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Viewing cable 09DHAKA825, GOB IMPLEMENTING CHITTAGONG HILL TRACT PEACE ACCORDS,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DHAKA825 2009-08-23 09:24 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dhaka
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKA #0825/01 2350924
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADA332BB MSI8226-695)
R 230924Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9347
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2158
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2907
UNCLAS DHAKA 000825 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
 
STATE FOR SCA/INSB, SCA/RA AND DRL 
STATE FOR INR/OPS ACTING DIRECTOR MICHAEL P. OWNES 
STATE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PINR MOPS PHUM PREL PGOV EAID BM BG
SUBJECT: GOB IMPLEMENTING CHITTAGONG HILL TRACT PEACE ACCORDS, 
OPPOSITION PARTY HOWLS 
 
REF:  A) Dhaka 763 
  B) Dhaka 476 (NOTAL) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU)  Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (CHTC) monitors credit 
PM Sheikh Hasina's personal commitment to peace in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts with progress towards implementation of the 1997 Peace 
Accords between the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) and indigenous 
groups.  In an August 18 donor briefing, Commission Co-Chair Lord 
Eric Avebury dismissed opposition Bangladesh National Party's (BNP) 
claims that Hasina's decision to withdraw military units from the 
Hill Tracts bordering India and Burma would foster insecurity. The 
CHTC Co-Chair said the planned withdrawal was largely "cosmetic" and 
would likely improve law and order in the Hill Tracts, where the 
military stood accused of numerous human rights abuses.  Despite 
this progress, the Commission believes the GOB lacks a strategic 
framework and implementation timetable.  The polarization of 
Bangladeshi politics on the issue could limit the window for 
progress to the 4 and 1/2 years remaining until the next national 
elections. 
 
Making Progress, Thanks to PM Hasina 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU)  On August 18, members of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Commission briefed donors on their recent visits to the field and 
meetings with GOB officials, including Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. 
 (Note: The CHTC is an international NGO established to monitor 
implementation of the 1997 Peace Accords signed between the GOB and 
indigenous groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts that abut India and 
Burma (Ref. B).) Commission Co-Chair and Member of the UK House of 
Lords Eric Avebury said, whereas earlier governments had sought to 
suppress dissent in the Hill Tracts militarily, Prime Minister 
Sheikh Hasina was committed to a "political solution."  Avebury said 
the impact of Hasina's commitment was palpable in the Commission's 
recent field visit; brigade commanders who had previously expressed 
pessimism about reducing the military's role in the region now 
voiced optimism the civil administration and police could 
effectively govern the areas.  In the six months since Hasina's 
Awami League took power, the GOB had moved to close down 
controversial commercial plantation agriculture on disputed land, 
set up a commission to resolve land disputes, and announce a 
withdrawal of military units from the Hill Tracts. 
 
Planned Troop Withdrawal Good for Security 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (SBU)  Avebury was dismissive of claims made by former PM 
Khaleda Zia and other opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) 
leaders that the GOB's decision to withdraw some military units from 
the Hill Tracts (Ref A) would invite insecurity in the region. 
Avebury said three Brigade Commanders told the Commission that the 
withdrawal would not lead to a rise in violence or disorder. 
According to Avebury and other commissioners, the planned withdrawal 
was largely "cosmetic," and would not reduce the military's ability 
to exert its power throughout the Hill Tracts, where only 35 of more 
than 300 military outposts would be closed.  To the extent security 
was affected, it would be for the better, argued Avebury, since the 
military stood accused of numerous human rights abuses against the 
local population. 
 
GOB Needs a Roadmap, and Political Support 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4.  (SBU)  Avebury was concerned, however, that the GOB did not 
possess a road map with verifiable timelines for implementation of 
the 1997 Accords, especially for resolving the tens of thousands of 
disputed land claims that arose out of previous GOB administrations' 
efforts to populate the Hill Tracts with ethnic Bengalis by offering 
land, often irregularly granted, to ethnic Bengali migrants. 
According to Avebury, Hasina told the Commission the GOB could 
finance implementation of the Accords, but she needed "moral and 
political support" to push ahead with implementation in the face of 
strong opposition.  Asked what the donor community could do to help 
the Commission, Avebury suggested that foreign missions could 
impress on Hasina the need for a time-bound implementation plan 
while providing the moral and political support she requested. 
 
Comment: Praise-Worthy Political Solution 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  The Awami League government deserves recognition for its 
work to implement the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tract Accords, which had 
stalled during the BNP and caretaker regimes (Ref B).  The challenge 
for PM Hasina's government will be to ensure that civilian 
authorities, especially the police, maintain law and order in the 
wake of the military's withdrawal, providing security for settlers 
while respecting the rights of indigenous groups.  Opponents of the 
Peace Accords, especially ethnic Bengali settlers, might instigate 
conflict; even the perception of weakened security would likely 
embolden critics of Hasina's "political solution."  The United 
States should continue to exploit opportunities to voice support for 
the Peace Accords.  Responding to a press question after his August 
20 meeting with Foreign Minister Dipu Moni (septel), the Ambassador 
reiterated U.S. support for implementation of the 1997 Peace 
Accords. 
 
MORIARTY.