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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1040, NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) REVIEW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1040 2009-08-20 20:13 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #1040/01 2322013
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 202013Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4907
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1597
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0175
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0321
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0027
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001040 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 
TAGS: KNNP AORC ENRG MNUC PARM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) REVIEW 
CONFERENCE 2010: REPORTING REQUEST 
 
REF: SECSTATE 83600 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske.  Reason: 1.4(D) 
 
1.  (C)  Post has recently held extensive conversations with 
Brazilian authorities on the NPT revcon, particularly in 
connection with the August 5-6 visit of NSC WMD coordinator 
Samore (reported septel).  Brazil believes that a successful 
revcon will be in its interest but defines success as the 
absence of public disunity.  As a non-nuclear weapons state, 
Brazil believes that the key to a harmonious revcon will be 
commitment on the part of the NWS to disarmament and 
officially places a higher priority on this goal than on 
reinforcing nonproliferation standards against challenges 
from Iran and North Korea.  Brazil's secondary interest will 
be in protecting its nuclear power program, especially the 
navy-run enrichment facility, from closer international 
scrutiny.  Approaches to Brazil should build upon President 
Obama's Prague speech committing the USG to disarmament and 
should be crafted to use Brazil's desire to be treated as a 
world power to ask it to take a leading role in the success 
of the revcon.  Frequent engagement with high-level Brazilian 
authorities can be useful.  As Brazil will begin a term as a 
non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in January, 
its approach on revcon-related issues will be calculated to 
enhance its standing as a key UNSC member.  The Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) should be included prominently in USG outreach 
as it controls Brazil's enrichment program and has been most 
resistant to engaging on noproliferation out of concern that 
such engagement will lead to greater restrictions on its 
activities.  Answers to reftel questions appear in paragraphs 
2 and 3 below. 
 
2.  (C)  Answers to reftel paragraph 6: 
 
--  General attitude: The GOB supports all major arms control 
regimes.  Brazil is strongly influenced by its own decision 
to forego its nuclear weapons program and join the NPT.  It 
views the NWS' commitment to disarmament as the core of the 
Treaty and has conditioned further participation in 
international nonproliferation efforts on greater 
disarmament.  Brazil has reacted negatively to the decision 
to help India's nuclear industry, regarding this as rewarding 
India for not joining the NPT. 
 
--  Position in CD and Revcon: Brazil is likely to support 
further arms control measures (CTBT, FMCT) and look for the 
revcon to place additional emphasis on disarmament. 
 
--  Partner countries:  Brazil coordinates its nuclear policy 
with Argentina and should be expected to work with other NNWS 
to tilt the revcon toward disarmament over nonproliferation. 
Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE) authorities 
have indicated an openness to working with the USG and other 
NWS prior to the revcon.  While Brazil's relationship with 
Iran does not extend to close cooperation or partnership, it 
is worth noting that Brazil maintains a cordial commercial 
relationship with Iran and generally refrains from direct 
criticism of Iran's nuclear program, preferring to blame 
proliferation problems on the slow pace of disarmament, 
regional tensions and Israel's nuclear program. 
 
--  Key GOB personnel:  Brazilian foreign policy is conducted 
by the MRE.  Under Secretary Vera Machado will be in the lead 
for the revcon and will coordinate with Brazilian Ambassadors 
in New York, Vienna and Geneva.  Because of its ownership of 
the enrichment process, the MOD will also play a key role and 
can be expected to resist any pressure to curb member states' 
right to enrichment or additional scrutiny of enrichment 
facilities. 
 
--  Role in international organizations:  Brazil is one of 
the leaders of the developing world in international 
organizations.  As a NNWS that gave up its nuclear program, 
the GOB believes it carries a great deal of influence among 
other NNWS. 
 
--  Policy process: The MRE is key in setting Brazil's 
nonproliferation and arms control policies.  The Presidency, 
MOD, Government Security Office and National Commission on 
Nuclear Energy are also involved.  MRE will consult with 
these other agencies and prodice policies for Presidency 
endorsement that reflect everyone's input.  As a result, one 
Ministry, in the case of nonproliferation issues usually the 
MOD, can often effectively veto new initiatives by blocking 
consensus. 
 
 
--  Key policy factors: A key foreign policy concern is 
attaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.  To 
gain this, the GOB tries to avoid taking controversial 
positions and track its policies with what will appeal to the 
largest number of UN members, i.e. the NAM.  The GOB will not 
be above grandstanding to the NNWS by opposing the P5 if it 
believes this will build support for Brazil's cause, but will 
strive for consensus and the outward appearance of unity. 
 
--  Arms Control Personnel: Brazilian missions in New York, 
Geneva and Vienna do not have full time employees dedicated 
to arms control and nonproliferation, although these issues 
compose a large portion of the work of these Brazilian 
missions. 
 
--  Key Meetings: The MRE augments its overseas missions 
during key meetings with staff from the Division of 
Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies. 
 
--  Role of non-government entities:  The nuclear power 
industry, academia and NGOs play little or no role in the 
formation of Brazilian policy.  Nuclear power is seen as 
important for the country's long-term energy needs, and 
Brazil's nuclear power program received a strong official 
endorsement when it was identified in the 2008 Defense 
Strategy as vital to national security.  Some NGOs have 
expressed reservations about the environmental effects of 
nuclear power, but these have little influence. 
 
3.  (C)  Answers to reftel paragraph 7: 
 
--  As noted in paragraph 2, Brazil often aligns itself with 
other developing countries.  There is a lingering view among 
many Brazilian elites that Brazil gave up its nuclear option 
too easily, a view seemingly justified by the supposedly 
advantageous deal India received.  This has fostered 
something of an inferiority complex among Brazilians 
strengthening the view that NWS disarmament has been 
inadequate and should be the highest NPT priority.  Brazil 
will align with NPT members taking this position and will be 
less forceful in supporting nonproliferation measures as a 
result, but will seek consensus on all issues rather than 
public divisions. 
 
--  Brazil sees itself as a leader of developing countries 
and will try to shape the overall positions of its 
colleagues.  As noted above, the Brazilian priority for the 
revcon is to reach consensus and avoid dissunity that would 
undermine the overall effectiveness of the Treaty regime. 
 
--  Brazilian representatives will receive detailed guidance 
from Brasilia and will have little flexibility without 
consulting the capital. 
 
KUBISKE