Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09DHAHRAN246, SAUDI AUTHORITIES CRACK DOWN ON SHIA IN AL-AHSA

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09DHAHRAN246.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DHAHRAN246 2009-09-16 13:30 2011-06-26 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Consulate Dhahran
Appears in these articles:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/22/116306/wikileaks-saudi-crackdown-on-shiites.html
VZCZCXRO7026
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDH #0246/01 2591330
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161330Z SEP 09
FM AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0283
INFO RUEHZM/GCC C COLLECTIVE
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0372
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAHRAN 000246 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP JOSHUA HARRIS AND JEREMY BERNDT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/16/2019 
TAGS: KIRF KISL PGOV PHUM SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI AUTHORITIES CRACK DOWN ON SHIA IN AL-AHSA 
 
REF: A. A. 09 DHAHRAN 210 
     B. B. 09 DHAHRAN 217 
     C. C. 09 DHAHRAN 8 
 
DHAHRAN 00000246  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kevin Kreutner, Acting Consul General, EXEC, DOS. 
 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
1. (C) Saudi authorities have stepped up discriminatory actions 
against Shia citizens in the Eastern Province (EP) oasis of 
al-Ahsa over the past year.  Contacts point to the governor of 
al-Ahsa, HH Prince Badr bin Mohammad bin Abdullah Al Saud, as 
the main force behind the most recent uptick in sectarian 
arrests and mosque closings.  However, they have also noted that 
these actions are likely sanctioned by the EP Governor, Prince 
Mohammed bin Fahd Al Saud, and the Interior Minister, Prince 
Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.  Several contacts have said that 
the discrimination in al-Ahsa is alienating the Shia community, 
particularly the youth, and is compromising their sense of Saudi 
"national identity."  END SUMMARY. 
 
SECTARIAN ARRESTS CONTINUE IN AL-AHSA 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C/NF) During an August 17 visit to al-Ahsa, an oasis home to 
one million residents (more than half of which are estimated to 
be Shia), PolOff met with two prominent businessmen and Shia 
political activists: XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
 The former was recently elected to the XXXXXXXXXXXX, and both contacts participated in a USG-sponsored 
visit of American civil institutions XXXXXXXXXXXX. 

 
3. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX provided PolOff with a list of 42 Shia 
individuals who have been arrested over the past year in 
al-Ahsa.  The list included their age, length and dates of 
detention, and reason for the arrest.  In most cases, these 
individuals were arrested for their "participation in religious 
celebrations" and for hosting Shia religious gatherings.  In 
many cases, they were arrested this summer, although the alleged 
offenses occurred in January 2009 at Ashura religious 
processions.  Our contacts were unsure why the authorities 
waited so long to make these arrests.  XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that 
virtually all of those arrested were freed after detentions of 
about one or two weeks, adding that some of the people on the 
list provided to PolOff had asked that their names not be 
publicly reported for fear of further reprisals from the 
authorities or extremist Sunni citizens.  [NOTE: Last month, the 
religious celebration of the birth of Imam al-Mahdi in al-Ahsa 
was also broken up by Saudi security forces (ref A).  END NOTE] 
 
CLOSING SHIA MOSQUES 
 
-------------------- 
 
4. (C/NF) Many of the myriad towns that comprise the greater 
al-Ahsa oasis are either entirely Sunni or entirely Shia.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said that in Sunni areas there are "forests of [Sunni] mosques" and even in entirely Shia areas there is at least one Sunni 
mosque.  Sunni mosques are generally funded and operated by the 
Ministry of Endowments (Wizarat al-Awqaaf), and the approval 
process to build these mosques is straightforward.  Sadek joked 
that if "just one Sunni complains" that he must travel too far 
to attend mosque the government will approve and fund a new 
mosque "tomorrow." 
 
5. (C) According to several contacts, building a Shia mosque in 
al-Ahsa is very challenging.  In 1998, the Saudi authorities 
announced new licensing requirements for Shia mosques in al-Ahsa 
and have since closed approximately 20 mosques.  Many of these 
mosques were in operation for more than a decade before being 
closed.  The authorities often used tactics similar to what is 
currently being done in al-Khobar to force the closures (for 
more on al-Khobar mosque closings see ref B), including cutting 
off electricity to the mosques and threatening the arrest of the 
property owner. 
 
6. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX described the licensing process as inconsistent and difficult to navigate.  For example, the designs and 
building plan for the Imam al-Reda mosque received the necessary 
approvals from the Ministry of Endowments and municipal 
authorities.  However, after the construction of the building 
was more than half completed, the governor of al-Ahsa, HH Prince 
Badr bin Abdullah Al Saud, halted progress citing the building's 
violation of height restrictions.  XXXXXXXXXXXX told 
PolOff that his family recently constructed a mosque of a 
similar height in a different part of al-Ahsa, which received 
the same approvals.  In their view, the arbitrary restrictions 
on mosques imposed by the Saudi authorities (height, size, 
proximity to other Shia mosques) are simply sectarian-based 
harassment and discrimination of the Shia.  (NOTE: XXXXXXXXXXXX took PolOff on a tour of several Shia mosques in al-Ahsa, including 
the partially constructed Imam al-Reda mosque, whose 
construction was stopped for approximately two years.  END NOTE) 
 
PRINCE BADR, THE GOVERNOR OF AL-AHSA 
 
------------------------------------  
 
7. (C/NF) Several human rights activists in the EP have cited 
Prince Badr as the source of the sectarian crackdown in al-Ahsa. 
 XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the Prince's discrimination against the Shia is "systemic and intentional."  XXXXXXXXXXXX who met Prince Badr on several occasions when obtaining approvals for the construction 
of his family's mosque, believes that the prince is an "all 
around bad governor" surrounded by "sectarian advisors."  Other 
contacts in the EP have echoed these sentiments. XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect), a self-proclaimed human rights 
activist originally from al-Ahsa, believes Badr is "extreme" in 
his discrimination.  "All of this discrimination nonsense is new 
[in al-Ahsa]."  He recalled as a child that his neighborhood was 
mixed Shia-Sunni and he was breast-fed by a Shia woman (Ibrahim 
is from a Sunni family), which he believes is "impossible" 
today.  XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect), the XXXXXXXXXXXX, warned that Prince Badr is "playing with 
fire" by harassing al-Ahsa's Shia residents. 
 
8. (C/NF) During an initial courtesy call visit to Prince Badr 
(strictly protect) in March 2009, when sectarian tensions were 
nearing their peak, Badr told the Consul General that Shia-Sunni 
relations were "cordial" in al-Ahsa and that there were "no 
problems" between the "brothers."  He said that the foreign 
media "exaggerates" sectarian problems, but acknowledged that 
diversity can be a "double-edged sword."  He also noted that his 
primary concern has always been security.  King Abdullah 
recently extended Prince Badr's term as the governor of al-Ahsa 
for an additional four years.  Prince Badr has served as 
governor of al-Ahsa since 1997, just before the Shia mosques in 
al-Ahsa were targeted for closure in 1998. 
 
PRINCE BADR HAS SUPPORT FROM THE 
 
INTERIOR MINISTER AND EP GOVERNOR 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Many of the same contacts who accuse Prince Badr of 
discrimination in al-Ahsa also view the Eastern Province 
Governor HRH Prince Mohammed bin Fahd Al Saud and his uncle the 
Interior Minister HRH Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al Saud as 
responsible for the problem.  Some believe these two powerful 
princes tacitly support discriminatory practices in al-Ahsa and 
elsewhere in the EP.  Others have even accused the princes of 
ordering local authorities, such as Prince Badr, to implement 
discriminatory policies themselves.  In any case, as most of our 
contacts readily point out, neither of the princes have stepped 
in to end the discrimination. 
 
DISCRIMINATION FOCUSED ON THE YOUTH 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
10. (C/NF) When asked how the Shia community is reacting to the 
most recent crackdown, XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that "the discrimination gap is bigger than ever."  He was especially worried about the youth, noting that they "don't have a voice that is listened to" 
and are losing their sense of a "national identity."  The vast 
majority of those recently arrested in al-Ahsa were under the 
age of 30.  He also noted that the sectarian clashes that took 
place in Medina (ref C) largely involved young men from al-Ahsa. 
 These views echo similar concerns across the Shia community 
that the youth are increasingly frustrated with the status quo. 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
------- 
 
11. (C) King Abdullah's recent extension of Prince Badr as 
governor of al-Ahsa has irked many Shia and human rights 
activists in the EP who view him as the primary antagonist and 
barrier to improved sectarian relations.  It has also lowered 
their expectations for positive results from the King's widely 
publicized interfaith and national dialogues.  END COMMENT. 
KREUTNER