwan in the near future. 
...  In this context, the F-16 C/D sale has both symbolic value in 
demonstrating Taiwan's capability of deterrence and bolstering 
Taiwan's negotiation assets relative to the PRC.  Given the 
uncertainties of future cross-strait relations, we urge the Obama 
administration to give positive consideration to the 'timing' of 
selling advanced F-16 C/D fighters and other defensive-oriented 
weapons to Taiwan to strengthen Taiwan's negotiation power with 
China and ensure the protection of Taiwan's democracy and security." 
 
 
STANTON