Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI1117, MEDIA REACTION: NORTH KOREA, U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09AITTAIPEI1117.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI1117 2009-09-15 09:46 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1117/01 2580946
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 150946Z SEP 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2314
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9386
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0813
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: NORTH KOREA, U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused 
September 15 news coverage on the captain of a Taiwan navy submarine 
being swept overboard during a mission; on the confrontation between 
Taiwan and Japan vessels over a Taiwan fishing boat's alleged 
intrusion into Japanese waters; on the H1N1 epidemic in Taiwan; and 
on Premier Wu Den-yih's meeting with Hong Kong politician Leung 
Chun-ying during Wu's trip to Hong Kong before Wu assumed the 
premiership. 
 
2.  In terms of editorials and commentaries, a column in the 
KMT-leaning "China Times" commented on the United States' recent 
decision to hold bilateral talks with North Korea.  The column 
interpreted the development, saying that it was an indication that 
the United States has yielded to North Korea.  The development has 
also made South Korea uneasy, the column said.  Regarding relations 
between China and the United States, another commentary in the 
"China Times" said the idea that China and the United States form a 
"G2" is unlikely, because neither the United States nor China is 
willing or interested in pushing forward such an idea to make it 
come true.  End summary. 
 
3. "North Korea" 
 
"The United States Holds Talks with North Korea, South Korea Does 
Not Relish [the idea]" 
 
The "International Lookout" column in the KMT-leaning "China Times" 
[circulation: 120,000] wrote (9/15): 
 
"United States Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs 
Philip Crowley said that the United States will have contact with 
North Korea and persuade North Korea to return to the six-party 
talks; even the possibility of United States Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton meeting with North Korean diplomats at the United 
Nations is not ruled out. 
 
"What matters is that he [Crowley] said, 'any talks that we have 
with North Korea will be held within the six-party context.'  Such 
phrasing is different from that in the past.  In the past, the 
United States' said that [the bilateral talks] would be held within 
the six-party 'framework.'  Now, they [the bilateral talks] will be 
held within the six-party 'context.'  If [the bilateral talks] are 
held within the [six-party] framework, the two parties [the United 
States and North Korea] must follow the rules set during the 
six-party talks and inform other parties what occurred during the 
[bilateral] talks.  However, [if the bilateral talks] are held 
within the [six-party] context, the two parties can make decisions 
on their own and it is not a necessity that other countries be 
informed. 
 
"These circumstances reveal two things.  First, the level of contact 
by the two countries has risen to the level of ministers of foreign 
affairs.  Second, as long as the label of six-party talks is not 
withheld from them, [the two countries] can hold talks at their own 
desire. 
 
"If one says that this is not a concession by the United States [to 
North Korea], no one will believe it.  However, why was the Obama 
administration eager to make concessions?  The answer is clear 
judging from common sense, which is that time is on North Korea's 
side.  The longer the procrastination, the more powerful North 
Korea's nuclear capability becomes and the fewer bargaining chips 
the United States has.  Now, to take advantage of North Korea's show 
of goodwill, Washington needs to make progress.  Moreover, domestic 
support in the United States for Obama's foreign policy still 
exists.  In the future, if such support decreases in tandem with the 
decline of [President Barack Obama's] reputation, it will be more 
difficult to hold [bilateral] negotiations. 
 
"South Korean's conservative newspaper 'JoongAng Daily' pointed out 
that even if bilateral talks [between the United States and North 
Korea] are held, such talks would just be an old-style, boring 
[fight] between defense and attack with no promising prospects. 
Such a tone fully shows that South Korea deeply fears that the 
United States would make progress with North Korea and abandon South 
Korea.  Why does [South Korea] assert that North Korea would still 
perform 'in the old way?'  Why does [South Korea] assert that such 
[bilateral] talks would be boring?  North Korea has recently shown 
consistent goodwill to the United States with clear measures very 
different from those in the past.  What's more, would the United 
States Secretary of State be willing to go into battle only to do 
boring things?" 
 
4. "U.S.-China Relations" 
 
"G2, An Expectation Difficult to Realize and an Unnecessary Source 
of Worry" 
 
Jia Qingguo, the Associate Dean of the School of International 
Studies (SIS) at Peking University, wrote in the KMT-leaning "China 
Times" [circulation: 120,000] (9/15): 
 
"... If one carefully analyzes the possibility of China and the 
United States forming a G2 in the foreseeable future, one can easily 
see that there is no need either to expect or worry about a G2. 
Under the current circumstances, the possibility of a G2 forming in 
the foreseeable future is remote.  Neither China nor the United 
States have the willingness or the prerequisites to advance a 
so-called G2. 
 
"First, the United States does not have the willingness to advance a 
G2.  Fundamentally speaking, deep down in their hearts, most 
Americans do not regard China as a partner which has common goals 
and is able to cooperate with [the United States] in the long run. 
Some Americans look at China as a competitor.  They believe that the 
relationship between China and the United States is a relationship 
between a hegemonic country and a rising country. .... There are 
more Americans who regard China as a country which holds different 
values [from that of the United States].  They do not believe that 
China and the United States can work together...without common 
values....The United States once had debates about whether to invite 
China to join the G8.  Most people believed then that it should not 
happen because China is not a so-called democratic country. ... 
 
"China does not have the willingness to advance a G2 either. 
Fundamentally speaking, deep down in their hearts, most Chinese 
people not only do not believe that China has risen, but also do not 
believe that China is able to lead in global issues and take 
international responsibility in a broad sense....Some Chinese people 
regard the United States as a threat to China's peaceful development 
and believe that it is impossible for the United States, as a 
hegemonic country, to do nothing and merely sit by and watch China's 
rise. 
 
"To most Chinese people, China is still a developing country.  China 
still faces many challenges during the process of domestic reform 
and development.  Before these issues and challenges are properly 
managed and solved, it is neither possible for China to -- nor 
should China -- excessively care about international issues, 
especially in terms of taking on too many international 
responsibilities. ..." 
 
STANTON