Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BOGOTA2627, WILL COLOMBIA-VENEZUELA TRADE SURVIVE THE RHETORIC?

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BOGOTA2627.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BOGOTA2627 2009-08-21 13:13 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #2627/01 2331313
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211313Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0243
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 9081
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2659
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ AUG 0238
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7958
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 4082
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 8617
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 2507
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS BOGOTA 002627 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/EPSC 
WHA/AND 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD PREL PGOV CO
SUBJECT: WILL COLOMBIA-VENEZUELA TRADE SURVIVE THE RHETORIC? 
 
REF: A. CARACAS 1062 
     B. BOGOTA 1431 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Venezuela's July 28 decision to freeze 
diplomatic relations with Colombia has put the Colombian 
business community on edge and complicated bilateral trade 
discussions.  While Colombian exports to Venezuela for the 
first half of 2009 had remained resilient in the face of an 
overall export decline, Chavez' decision to restrict imports 
from Colombia will cause short-term pain.  The longer-term 
trade implications of the latest diplomatic spat are less 
clear, as Colombian-Venezuelan trade has weathered, and even 
thrived under, previous adverse situations.  Venezuela has 
the ability to restrict imports from Colombia, but the high 
degree of interdependence along the border, coupled with the 
costs of substituting away from Colombia, lead many 
Colombians to see the latest spat as just another bump on the 
trade relationship's rocky road.  The situation further 
reinforces the GOC's commitment to diversifying its export 
markets through the pursuit of free trade agreements.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
EXPORTS TO VENEZUELA RESILIENT IN FIRST HALF OF 2009 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
2. (U) Colombia's exports to Venezuela through June, 2009 
declined by only three percent compared to the same period in 
2008.  This contrasts with an 18 percent decline in global 
Colombian exports and defies (at least for the first six 
months) predictions of a sharp decrease in bilateral trade 
for 2009 (Ref B).  Carlos Fabian Cepeda, Director of Economic 
Studies at the Colombian-Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce, 
noted that the overall composition of Colombian exports to 
Venezuela is beginning to shift from manufactured items to 
primary goods, as a result of Venezuela's endogenous 
growth/import substitution model. 
 
DIPLOMATIC ROW MEANS SHORT-TERM PAIN, LONG-TERM UNCERTAINTY 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
3. (SBU) President Chavez' decision to "freeze" diplomatic 
relations with Colombia and exact trade-related punishment 
will certainly cause Colombia problems in the short term. 
While GOC officials hesitate to estimate the impact on trade 
of the latest dust-up, Trade Ministry's Director for Economic 
Integration Alfredo Ramos noted that the bureaucratic steps 
for Colombian exporters to Venezuela have increased 
exponentially and that frequent, random border closings and 
arbitrary rejection of Colombian goods have become the norm. 
 
4. (SBU) Ramos said that the Venezuelan website to apply for 
preferential exchange rate dollars (Cadivi) no longer offers 
Colombia on its drop-down menu of import-origin countries. 
(Note: Venezuelan importers still owe US$275 million to 
Colombian exporters, funds that are tied up in the Cadivi 
bureaucracy.  End note.)  Venezuela's suspension of cheap 
gasoline exports to Colombia will certainly affect the border 
department of Norte de Santander and lead to increased 
smuggling.  The Venezuelan decision to revoke import licenses 
for 10,000 Colombian vehicles, on the other hand, will have 
little effect since Colombian carmakers had not tooled up for 
those orders out of fear of not getting paid. 
 
5. (SBU) What these measures mean for the medium and long 
term is less clear and depends on how willing Chavez is to 
inflict economic pain on Venezuelans for the sake of making 
his point to Colombia.  According to Cepeda, the border 
region has a high degree of interdependence and substituting 
Argentine or Brazilian goods for Colombian ones will 
introduce higher prices into an already tenuous Venezuelan 
inflation environment.  GOC officials privately hope that, 
like previous upsets with Venezuela, this one will blow over 
and some normality can be restored to the trade relationship. 
 Business community leaders acknowledge that their current 
malaise is not new; it is merely an extension of the 
fragility of the bilateral relationship over the last several 
years. 
 
BILATERAL TRADE TALKS STILL GOING NOWHERE, EVEN SLOWER 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
6. (SBU) According to Ramos, GOC trade officials' principal 
underlying fear over this latest round of bad blood is how 
much it will delay bilateral talks on an agreement to replace 
Venezuela's Andean Community (CAN) commitments, which expire 
in April, 2011.  Talks were never moving fast to begin with 
(Ref B) and are now non-existent.  Trade Minister Plata was 
in Caracas Wednesday, August 19, for an Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF) event and spent a total of 30 seconds 
talking with his Venezuelan counterpart, Eduardo Saman. 
 
LATEST SPAT UNDERSCORES NEED TO DIVERSIFY EXPORT MARKETS 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
7. (SBU) Colombia's push to have nine FTAs in place with 45 
countries by 2010 is part of its efforts to diversify its 
export markets. Chavez' latest show of bluster reinforces the 
need to diversify away from its second largest, (and most 
erratic) export market.  Some in the business community 
opined that this most recent incident may in fact have a 
silver lining in that uncertainty over Venezuela will force 
traditionally cautious and complacent Colombian 
businesspeople to explore non-traditional export markets more 
than any free trade agreement could. 
Brownfield