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Viewing cable 09ANKARA1145, TURKEY: SWEDES VIEW INCREASING AEGEAN TENSIONS AS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ANKARA1145 2009-08-07 11:28 2011-05-20 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
Appears in these articles:
http://www.tanea.gr
VZCZCXRO7321
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #1145/01 2191128
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071128Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0447
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 6125
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001145 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EUN TU SW
SUBJECT: TURKEY: SWEDES VIEW INCREASING AEGEAN TENSIONS AS 
CONTRARY TO EU ASPIRATIONS 
 
REF: A. STOCKHOLM 467 
     B. STATE 77681 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,c) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  Ambassador discussed reftels joint efforts 
with Swedish Ambassador Christer Asp August 5 and noted, in 
particular, that rising Turkish-Greek tensions over recent 
Aegean events could inadvertently impact Turkey's EU 
accession bid.  Asp commented that Greece and Cyprus already 
have attempted to raise the issue in the July GAERC meeting. 
As EU President, Stockholm has pushed Ankara to take steps 
that would ease stresses with Athens and Nicosia, namely 
opening the Halki Seminary and backing down on objections to 
Cypriot oil explorations.  Despite a general feeling that 
heavy lifting on Cyprus would have to wait until MFA U/S 
Apakan (a hardliner on Cyprus/Greek issues) left for his new 
assignment in September, Asp reported that he has already 
seen signs of flexibility, including some from Apakan 
himself. The most promising is a possible GOT declaration of 
non-aggression and peaceful resolution regarding the 
continental shelf.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) In an August 5 meeting, the Ambassador reiterated to 
Swedish Ambassador Christer Asp that the USG intentions to 
work in tandem with Stockholm on issues related to Turkey's 
EU accession bid as earlier discussed by EUR DAS Matt Bryza 
and Swedish MFA Director Lars Wahlund in a July 19 DVC (ref 
A).  The Ambassador noted a disappointing turn from warming 
Turkish-Greek relations punctuated by recent Turkish military 
flights over the Greek-populated Agathonisi and Farmakonisi 
islands.  Such events could adversely impact the upcoming 
Ankara Protocol review in November should Athens decided to 
drag Brussels into a bilateral dispute over the Aegean. 
 
3.  (C) Asp commented that Brussels has traditionally chosen 
to "stay out" of Turkish-Greek disputes.  However, given the 
importance of this year's Ankara Protocol review, he has 
articulated similar concerns to the GOT.  Both Greece and 
Cyprus raised territorial complains against Turkey at the 
July EU General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(GAERC) meeting, reported Asp.  As EU President, Sweden 
managed to kill the discussion by convincing other members 
not to intervene.  Nevertheless, Cyprus will likely revive 
the issue again before November.  Asp agreed to echo the 
Ambassadors concerns over Agathonisi and Farmakonisi with the 
GOT. 
 
4. (C) Under its EU Presidency, Stockholm has pushed Ankara 
to open Halki Seminary as it would gain Turkey good will with 
the Greek Orthodox community and benefit Istanbul as a 2010 
European Capitol of Culture.  Asp said that Swedish MFA U/S 
Frank Belfrage pushed U/S Apakan hard on this issue during an 
August 3 Brussels meeting.  Asp had also encouraged lead GOT 
EU negotiator Egemen Bagis to do the same and to show more 
flexibility toward Cyprus.  Bagis reportedly responded that 
he was working on Halki, but that it would ultimately require 
a reciprocal act in Northern Thrace.  (NOTE: In contrast to a 
month ago, we are hearing this linkage every time Halki comes 
up.  This is significant step backward. END NOTE)  Cyprus, 
however, would have to wait until September, when Apakan 
assumes his new position as Turkish UN Permanent 
Representative in New York. 
 
5. (C) Asp reported, however, that Apakan has show signs of 
softening his traditionally incalcitrant position on Cyprus. 
During his meeting with Belfrage, Apakan reportedly said that 
he would consider allowing Cypriots to attend one of the 
three OECD education and cultural programs that Turkey had 
previously blocked.  Belfrage also encouraged Apakan to show 
more flexibility on energy issues, namely Cypriot oil 
exploration, as current Turkish objections will just prolong 
Nicosia's efforts to block the opening of additional EU 
chapters (namely energy) and to contemplate issuing a 
declaration of non-aggression and peaceful resolution on the 
matter.  Asp reported he had been told since that the GOT was 
working on such a resolution and would consult with the 
Swedes regarding content and timing.  (NOTE:  Asp opined that 
the EU has shot itself in the foot over the energy chapter by 
allowing Nicosia to block its opening.  Momentum is growing 
amongst members to increase pressure on Cyprus to step down; 
Nabucco has helped with this. END NOTE)    Nevertheless, he 
expressed concern to the Ambassador that the Turks may ask 
the GOC for a guarantee of equal rights on the continental 
 
ANKARA 00001145  002 OF 002 
 
 
shelf in return.  On the Ankara Protocol, Apakan reportedly 
said that Turkey may consider a variation of the Finnish 
Proposal of opening one airport and one port in exchange for 
Famagusta. 
 
6. (C) Comment:  Asp is willing to give the Turks the benefit 
of the doubt on issues such as the Aegean.  As we have noted 
previously, Athens' reluctance to explain why overflights of 
Agathonisi and Farmakonisi are different (i.e. real 
violations of sovereignty) has even the Swedes confused. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
JEFFREY