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Viewing cable 09DHAKA686, GOB BUDGET: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DHAKA686 2009-07-13 10:37 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dhaka
VZCZCXRO5600
PP RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHGI
RUEHJS RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKA #0686/01 1941037
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131037Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9147
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJB/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 000686 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/INSB 
WHITE HOUSE FOR USTR VKADER 
COMMERCE FOR SLEWIS-KHANNA, DFONOVICH 
NEW DELHI FOR FAS 
DOJ FOR OPDAT, LSAMUEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID BG
SUBJECT: GOB BUDGET:  THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.   (SBU) The recently-passed Government of Bangladesh (GOB) budget 
is expansionary and flexible.  The $16.6 billion budget includes a 
progressive initiative for encouraging public-private partnerships 
to develop energy and transport infrastructure.  More troubling is a 
tax amnesty that would allow Bangladeshis to "whiten" so-called 
"black money."  Local economists also voiced concern about increased 
duties on a range of imports, which they characterized as unduly 
protectionist. 
 
EMPHASIS ON FISCAL STIMULUS 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Bangladesh's FY10 budget reflects many of the priorities 
the Awami League outlined in its election manifesto, including 
increased spending on employment, education and health programs; 
expanding the social safety net, especially food subsidies; and 
investing in infrastructure.  The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) 
traditionally allocates many of these expenditures under its "Annual 
Development Program," or ADP.  The GOB almost always fails to fully 
implement the ADP during the fiscal year, which runs from July 1 to 
June 30. 
 
3.  (SBU) This year's ADP totals $4.4 billion, which, according to a 
local think tank, is 19 percent higher than the proposed ADP for 
FY09 and 33 percent higher than the amount of last year's ADP the 
GOB actually implemented.  As the think tank reported, the new ADP 
was "not oversized in the context of the country's needs, but 
ambitious in the context of current implementation capacity." 
 
4.  (SBU) A World Bank economist characterized the budget as 
"expansionary," which was not necessarily bad given the current 
global economic situation.  The fiscal stimulus, social safety net 
programs and large ADP allocation in the budget would give the GOB 
flexibility to offset potential slowdowns in Bangladeshi exports and 
remittances, key drivers of Bangladesh's economy and the areas most 
likely to be affected by the global economic crisis.  (NOTE: 
Bangladesh's exports and remittances both grew during FY09, which 
ended on June 30.  Exports grew 13 percent, and remittances grew 23 
percent.  END NOTE.) 
 
5.  (SBU) This expansion was good, the economist added, only so long 
as it funded real investment in infrastructure, education, health, 
etc.  An expansionary budget was worthless if politicians and 
middlemen siphoned funds from investment and development projects. 
 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
--------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) One of the most promising new initiatives of the budget is 
one that promotes public-private partnerships to develop transport 
and energy infrastructure in Bangladesh.  The GOB allocated more 
than $300 million to get this initiative off the ground, including 
funds for technical assistance to ensure proper implementation of 
the program.  The PPP initiative, as it is known, was apparently the 
brainchild of a small group of young businessmen and respected 
economists, who wrote a position paper for the GOB that formed the 
core of the proposal. 
 
7.  (SBU) Critics have warned that the PPP initiative could just 
become another avenue for graft if the government did not implement 
it properly.  The GOB's announcement that the first PPP project 
would be a light rail system for Dhaka drew criticism from some 
experts who said this project was overly ambitious and the GOB 
should focus on smaller projects at first, including independent 
power plants.  Others have praised the proposal.  At a follow-up 
seminar with GOB officials and businessmen, officials from India who 
implemented a similar program briefed the Bangladeshis on 
public-private partnership best practices from the Indian 
experience. 
 
"MONEY WHITENING" 
----------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) The most controversial component of the budget is a tax 
amnesty that will allow Bangladeshi citizens and companies to 
 
DHAKA 00000686  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
legitimize previously undisclosed income.  As originally proposed, 
the amnesty, or "whitening of black money," would allow taxpayers to 
pay only 10 percent in taxes on previously undisclosed income 
declared sometime before 2012, as long as taxpayers invested the 
money in a variety of sectors, including real estate.  The original 
proposal also stated taxpayers would not have to disclose the 
sources of their income, which left the door open for the legalized 
laundering of the proceeds of crime and terrorism. 
 
9.  (SBU) Critics attacked almost every aspect of the proposed 
amnesty.  The Ambassador, joined by the chiefs of the European 
Union, British, Australian, Canadian, German, Dutch and Danish 
missions, wrote the Finance Minister to express serious concern that 
the failure to disclose sources of income violated not only 
Bangladesh's own Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Anti-Terrorism 
laws, but also international standards laid down by the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF). 
 
10.  (SBU) Economists said the proposal could destroy the GOB's 
ability to collect taxes, which was not very strong in the first 
place.  Who would pay the normal 25-45 percent tax rates when they 
could get away with paying only 10 percent at the end of three 
years?  GOB officials weakly responded that the amnesty was a 
political necessity, which would increase investment in Bangladesh. 
Local businessmen said the amnesty was simply a ploy for politicians 
to legalize the proceeds of graft and extortion.  The World Bank 
noted that various Bangladesh governments had implemented tax 
amnesties nine times since the 1980s.  All these amnesties combined 
recovered less than $3 billion in previously undisclosed income and 
taxes. 
 
11.  (SBU) In the face of this criticism, the GOB amended the 
amnesty to cover only one year.  The GOB adjusted the wording of the 
final legislation with the intention of insuring the legislation did 
not over-ride AML and anti-terrorist finance laws.  The central bank 
also pledged to issue regulations confirming this and directing 
banks to continue exercising due diligence and verifying sources of 
funds. 
 
PROTECTION FOR LOCAL INDUSTRY 
----------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Local economists also criticized the range of customs, 
supplementary and regulatory duties the budget placed on a variety 
of imports, including cars, mobile phones, powdered milk, snack 
foods, newsprint, air-conditioners and other consumer goods.  An 
economist and banker said these duties punished consumers.  An 
international economist noted these duties protected local 
industries that already received high rates of protection.  These 
criticisms prompted the GOB to adjust some of the tariffs in its 
final legislation, including on some cars, newsprint and mobile 
phones. 
 
PAYING FOR THE BUDGET 
--------------------- 
 
13.  (SBU) The GOB projected a budget deficit of about $5 billion, 
or roughly 5 percent of GDP.  Some local experts questioned the 
GOB's revenue estimates for the coming year and expressed doubt 
about the government's abilities to increase tax collection, 
particularly as a result of the tax amnesty provisions.  Assuming 
the deficit projection remains on target, the GOB planned to finance 
60 percent of the deficit from domestic sources, mostly through 
local bank borrowing.  Some experts cautioned this could crowd out 
private sector borrowing, while others claimed local banks had 
excess liquidity that could absorb government borrowing.  In terms 
of foreign financing of the deficit, an economist at one 
multi-lateral lending institution was pessimistic about the 
prospects for budgetary support from his organization.  He said some 
of the budget's protectionist measures and the GOB's stated 
intentions to slow divestment of state-owned enterprises and revamp 
its public procurement rules could harm prospects for foreign budget 
support. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
14.  (SBU) With the exception of the tax amnesty and some of the 
 
DHAKA 00000686  003 OF 003 
 
 
tariff increases, the GOB budget is largely sound.  It contains some 
buffers that could allow the government to compensate for unexpected 
shocks.  It seeks to fulfill some of the Awami League's promises to 
aid the poor and promote growth in the face of a global economic 
slowdown.  The GOB has projected its economy will grow 5.5 percent 
in the coming year, which some say is too modest a projection. 
Modest it may be, but it is also politically savvy.  It dampens 
expectations for a year where Bangladesh might finally feel the 
effects of the global economic crisis.  And if growth exceeds the 
projection, the government can claim the credit. 
 
15.  (SBU) The devil, as always, is in the details.  In its first 
six months, the Awami League government has not demonstrated an 
ability to move quickly on key economic goals, particularly energy 
and power development.  Bureaucratic inertia is partly to blame, but 
dividing the spoils after eight years out of power has distracted 
many in the Awami League from pursuing national economic priorities. 
 It remains to be seen whether the Awami League can and will direct 
its energies to achieving its numerous budget goals. 
 
Moriarty