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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1124, LULA FAVORS FRENCH FIGHTERS -- SITUATION SERIOUS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1124 2009-09-09 10:20 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO1368
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1124/01 2521020
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091020Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5040
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0498
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0082
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9905
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8166
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4518
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001124 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, WHA AND PM. OSD FOR USD/ATL. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019 
TAGS: PREL MASC ETTC BR
SUBJECT: LULA FAVORS FRENCH FIGHTERS -- SITUATION SERIOUS 
BUT NOT HOPELESS 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 1100 
     B. BRASILIA 1094 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske.  Reason: 1.4(d) 
 
SUBJECT:   Lula Favors French Fighters ) Situation Serious 
But Not Hopeless 
 
1.   (C)  SUMMARY.  In a surprise announcement during the 
September 7 visit of French President Sarkozy, President Lula 
said Brazil would begin negotiations to purchase French-made 
Rafale fighter aircraft.  The President,s step short 
circuited the Brazilian Air Force,s technical evaluation 
process which was supposed to deliver a recommendation in the 
next week.  Since Lula,s announcement, GOB officials have 
been engaged in spin control to convey the message that the 
purchase from France is not completely certain; the intention 
is simply to begin purchase negotiations.  Nevertheless, the 
September 7 message indicates that the Rafale is now the 
strong favorite and underlines the importance of the 
Lula-Sarkozy personal relationship.  Because Lula cited the 
French willingness to transfer technology as the basis for 
his preference, and the USG has recently concluded the 
Congressional notification process for Boeing,s F18 Super 
Hornet, we may be able to use the final tech transfer 
approval to seek a level playing field in the negotiation 
phase.  As this was a political decision, we will need 
political-level support for the USG candidate to supplement 
the Super Hornet,s superior package of technology and 
offsets.  END SUMMARY. 
 
WHAT WE KNOW 
------------- 
2.  (U)  In a joint news conference with Sarkozy, September 
7, Lula said that Brazil would begin negotiations with 
France for the purchase of thirty-six fighter aircraft.  Lula 
cited France,s willingness to transfer technology and the 
importance of &consolidating8 the strategic partnership 
with France as the reasons for his decision.  To bolster the 
French case, Sarkozy reportedly promised to buy a dozen C390 
cargo planes, to be developed by Brazil and to support Rio de 
Janeiro,s bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games.  The French 
reportedly also promised to assist Brazil in exporting future 
French-Brazilian aircraft to unspecified countries in Latin 
America and Africa.  Almost immediately after the news 
conference, other Brazilian officials began giving their own 
version of the announcement.  Foreign Minister Celso Amorim 
said that &there was a decision to negotiate with one 
supplier.  There was no decision in relation to the other two 
(competitors).8  Later press reports indicated that Lula 
&did not rule out8 the USG or Swedish planes. 
 
3.  (C)  It is likely that Lula,s announcement came as a 
surprise to the rest of the Brazilian government.  Over the 
past several weeks, Mission Brazil has heard the consistent 
message that any decision would be made after Sarkozy,s 
visit.  Air Force contacts informed MLO Brasilia that they 
would be submitting their technical evaluation to the MOD in 
the week following the visit for review and preparation of a 
recommendation to the President.  The evaluation was never 
completed or delivered, meaning Lula,s decision to favor the 
French was taken without the benefit of over a year of work 
by Air Force experts. 
 
4.  (U)  September 8 press commentary shows the beginnings of 
a debate on the issue.  Several commentators, notably in 
Folha Sao Paulo, have criticized the expense of the purchase 
and the lack of transparency of the decision process.  Coming 
on the heels of criticism of the government for the 
non-competitive purchase of French submarines (ref a), Folha 
notes there seems to be a &strategy of silence for defense 
purchases.  Another op ed in the same paper, however, 
trumpeted the deal as a means of avoiding an undesirable post 
cold war unipolar world.  All commentators, however, still 
seem to believe that the USG is not reliable as a partner for 
technology transfer and that a future administration could 
decide to cancel any arrangements made by the current one. 
 
5.  (C) On September 8, USMLO Air Force Section Chief met 
with the BRAF team responsible for the evaluation process and 
 
BRASILIA 00001124  002 OF 003 
 
 
reported that they have received direction to continue work 
as usual and not to react to what is being aired in the 
press.   During another meeting with two 3-star General 
Officers, Brig. Salmone (Deputy Commander of Aerospace 
Technology Command) and Brig. Knupp (BRAF Finance 
Secretariat),  they indicated the BRAF are proceeding &as if 
nothing happened yesterday,8 i.e. the Air Force will prepare 
its recommendation as previously planned and deliver it to 
the Minister; the USG should remain engaged as it was before 
Lula,s statement. (They stressed the importance of this 
moment for moving forward with the United States-Brazil 
relationship.) 
 
WHAT IT MEANS 
------------- 
6.  (C)  Above all, the September 7 press conference showed 
that the fighter purchase has become a political decision in 
which the Super Hornet,s superior capabilities and Boeing,s 
offer of industrial partnership mean little.  Lula,s 
announcement of an intention to negotiate a fighter purchase 
with France appears to have cut both Defense Minister Jobim 
and the Brazilian Air Force out of the loop and ignored the 
GOB,s official process for arriving at a decision.  Despite 
Jobim,s statement to Under Secretary Tauscher (ref b) that 
he would give the U.S. a chance to match others, offers, the 
process has passed Jobim by.  Jobim,s intention was to play 
a major role in the process, both to strengthen his authority 
as Minister and to add an achievement to his resume should he 
run for President in 2010.  When the skipping of the 
technical evaluation becomes known, it is likely that more 
questions will be raised about the lack of a process.  Given 
the spate of scandals touching members of the Brazilian 
government, it is also possible that there will be 
allegations of corruption arising from the deviation from the 
previously-announced procedure.  The explanatory statement by 
Amorim was clearly intended to leave an opening for the other 
competitors, but Lula, through his announcement, has taken 
charge of the process and set the terms. 
 
7.  (C)  As the government did with the submarine purchase, 
announced in December 2008 (ref a), Lula,s emphasis on tech 
transfer, without any specifics on what technologies are 
involved, provides an excuse to focus on a single preferred 
supplier.  The submarine decision was also announced during a 
Sarkozy visit to Brazil, showing the power of the personal 
relationship over such considerations as capability, cost and 
benefit to the Brazilian economy.  It is worth noting that 
Brazil faces Presidential elections in 2010, and Lula will 
not want to hand the opposition an issue with which to 
criticize his government for wasting money or employing 
questionable procurement processes.  Should opposition in the 
press and the Brazilian Congress grow, it is possible Lula 
could turn to another option or put off the fighter 
competition to be decided by the next President. 
 
WHAT TO DO 
---------- 
8.  (C)  The clear designation of the French as the front 
runners means that the USG/Boeing bid faces a major challenge 
in order to level the playing field.  It will be critical to 
counter the perception that USG willingness to transfer 
technology is ephemeral and to get this message to Lula, who 
has established himself as the only decision maker on this 
issue.  In doing so, we need to take advantage of Lula,s 
definition of tech transfer as the key issue and the fact 
that while negotiations are to open with France, they are not 
yet closed to the other competitors.  We can use the 
completion of the thirty day Congressional notification 
period for the sale on September 5 as a new fact in support 
of the USG bid.  By meeting Lula,s requirement for assured 
tech transfer, we can argue that we should begin the 
negotiation process for the same reason the French have been 
invited to do so. 
 
9.  (C)  Given that Lula,s decision to begin negotiations 
with the French was made following a late dinner with 
Sarkozy, the importance of personal relationships cannot be 
overstated.  Should President Obama speak with Lula in the 
next few weeks, it would be important for him to mention the 
fighter sale.  Post recommends that any such conversation 
 
BRASILIA 00001124  003 OF 003 
 
 
could include such points as: 
 
--  We understand you are negotiating with the French for the 
purchase of fighter aircraft because they are offering 
technology transfer.  We are prepared to offer full transfer 
of all necessary technology as well. 
--  This decision has been made and passed through Congress. 
I guarantee it will not change. 
--  Since we are offering the same technology transfer as the 
French, I ask that we also be included in the purchase 
negotiations.  I am confident that we will be able to offer a 
better deal. 
 
10.  (SBU)  Post also recommends that senior USG officials 
make similar points to the Brazilian press.  Additionally, we 
should add that the USG is offering technologies the others 
cannot (e.g. low observables, materials testing and proven 
AESA radar).  We should also note that both the French and 
Swedish entrants contain USML-controlled technology and 
require export licenses both for sale to Brazil and should 
Brazil wish to transfer to third parties. 
 
11.  (SBU)  On September 14, Boeing plans to host a suppliers 
conference with Brazilian industry,  which generally favors 
partnership with Boeing.  Post will engage with Boeing on a 
positive message.  If Lula,s tech transfer issues can be 
addressed, hearing from business leaders that the Brazilian 
economy would benefit most from partnership with Boeing could 
be influential.  Boeing expects substantial press coverage at 
this event, and we should ensure that the USG is represented 
to underline that we have completed our tech transfer 
approval. 
KUBISKE