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Viewing cable 09DAKAR948, SENEGAL: War and Banditry in the Casamance

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DAKAR948 2009-07-27 11:21 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXRO7084
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0948/01 2081121
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271121Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2824
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 000948 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL AND INR/AA 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KDEM ECON SG
SUBJECT: SENEGAL: War and Banditry in the Casamance 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) In recent weeks, armed gunmen hijacked several 
transportation vehicles and robbed local businesses in Casamance. 
These attacks have resulted in several deaths and led the Senegalese 
military to reinforce their positions in the area north of 
Ziguinchor on the trans-Gambian highway.  Attacks seem motivated by 
the rebellion's need to fund its logistical needs coupled with 
weaker command and control and a lack of political leadership within 
the MFDC (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance).  If the 
situation continues to deteriorate  it could evolve from isolated 
acts of banditry to more generalized insecurity.  End Summary. 
 
Violent Banditry 
---------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Acts of banditry have been common throughout the history of 
the rebellion in Casamance, but in recent years banditry had 
significantly dimished as the conflict lay dormant.  However, during 
the month of June, seven major security incidents took place, 
ranging from passenger vehicle hijackings to extrajudicial 
execution.  On June 7, gunmen opened fire on two vehicles in the 
area of Diouloulou (Gambian border) resulting in three deaths, one 
of the victims who was injured in the shooting was reportedly axed 
to death by the gunmen who were furious that his vehicle tried to 
drive through their roadblock.   On June 9, armed gunmen executed 
Youssouf Sambou (aka Rambo), a former MFDC combatant who had become 
a mediator between MFDC and the GOS.  An Embassy source indicated 
that a dissident MFDC group led by a war chief known as Famara from 
the northern MFDC branch of Diakaye is allegedly behind these 
attacks.  He described them as "a solitary war group" (i.e. not in 
active coordination with the rest of the MFDC). 
 
Logistical Problems 
------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Growing logistical difficulties are the apparent reason for 
the increasing in the number and intensity of attacks, according to 
an Embassy source.  He noted that "the redeployment of the 
Senegalese army hampers movement of MFDC rebels and inhibits free 
conduct of their lucrative illicit activities."  He also noted that 
Colonel Paul Ndiaye, the Senegalese Military Commander of Ziguinchor 
"has considerably reduced the trafficking of timber in which both 
MFDC rebels and Senegalese army personnel in Casamance were 
involved."   The armed branch of MFDC, he concluded, is left with 
"cashew trafficking in the south for the Kassolol group, car 
hijacking and underground contributions paid by villagers in the 
north."  As a result, there seems to be growing impatience and 
suspicion among younger combatants who wish to see change in their 
moderate leadership and do not hesitate to use more violence to 
express themselves. 
 
Moderates Are Traitors 
---------------------- 
4. (SBU) Since the death in 2007 of its historical and charismatic 
leader Father Diamacoune, MFDC has become an uncoordinated gaggle of 
separate armed groups without political leadership.  The main armed 
group known as Kassolol, located in the south at the border with 
Guinea Bissau, is headed by Cesar Atoute Badiate, and has so far 
adopted a moderate line vis-`-vis the GOS.  However, Cesar's 
leadership is questioned by younger combatants who push for change. 
It is reported to Embassy that the latter find that the moderate 
line has not yielded any tangible benefits except for their leaders 
who pocket the bribes provided by GOS, which has under President 
Abdoulaye Wade sought to buy peace without making any concession 
through negotiations. 
 
5.  (SBU) The Embassy's source indicated that this group of young 
combatants is working towards a "merger with combatants of Diakaye 
and Mahmouda in northen Casamance  and even some elements of the 
radical group led by Salif Sadio."  The unified command they 
envision could be led by Pascal Fangoure or Mamadou Niantang, two 
combatants from the North who are not among the most prominent and 
known military chiefs of the MFDC.  Reportedly, this impatience with 
the moderates led in June to the execution of Youssouf Sambou 
(Rambo) by a group of young rebels when he tried to lecture and 
convince them to stop hijacking vehicles.  They called him a traitor 
before shooting him dead.  Rambo was allegedly one of the 
beneficiaries of a thirty million CFA (USD 60,000) gift donated by 
President Wade to the "wise men of the Casamance" who have helped to 
resolve the conflict. 
 
What is Salif Sadio up to? 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) According to an Embassy source the relationship between 
Gambian President Yaya Jameh and radical MFDC leader Salif Sadio, 
who lives in the Gambia, has recently soured.  Jammeh is apparently 
 
DAKAR 00000948  002 OF 002 
 
 
annoyed that Salif allegedly has evaded surveillance by Jammeh's 
men.  It is also rumored that Salif may find in the new military 
leadership of Guinea Bissau a more sympathetic attitude.  A source 
in the Casamance told Embassy that Naval Captain Zamora Induta, 
acting Chief of Staff of Guinea Bissau's armed forces, knows Salif 
well and their ties go back to the days when Ansoumana Mane led the 
Bissau-Guinean army rebellion in 1998 and Salif and his men joined 
forces with the Bissau-Guinean rebels.  Induta was in the rebel's 
camp, while Senegal had chosen to send its army to support the 
Bissau-Guinean loyalists.  The Embassy's source opined that Sadio 
might migrate back to southern Casamance and reoccupy his old 
stronghold of Baraka Mandioka.  The Bissau-Guinean Army under the 
recently assassinated Chief of Staff, General Tagme Nawai, supported 
by Senegal, expelled him from his former headquarters and forced him 
to flee north to the Gambian border where President Jammeh has 
provided him sanctuary. 
 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The situation in Casamance has become volatile again.  The 
conflict continues to persist as a result of a lack of leadership in 
both the MFDC and the GOS (there is no one in the government with a 
clear mandate and authority to negotiate an end to the conflict). 
Responding to MFDC's banditry, the Senegalese have reinforced their 
military presence and engaged in counter-insurgency efforts to win 
hearts and minds while neglecting to design a comprehensive 
political strategy to end the conflict.   A relapse into violence 
could further isolate and impoverish the region which might become a 
hot bed of narcotics trafficking and a part of continuum of 
criminality between Guinea Bissau and Gambia. 
SMITH