Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BAMAKO511, MALI'S AUDITOR GENERAL RELEASES 2009 REPORT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BAMAKO511.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAMAKO511 2009-08-03 15:39 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bamako
VZCZCXRO3528
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0511/01 2151539
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031539Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0608
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000511 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAID ETRD EINT EAGR ML
SUBJECT: MALI'S AUDITOR GENERAL RELEASES 2009 REPORT 
 
REF: BAMAKO 00232 
 
1. (SBU) On July 13, Mali's Office of the Auditor General 
(BVG) released its fourth annual report.  Notwithstanding a 
tumultuous year for the office and the Auditor General, the 
BVG was able to conduct 49 audits in 2008, up from 33 in 
2007.  Among the 25 entities audited, the BVG identifed 98 
billion CFA (USD 200 million) of revenue lost to the Treasury 
between 2003-2007.  Of that figure, 40.64 billion CFA (USD 81 
million) was attributed to fraud, and 57.63 billion CFA (USD 
75 million) was due to mismanagement.  If history is any 
guide, the government will recover much of the money 
identified in the report, and the audited institutions will 
implement some of the changes suggested by the BVG.  It is 
unlikely, however, that the corruption identified in the 
report will result in criminal prosecutions.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
End of an Interesting Year 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On July 13, Mali's Office of the Auditor General 
(BVG) released its fourth annual report.  As in the past, the 
Auditor General Sidi Sosso Diarra first delivered copies to 
the President, followed by the Prime Minister and other 
officials in the Government.  On July 28, Diarra presented 
his findings to the Malian press corps and responded to 
criticisms of the BVG's methodology and conclusions. 
 
3. (SBU) The most remarkable aspect of this year's report is 
that it was published at all.  During the course of the year, 
Diarra faced what he described as a "media lynching," a major 
French consulting firm recommended that the BVG be scrapped, 
and Diarra himself was placed under arrest during a showdown 
with the Malian judiciary (see reftel).  At the July 28 press 
conference, Diarra insisted the adversity only strengthened 
the BVG's resolve to complete its work effectively. 
 
-------------- 
A Lot of Money 
-------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The BVG was able to conduct 49 audits in 2008, 
compared to only 33 in 2007.  The 49 audits took place within 
25 government entities, and identified approximately 98 
billion CFA (200 million USD) lost to the Malian Treasury 
between 2003 and 2007.  To put this figure in perspective, 98 
billion CFA is equivalent to 10% of Mali's budget of 1.001 
trillion CFA (2 billion USD), and almost equal to Mali's 
budget deficit of 128 billion CFA (256 million USD).  Of the 
98 billion CFA identified as lost by the BVG, 40.64 billion 
CFA (81 million USD) was due to fraud (defined as theft, 
deviations of funds, and double and/or unjustified payments), 
and 57.63 billion CFA (75 million USD) was due to 
mismanagement.  In all, the BVG estimated that 89.5 percent 
of that money, or almost 88 billion CFA (176 million USD) 
could still be recovered by the government if certain steps 
were taken.  Comment: Given the limited resources of the 
Malian government, this seems like a very high estimate.  End 
Comment. 
 
5. (SBU) Remarkably, 76 billion of the 98 billion CFA 
identified by the BVG as lost to the Malian state were the 
responsibility of just three audited entities: the INPS 
(Social Security), Customs, and the Treasury itself.  The BVG 
determined INPS was responsible for losing 22 billion CFA (44 
million USD) by failing to pursue employers who did not 
regularly pay social security contributions for their 
employees.  The Treasury as an institution was the greatest 
culprit of all, costing itself 44 billion CFA (88 million 
USD).  The greatest problem identified at Treasury consisted 
of 25.5 billion CFA (51 million USD) of payments for which no 
documentation existed to explain or justify the expense. 
 
------------------------ 
Criticism and Complaints 
------------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) The BVG has frequently been criticized for being a 
redundant agency duplicating audit mechanisms already in 
place in Mali, such as the Accounting Section of the Supreme 
Court.  In addition, the entities audited often take issue 
with the conclusions of the report, particularly when the 
conclusions of the report conflict with audits conducted by 
other entities.  In this year's report, for example, the 
National Agency for Provincial Investment (ANICT) was blamed 
for the loss of 40 million CFA (80,000 USD), notwithstanding 
the Agency having been audited by a European Union service 
that found no financial impropriety. 
 
7. (SBU) The BVG, in turn, points out that each entity 
audited has an opportunity to present written objections and 
 
BAMAKO 00000511  002 OF 002 
 
 
explanations to the auditing teams; and after the draft audit 
is written, the audit team meets with management to discuss 
disagreements.  The Auditor General told the press July 28 
that entities are fully able to voice their concerns, even if 
at the end of the day, the BVG does not agree.  Diarra 
further noted that some entities abuse the consultative 
process to delay the completion of the BVG's report, and that 
in the case of such delay, at some point a decision must be 
made.  Diarra attributed inconsistencies with other reports 
to the fact that different auditors use different 
methodologies. 
 
--------------------- 
Prospects and Results 
--------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) To date, there has not been a single criminal 
prosecution resulting from the investigations of the BVG. 
However, the Auditor General can point to other tangible 
results of the BVG's work.  Each year, the BVG conducts 
follow-up studies of entities audited in years past, in order 
to see if the recommendations of the BVG have been put into 
place.  Of the nine such examinations conducted in 2008, the 
BVG reported that 74 percent of its recommendations, or 98 of 
132 recommendations, had been implemented by the audited 
entities, resulting in better financial management and 
decreased opportunity for fraud.  In addition, the Auditor 
General frequently remarks that the work of the BVG has 
allowed the state to recover billions of CFA that would 
otherwise have been lost. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Comment: Now Comes the Hard Part 
-------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU)  Given the tumultuous nature of the year just past, 
it is significant that the Auditor General has succeeded in 
completing significant audits and in producing what appears 
to be a thorough and far-reaching report.  The Auditor 
General was only able to overcome the trials and tribulations 
of the past year because of significant and public support 
from the Government.  Nonetheless, President Toure should go 
further.  In addition to outwardly expressing support for the 
BVG's work, President Toure should give that work teeth by 
encouraging criminal prosecutions against the acts of 
corruption identified in the report. 
 
MILOVANOVIC