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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1038, VISIT OF WMD COORDINATOR SAMORE TO BRASILIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1038 2009-08-20 18:25 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXYZ0020
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #1038/01 2321825
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201825Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4905
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1595
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0173
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0319
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001038 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, T AND ISN. NSC FOR SAMORE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019 
TAGS: KNUP PARM PREL NPT IAEA MNUC BR
SUBJECT: VISIT OF WMD COORDINATOR SAMORE TO BRASILIA 
 
REF: BRASILIA 725 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske.  Reason: 1.4(d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  NSC WMD Coordinator  Gary Samore visited 
Brasilia August 6-7 to hold discussions with senior Brazilian 
officials on North Korea, Iran and strengthening 
international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. 
Samore approached the Brazilians as potential partners in 
nonproliferation efforts, pointing out that Brazil,s 
decision to forego its own nuclear weapons option and 
concentrate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy gave it high 
credibility as a counter example to Iran.  Brazilian 
interlocutors were receptive to Samore,s message and 
believed that President Obama,s Prague speech was important 
and opened the way for further dialogue; however, they 
preferred to focus on the importnace of nuclear weapons 
states (NWS) disarming rather than engage on 
nonproliferation.  The GOB responded positively to proposals 
for a nuclear  security summit and for consultations on the 
2010 NPT revcon.  Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco 
Aurelio Garcia sounded a hopeful note by saying that the 
Administration,s approach to disarmament would be helpful to 
Brazil in addressing the question of signing an Additional 
Protocol (AP) with the IAEA and that he thought a solution 
could be reached.  Prof. Garcia agreed to Samore,s proposal 
that a U.S. team of experts would visit Brazil to discuss 
implementation of the Additional Protocol.  The visit 
provided important clarification of the roles of various GOB 
agencies on nonproliferation issues.  Although there was no 
indication that Brazil is prepared immediately to play a more 
positive role on key nonproliferation issues, Samore's visit 
opened the way to a more robust dialogue that would be 
important to eventually encouraging Brazil to adopt a more 
constructive approach.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU)  Samore's discussions included meetings with the 
Ministries of External Relations (MRE) and Defense (MOD), the 
Presidency and the Office for Institutional Security, newly 
designated to oversee security at nuclear installations.  His 
 
meetings on nuclear energy will be reported septel.  While 
responsibilities for energy are relatively clear cut, Brazil 
is still developing its nuclear policy formulation process 
with the MRE Under Secretary for Political Affairs playing a 
coordinating role.  Samore's meeting at the MOD confirmed 
that protecting Brazil's enrichment program from greater 
oversight will remain a component of Brazilian policy.  All 
GOB agencies, however, welcomed the opportunity for further 
dialogue with USG counterparts. 
 
North Korea 
----------- 
3.  (C)  Samore raised North Korea with Ministry for External 
Relations Under Secretary Roberto Jaguaribe who pointed out 
that working with the North Koreans was often difficult 
because &they always stick to their script.8 Jaguaribe said 
he believed the six party talks were the only way to proceed, 
but urged the USG to also seek increased bilateral dialogue 
with the DPRK.  Samore,s statement that he did not see much 
short term prospect for North Korea curtailing its nuclear 
program led to a lengthy discourse from Jaguaribe on the 
inefficacy of sanctions and the importance of dialogue, 
particularly via the six party process as this would bring 
the United States, Russia and China together. 
 
Iran 
---- 
4.  (C)  Samore encouraged Brazil to use its relatively good 
relations with Iran to encourage a constructive approach to 
the international community.  Despite offers of dialogue from 
Washington, Iran had not responded and had not halted 
enrichment activities.  If Iran does not respond soon, the 
U.S. will have no choice but to turn to sanctions.  Foreign 
Minister Celso Amorim urged engagement with Iran and placing 
Iran,s nuclear ambitions in the context of the larger Middle 
East situation.  He recommended that a way should be found 
not to make Iran give up its enrichment activities, but to 
avoid enriched uranium being used for weapons.  Jaguaribe 
said that Brazil had advised the Iranian government to 
respond to President Obama,s proposals constructively and 
believed that Iran,s internal problems might lead to a more 
constructive approach to the international community.  At the 
same time, both Amorim and Jaguaribe raised Israel,s nuclear 
program as a primary reason for Iranian behavior. 
Presidential Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia went further, 
citing Israeli disarmament as a precondition for addressing 
Iranian proliferation.  Garcia offered Brazilian assistance 
in promoting dialogue with both Iran and North Korea, but he 
would not commit to urging Iran to suspend  enrichment 
activity to allow time for dialogue on the issue. 
 
Additional Protocol 
------------------- 
5.  (C)  Samore cited the adoption of an Additional Protocol 
to the NPT as an area in which Brazil can add to its 
leadership role in the area of nonproliferation.  He pointed 
out that many countries, including the United States, had 
concerns about protecting proprietary technology and had been 
able to work out arrangements with the IAEA that allowed them 
to sign APs.  MRE Director for Sensitive Technologies 
Santiago Mourao said that of the resistance in Brazil to an 
AP has come from the MOD, which supervises Brazilian 
enrichment operations run by the Brazilian navy as part of 
its nuclear propulsion program.  MOD Chief of Staff Murilo 
Barbosa argued that an AP for Brazil was not necessary, 
because Brazil already belonged to other nonproliferation 
regimes and maintained that Brazil,s defense strategy (which 
he helped write) prevented further discussion.  Barbosa also 
pointed out, as evidence of why an AP is not needed, that 
Brazil (because of navy ownership of enrichment) is the only 
NNWS with a military facility under safeguards.  During 
Samore,s visit to Rio de Janeiro, Nuclear Energy Commission 
President Goncalves said that his organization had prepared 
&technical documents8 on the AP but declined to discuss 
them absent a political decision to consider an AP.   Mourao 
stated that steps toward NWS disarmament would be a 
precondition for Brazil to consider an AP.  Garcia was 
slightly more positive on this point when he told Samore that 
the Administration,s new openness to disarmament would be 
helpful.  &I think we can reach a solution,8 he said. 
Defense Minister Jobim did not evince such optimism but 
agreed that there was scope for work on possible technical 
solutions to Brazil,s concerns.  As a follow up to the 
discussions, Brazilian officials agreed to host a visit by 
U.S. experts to discuss the Additional Protocol. 
 
Other Issues: NPT RevCon, Nuclear Safety, PSI, Fuel Bank, 
Nuclear Suppliers Group 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
6.  (C)  In each of Samore,s meetings, the Brazilian side 
praised President Obama,s Prague speech as opening the way 
to a more successful NPT revcon in 2010.  Amorim expressed 
interest in discussing the revcon agenda with the P5 and 
urged greater consultations with the NNWS.  Similarly, Amorim 
and Under Secretary for Political Affairs Machado pushed for 
an increased Brazilian role in FMCT negotiations and 
supported U.S.-Brazil bilateral consultations on disarmament 
(without mentioning nonproliferation).  Brazilian responses 
to the proposed Nuclear Security Summit were positive, though 
non-committal.  Institutional Security Director Felix reacted 
positively to future discussions on critical infrastructure 
protection, a new responsibility of his office.  Similarly, 
Machado expressed interest in learning more about the PSI and 
agreed to U.S. proposal for expert talks on PSI, but gave no 
indication that Brazil was prepared to join PSI.  The 
Brazilian side indicated it would join consensus in support 
of IAEA Director General El Baradei,s proposal for a nuclear 
fuel bank but expressed reservations about discouraging 
enrichment that could affect Brazil,s nuclear industry.  The 
Brazilian side also said they could &work with8 the 
proposed Australian language for the Nuclear Supplier Group 
guidelines for transfers of ENR. 
 
7.  (C)  COMMENT.  Post regards the Samore visit as producing 
opportunities for further dialogue on nonproliferation 
issues.  Samore's Brazilian contacts expressed themselves to 
be open to further discussions and were pleased to be 
approached as an important partner on global issues.  That 
said, it is clear that Brazil's positions will not change in 
the short term.  Brazil will still champion the NNWS and 
highlight disarmament over proliferation and will prefer to 
cite Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy rather than 
focus on the dangers of proliferation in the Middle East. 
While further dialogue may not produce rapid improvments in 
these positions, it will be key for developing a long-term 
relationship in which Brazil becomes a more important global 
stability partner. 
 
8.  (U) This cable has been cleared by WMD Coordinator Samore. 
KUBISKE