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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI1063, MEDIA REACTION: DALAI LAMA'S TAIWAN VISIT, JAPAN'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI1063 2009-09-01 08:43 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1063/01 2440843
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010843Z SEP 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2227
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9367
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0797
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001063 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: DALAI LAMA'S TAIWAN VISIT, JAPAN'S 
ELECTIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage September 1 on China's reaction to the visit by the Dalai 
Lama to Taiwan; on the "surprising" results of the KMT's primary for 
the year-end Hualien County Magistrate election; and on the H1N1 
epidemic in Taiwan.  In terms of editorials and commentaries, an 
op-ed in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" discussed the Dalai 
Lama's visit to Taiwan and said the Green camp appears to be the 
winner while the Blue camp has made substantive gains from the Dalai 
Lama's visit.  An editorial in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" lashed out at President Ma Ying-jeou 
and called him a "puppet" in handling the Dalai Lama's visit to 
Taiwan and cross-Strait relations.  With regard to the landslide 
victory of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 
nationwide elections Sunday, an op-ed in the pro-unification "United 
Daily News" said DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama will seek to form an 
equilateral strategic triangle among the United States, Japan and 
China.  A column in the KMT-leaning "China Times" also discussed the 
future direction of Japan's foreign policy and said the DPJ will 
draw itself farther away from Washington but closer to Beijing so as 
to balance the current situation and pursue Japan's own interests in 
its relations between the United States and China.  An editorial in 
the pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" said the rise 
to power of the DPJ "may affect the U.S.-Japan security 
relationship" and suggested that the DPP counteract possible efforts 
by Beijing and the KMT to take Taiwan out from under the U.S.-Japan 
security umbrella.  End summary. 
 
2. Dalai Lama's Taiwan Visit 
 
A) "Green [Camp] Saves Its Face While the Blue [Camp] Makes 
Substantive Gains" 
 
Professor Chen Mao-hsiung from National Sun Yat-sen University's 
Department of Electrical Engineering opined in the mass-circulation 
"Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] (8/31): 
 
"... For the United States, it hopes that the status quo will be 
maintained and no conflicts will emerge in the Taiwan Strait.  If it 
were [Taiwan's] ruling party that came forth and invited the Dalai 
Lama to visit Taiwan, not only would cross-Strait relations go 
downhill, but also the United States would face a dilemma.  But this 
time it was the opposition party that made the invitation, and the 
ruling party also did something appropriate to draw a clear line 
between itself and the Dalai Lama -- a move that not only justified 
its decision [to allow the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan] but also 
saved the United States from getting into any trouble. ...  The 
international media firmly believes that the Dalai Lama's visit to 
Taiwan will step on the red line drawn by China, [but] that was 
because they do not understand the confrontation between the Green 
[camp] and the Blue [camp] in Taiwan and the triangular relationship 
between the two camps and China.  The stronger the Green camp [tries 
to] push, the [more] it will draw the Ma administration and China 
closer together.  Only when the Ma administration tries proactively 
to let Taiwan be annexed by China, will the actions by the Green 
camp become a [force for] resistance.  If the goal of the Ma 
administration is to maintain the status quo [across the Taiwan 
Strait], the antagonism between the DPP and China will, on the 
contrary, create room for the Ma administration to [maneuver] and 
bargain [with China]; as a result, the DPP's actions can be regarded 
as aiding [Ma]." 
 
B) "Now the Punishment Begins" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (9/1): 
 
"... Beijing also had to act because of its global propaganda 
strategy to isolate the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause. Muted, 
targeted criticism, with an indirect snipe at Ma through its boycott 
of the Deaflympics' opening ceremony, was its only option.  While it 
needs Ma to remain in power and to be able to effect pro-China 
policies such as an economic cooperation framework agreement, 
Beijing is also using the Dalai Lama's visit to remind Ma who is in 
charge. Consequently, Beijing will likely tell the Ma administration 
that while it was willing to show flexibility by not reacting too 
strongly to the visit, the price for this would come in the form of 
concessions -- by Taiwan. 
 
"This development suggests that Ma is in a vicious circle. He is 
forced to make political decisions based not on his Cabinet's 
assessment of what is best for the country, but as unavoidable 
concessions to activist elements such as Morakot victims, the DPP 
and Beijing.  It's even worse if a president has to make a 
concession to mitigate the harm done by a previous concession, as 
could happen after Beijing seeks to cash in on its "goodwill" in not 
retaliating over the Dalai Lama's visit.  When political imperatives 
are driven by external forces -- as is the case here -- a president 
is no longer a leader.  He's a puppet." 
ELECTIONS 
 
 
3. Japan's Elections 
 
A) "Last Wishes of [DPJ Leader] Yukio Hatoyama's Grandfather -- 
Multilateral, Independent Diplomacy [for Japan]" 
 
Professor He Sishen from Fu Jen Catholic University's Department of 
Japanese Studies opined in the pro-unification "United Daily News" 
[circulation: 400,000] (9/1): 
 
"... Even though the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) will sense more 
acutely the pressure from the United States in the wake of its 
victory, ... the DPJ will still highlight in its foreign policy [the 
need to] construct an equal partnership with the United States.  To 
accomplish such a goal, Japan will have to strengthen its relations 
with its neighboring countries in East Asia, in particular, its 
relations with China.  It is expected that Sino-Japan relations will 
continue to advance after the DPJ takes over the helm. ... 
 
"Yet if the United States, in its increasing need to work with China 
on various international issues, tries to push Japan toward China, 
there will be more chances for the 'U.S.-Japan-China leaders' 
summit,' currently advocated by Japan, to be held.  Needless to say, 
the DPJ will try to avoid the possibility of allowing the United 
States to replace Japan with China; instead, while seeking to make 
Japan get rid of its reliance on the United States, the DPJ will 
take advantage of its relations with China to build leverage for its 
relations with the United States and thus create an equilateral 
strategic triangle among the United States, Japan and China. ..." 
 
B) "The Foreign Diplomacy Direction of the Democratic Party of 
Japan" 
 
The "International Lookout" column in the KMT-leaning "China Times" 
[circulation: 120,000] wrote (8/31): 
 
"The landslide victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 
nationwide elections Sunday was something expected.  What one needs 
to pay attention to should be the future direction of Japan's 
[foreign] policy.  What deserves [our] attention are:  First, is 
Japan moving toward a [diplomatic] objective of a multilateral 
approach that [links itself more closely] with the world, or it will 
still retain its unilateral [direction] of looking up to the United 
States?  Second, will it change its previous thinking of 'getting 
out of Asia' and return to [join] Asia?  Third, how is Japan going 
to deal with its relations with the United States and China?  Will 
it possibly emphasize the trilateral cooperation among the United 
States, China and Japan? ... 
 
"A plain and simple observation [shows that] the DPJ government will 
draw itself a little farther away from the United States and a 
little bit closer to China, in an attempt to balance the current 
situation and to pursue Japan's own interests [in its relations 
with] China and the United States.  [It appears that the] DPJ has 
not yet thought of forming an alliance among the United States, 
China and Japan." 
 
C) "DPJ Triumph Offers Challenge for Taiwan" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (9/1): 
 
"Japan experienced its most dramatic political turnabout in decades 
Sunday when the opposition centric (sic) Democratic Party of Japan 
scored a landslide victory over the long-ruling conservative Liberal 
Democratic party in lower house Diet elections, a triumph that will 
pave the way for DPJ President Hatoyama Yukio to become the first 
non LDP prime minister in 16 years. ...  At the same time, the rise 
to power of the DPJ, which has opposed the dispatch of Japan 
Self-defense Naval Forces to the Indian Ocean and closer relations 
with the PRC and other Asian neighbors, may affect the United 
States-Japan security relationship.  In the past, Tokyo had always 
followed Washington's lead in exchange for protection by America's 
"nuclear umbrella," but the DPJ has already indicated that it has no 
intention of continuing this slavish mentality in the future and 
will have its own strategic thinking that will reflect the national 
interests of Japan and its people, even though it will not consider 
abolishing the 2006 U.S.-Japan agreement on the adjustment of U.S. 
force deployment. 
 
"Whether the DPJ, which has good ties with the DPP, will also adjust 
the content of the U.S.-Japan security relationship to exclude 
Taiwan is unlikely, but by no means inconceivable. Since the KMT, 
and hard-line "independence" proponents in the DPP, have 
traditionally had closer ties with LDP and other elements of the 
Japanese right-wing, the sudden rise to power of the center-left DPJ 
will leave the rightist KMT government under China-centric President 
Ma Ying-jeou in a rather awkward position. ...  The DPP should jump 
ELECTIONS 
 
to rise out of such narcissism and realize that the DPJ's example 
shows that center-left grassroots parties can defeat rich and 
rightist one party dominant parties in single seat district 
parliamentary elections. Moreover, only active initiatives to 
promote dialogue with DPJ parliamentarians by the DPP can counteract 
possible efforts by both Beijing and Ma's China-centric KMT 
administration to take Taiwan out of the U.S.-Japan security 
umbrella and into the PRC's orbit.  Proactive party diplomacy on the 
DPP's part is essential now to help ensure that the first real 
change of skies (sic) in Tokyo in over five decades will lead to 
greater strategic independence from both the PRC and the U.S. and 
the promotion of interests of Japan's people in terms of the values 
of democracy and social justice." 
 
STANTON