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Viewing cable 09BANGUI191, BANGUI RESPONSE TO STATE 087508 - STATE OF CIVILIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BANGUI191 2009-08-28 20:07 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bangui
VZCZCXRO3854
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHGI #0191/01 2402007
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 282007Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1020
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0008
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0198
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0115
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0303
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0314
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0213
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0157
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0153
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0503
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0488
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0144
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0475
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1285
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000191 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
NAIROBI  FOR AKARAS 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
INR FOR CNEARY 
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON 
PRM FOR GPARKER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL PHUM PINR MOPS CG UG SU CT
SUBJECT: BANGUI RESPONSE TO STATE 087508 - STATE OF CIVILIAN 
PROTECTION AGAINST LRA ATTACKS IN THE CAR 
 
REF: A. A- 09 State 87508 
     B. Ref B - 09 Bangui 190 
     C. Ref C - 08 Bangui 64 
     D. Ref D - 09 Bangui 50 
 
BANGUI 00000191  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Fundamentally, the solution to the LRA 
incursion into the Central African Republic (CAR) does not lie 
on the Central African side. The humanitarian community, already 
overstretched by the enormous demands in the rest of the CAR is 
trying to respond to the relatively small (but growing) needs of 
the Obo region of southeastern CAR. In its efforts, the 
humanitarian community is hampered by the distance to Obo, the 
rains, and the lack of physical and financial resources.  The 
government (CARG) has sent 150 soldiers to the Obo area, 
approximately ten percent of their entire combat ready force. 
The small contingents of international forces in the CAR do not 
currently have the capacity, mandate, or desire to extend 
assistance to this region; thus any military solution will have 
to come from the Ugandans.  The USG could help alleviate the 
stress upon the humanitarians by contributing financially to the 
UN, but a greater engagement or pressure upon the CARG is 
unlikely to be successful. Only the Ugandan military (UPDF) has 
any real capacity to stop the LRA from re-grouping in the CAR. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) The Central African Army (FACA) has deployed 90 
soldiers to Obo with 60 more currently on their way. This is 
approximately ten percent of their entire ``combat ready'' force 
of 1300-1500. The FACA ground commander is a former IMET grad 
with three years experience in Obo. The French Defense Attache 
(DATT), who has very close relations with the FACA, states he is 
happy with quality of the leadership on the ground but concedes 
that his confidence is relative to the overall quality of the 
FACA. The FACA normally suffer from an extreme lack of means, 
but have been given some cash for fuel by the French and appear 
to have sufficient ammunition. They have, however, broken the 
frame of their only vehicle. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
FACA says the force aims to have a 3-to-1 ratio in their favor 
when engaging hostile forces. Furthermore, communication with 
humanitarian relief groups is sporadic, although some FACA units 
are reportedly planning to deploy to Mboki (west of Obo) to 
protect humanitarian food supplies following a rumor of a 
planned LRA attack. Importantly, the local population was very 
vocal in expressing their complete lack of confidence in the 
FACA to the Ambassador and the UN representative during a recent 
visit to Obo. 
 
3. (SBU) Information on the UPDF is less exact: Post understands 
they have 200 soldiers near Obo with two helicopters and a light 
reconnaissance aircraft. Post has received conflicting reports 
about the level of coordination between the forces, but tends to 
believe that the better armed and trained UPDF is likely acting 
in minimal coordination with the FACA; however, a joint 
FACA-UPDF operation on August 27, 2009 resulted in seven LRA 
fatalities. According to the French DATT and the newly appointed 
head of the Presidential Guard, the FACA has placed no 
restrictions on the number of UPDF allowed on Central African 
territory. The Chief of Staff of the FACA is reportedly headed 
to Kampala in early September for direct consultations with the 
UPDF. 
 
4. (SBU) UN contacts fear the current humanitarian response may 
be insufficient. A current interagency mission is in the area 
with supplies, mostly nonfood items, meant for 2,500 internally 
displaced people and refugees. The UN High Commission of 
 
BANGUI 00000191  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Refugees (UNHCR) has registered 800 Congolese in Mboki and they 
suspect there are at least 400 in Obo with more arriving each 
day. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance (OCHA) estimates that there are at least 3,000 to 
4,000 IDPs and a maximum of 5,000 IDPs in the area.  The World 
Food Program (WFP) has sent a convoy in the last week with 
enough food to feed 2,000 displaced people for two months. 
Therefore, the UN may have underestimated the scope of the 
problem by about half. OCHA, which is coordinating the 
interagency mission, has basic contingency plans in place for up 
to 40,000 refugees and displaced people in the Obo area, but 
these plans have not been stress tested. OCHA contacts told Post 
that they will have a better of view of their options when the 
interagency team returns at the start of September. 
 
5. (U) The various UN agencies have identified three pressing 
needs: 
 
--  More funding for Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) which 
will help bring additional aid to Obo and Birao (Ref B). While 
there is currently one plane available, OCHA and WFP are seeking 
an additional plane dedicated to providing supplies. 
 
--  Ground transport based in Obo such as pickup trucks and 
personnel transport. Until now, there has been very little 
humanitarian activity (only one significant NGO was active) and 
there is very little capacity to move the goods needed. This 
means that vehicles must be dispatched from Bangui for every 
visit. Transit time is five to seven days, each way, depending 
on rains, rivers, and bridges. 
 
--  Funds to set up a base of operations in the area. The UN is 
working out of temporary lodgings and want something more 
stable. 
 
6. (SBU) With only about 300 troops, the UN Mission in Chad and 
Central Africa (MINURCAT) has no mandate or capacity to leave 
Birao in the Northeast.  Furthermore, the Obo area is well 
beyond their helicopter medevac range. The Mission for the 
Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX) does not have the 
funding or will to extend their mission to the Southeast. They 
have shown scant inclination to engage in military operations in 
their own areas of operation and there are no plans to extend 
their limited capacities to Obo. 
 
7. (SBU)  Very little, if anything, should be expected from the 
CARG, even if the LRA re-groups in the CAR. Obo is simply too 
far, too sparsely populated and too removed from politics in 
Bangui to illicit a major response. Though President Bozize 
hopes to celebrate World Food Day in Obo in October 2009, Post 
believes this is not a signal of political will but more of a 
show to the rest of the country that Bozize's influence 
encompasses the entirety of the country. If instability 
persists, he would, without hesitation, cancel the plans. 
 
8. (SBU) The French Embassy is the only other major 
international player outside of the UN that is in any way 
engaged with this issue (NOTE: The Russians and the Chinese do 
not engage on internal affairs and the CEMAC ambassadors lack 
the means and capacity to act. END NOTE). The French response 
has been limited to military to military information sharing. 
They do not consider that the southeast is connected enough to 
CAR politics nor do they think the threat posed by the LRA is 
significant at this point. The French DATT did say, though, that 
 
BANGUI 00000191  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
a ``significant presence'' of the LRA on Central African 
territory would force them to reassess the situation, but it is 
worth noting that they continually denied the presence of the 
LRA in the CAR for months, even after the Ambassador's extended 
trip in 2008 (Ref C). 
 
9. (SBU) COMMENT: The continued presence of the Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA) around Obo is troubling as it further 
stresses the abilities of humanitarian actors to respond to the 
already onerous needs of the CAR. But while the LRA attracts 
much attention in Washington, it does not in the CAR. This is 
because the threat posed by the LRA pales when taken in context 
with the humanitarian needs elsewhere in the CAR.  It should be 
noted that the total population of the region does not exceed 
65,000, fewer than the number of CAR refugees already in Chad, 
for example. Ongoing internal conflicts around Ndele (Ref D), 
Birao, the lingering displacement of approximately 130,000 
people, and the presence of multiple armed groups and road 
bandits throughout the country are higher priorities for the 
government and the humanitarian community. END COMMENT. 
COOK