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Viewing cable 09BOGOTA2376, COLOMBIA DCA NEGOTIATIONS -- EMBASSY IDEAS FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BOGOTA2376 2009-07-27 22:08 2011-03-20 12:30 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles:
http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #2376/01 2082208
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 272208Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9972
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 9051
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2551
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7850
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 3962
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 8544
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002376 

SIPDIS 

FOR USSOUTHCOM GEN FRASER AND ASD/HDASA PAUL STOCKTON 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2019 
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS PGOV MCAP KTIA PTER CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA DCA NEGOTIATIONS -- EMBASSY IDEAS FOR 
TRACK II 

REF: BOGOTA 1334 

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield, Reasons 1.4 (b and d) 

SUMMARY 
-------- 

1. (C) The GOC expects positive signals soon on Track II 
issues as DCA negotiations wrap up.  They have repeatedly 
stated that satisfaction on Track II is a precondition for 
closing out the DCA.  Embassy recommends positive responses 
without additional commitments, specifically a U.S. Air 
Force-to-Colombian Air Force letter offering an air defense 
assessment team, an OSD-to-MOD letter offering working level 
discussions on stockpile agreement process, and upgrade for 
the operating arrangement to the level of SOUTHCOM 
Commander-CHOD.  END SUMMARY. 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS TIED TO DCA 
-------------------------------------------- 
2. (C) From the inception of negotiations on a Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Colombia, the Government of 
Colombia (GOC) has asked for several additional security
assistance-related issues to be addressed in the same 
process.  They accepted our argument that these issues would 
be covered in a parallel, but separate (so-called Track II) 
process, and that we would not move forward on them until we 
saw light at the end of the tunnel on the DCA negotiations. 
With recent high level GOC public support for the DCA, and 
considerable progress in the last negotiating round, we now 
see that light.  Following are Embassy ideas on how to 
address Track II.  These are suggestions; we acknowledge that 
the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM) are the ultimate decision-makers on these issues. 
But we also note that the GOC has said repeatedly they will 
not sign the DCA until they have satisfaction on Track II 
issues. 

3. (C) GOC concerns on Track II have focused on three areas. 
First, they are interested in an air defense system tied into 
the Cooperative Security Location (CSL) structure.  Second, 
they want assurances of access to U.S. arms, systems, or 
technology in case of a national security emergency in the 
region, whether by stockpile agreement or some other process. 
 Third, they want access to all aspects of the CSL once 
operational--including space, intelligence product, and 
infrastructure.  In each case, the GOC is interested in the 
substantive issue itself, but also in being able to transmit 
to their public that they obtained benefits connected somehow 
to the DCA.  Along those lines, Embassy suggests responses 
that do not offer everything the GOC has requested, but 
enough to allow them to point to progress. 

AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM 
------------------- 
4. (C) As the GOC looks to Venezuela's acquisition of 
sophisticated Russian Sukhoi aircraft, they would love to 
have an equally sophisticated air defense system.  The 
Colombian military views the Sukhoi in Venezuelan hands as a 
legitimate threat to national security.  This may well be the 
case.  It is our judgment, however, that the GOC has not even 
begun the necessary assessment, analysis, and planning for an 
air defense system.  We suggest an offer that responds 
without making a long term commitment.  Specifically, a 
mil-to-mil letter--we recommend U.S. Air Force South 
(AFSOUTH) Commander to Colombian Air Force (COLAF) 
Commander--offering to send an assessment team to Colombia at 
an early opportunity.  The team would assess current 
Colombian capabilities, potential air defense needs, 
realistic budget considerations, and options.  We would be 
clear from the beginning that the team has no authority to 
make commitments. 

STOCKPILE AGREEMENT 
------------------- 
5. (C) It is our judgment that the GOC has not even decided 
if they wish to pursue a stockpile agreement with us.  But 
since they have raised it in side conversations, we recommend 

that we open a dialogue.  The device could be a letter from 
an appropriate official in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) to an appropriate official in Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) (we recommend DASD/HD&ASA/WHA to new Vice MOD 
Arbelaez) offering to initiate working level dialogue on the 
process to reach a stockpile agreement.  As with the air 
defense assessment offer, the letter would make no 
commitments other than information on the process by which a 
stockpile agreement is concluded. 

ACCESS TO CSL FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
------------------------------------------- 
6. (C) In some ways, this is the easiest of the three.  Since 
the CSL will be on an operational COLAF base, the GOC will 
have de facto access anyway.  They realize that.  But they 
want to have something they can show to their public 
suggesting they got more than Ecuador ten years ago.  The 
solution, we suggest, is the mil-to-mil operating arrangement 
that is signed following the DCA.  Under the Manta agreement, 
this document was signed by SOUTHCOM J5 Director and host Air 
Force Commander.  It lays out operational understandings and 
procedures for the CSL.  It is not a political or policy 
document.  We suggest that the operating arrangement be 
upgraded to SOUTHCOM Commander-Chief of Defense (CHOD).  It 
says the same thing.  It is still a non-political document. 
But it allows them to say they got something more than 
Ecuador. 

7. (C) GOC negotiators in the next DCA round will realize we 
are approaching the endgame in the negotiations.  President 
Uribe again directed his negotiators on July 23 to conclude 
an agreement as soon as possible.  They will ratchet up the 
pressure and will note that they cannot sign the DCA until 
they have understanding on Track II.  Embassy recommends that 
we have something concrete to say on the subject by the 
August 11 negotiating round.
Brownfield 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================