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Viewing cable 09DARESSALAAM385, ZANZIBAR: DONORS SEEK COMMON POSITION ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DARESSALAAM385 2009-06-11 14:27 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dar Es Salaam
VZCZCXRO6490
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBZ RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHJO RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHMR RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHRN
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDR #0385/01 1621427
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111427Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8598
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 2914
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3444
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 1370
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0060
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1307
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0127
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0843
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEWMFC/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA//J3
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 000385 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR AF/E: JLIDDLE AND INR/RAA:FEHRENREICH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PREL PGOV TZ
SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR: DONORS SEEK COMMON POSITION ON 
ELECTIONS, POLITICAL RECONCILIATION 
 
REF: (A) DAR ES SALAAM 340 (B) DAR ES SALAAM 444 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Key donor nations agree that the political 
impasse in Zanzibar constitutes a "risk situation."  There 
was a consensus that donors needed to reinforce their 
concerns with GOT and Zanzibar interlocutors and to press for 
change through a common position.  Norway and Netherlands are 
looking at establishing "Zanzibar Affairs Officers" at their 
respective embassies.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) On June 9 Sweden, as EU President, hosted its second 
meeting to coordinate positions and share information in the 
lead-up to Tanzania's 2010 General Elections.  Present were 
ambassadors and charges from the UK, Norway, Finland, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Canada, Japan, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, 
Spain, Switzerland and the European Commission.  Also in 
attendance were the UN Country Director, representatives from 
UNDP and UK's DfID, Political Counselors from Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, UK and Canada, in addition to the U.S. P/E 
Chief and Zanzibar Affairs Officer.  Most of the discussion 
centered on Zanzibar, where there was a consensus that the 
archipelago represented a "risk situation." 
 
3. (U) Swedish Ambassador Herrstrom recalled a recent visit 
of European Ambassadors to Zanzibar as well as a recent 
observation mission of key donor countries to witness the 
by-election held May 23 in Zanzibar's Magogoni District (ref 
A).  Herrstrom said he was "impressed" by the lack of trust 
among the parties, particularly among opposition party CUF. 
He hoped donors could form a broad consensus on what might be 
pre-conditions for a peaceful, free and fair election in 
2010.  He also asked delegations to work together to 
harmonize key messages that all could use when dealing with 
Tanzanian political leaders. 
 
4. (SBU) Norway, which has just opened a Consulate in 
Zanzibar, said it would ramp-up its political activity in 
Zanzibar by sending a contracted "Zanzibar Affairs Officer" 
who would be active in the region up to the 2010 elections. 
The person they would send, a political scientist, performed 
a similar function in 2005 in Zanzibar.  Norway thought the 
Zanzibar Election Commission had a more "positive approach" 
than in previous elections, although there was still some 
political interference with the body.  Of concern for now was 
voter 
registration, which was rigged in favor of ruling CCM and 
which might be difficult to monitor.  Norway also warned 
delegations to be more critical in their conversations with 
opposition CUF, noting that the party also had the power to 
be disruptive to the electoral process.  Who CCM/Zanzibar 
names as its leader going into 2010 will also be crucial for 
a stable, post-Karume transition.  Delegations should 
continue a "constructive dialogue" with likely candidates, 
reinforcing shared goals and sharing information when 
possible. 
 
5. (SBU) Soon-to-depart Dutch Ambassador Van Kesteren, the 
only Ambassador at the meeting who was personally present in 
Zanzibar during the 2005 General Elections (thought by most 
observers to have been flawed), was critical of the present 
government's ability to hold free and fair elections.  He 
said there was no real change with CCM/Zanzibar since 
multi-party elections began.  Senior members of CCM still 
were of the "win at all costs" 
mentality.  Van Kesteren called on delegations to play 
"hardball."  Donors should draft a common letter to ZEC with 
agreed-upon minimum conditions that needed to be present on 
the ground by a specific date, say November or December 2009. 
 Should those conditions not be met, then donors would "pull 
the plug" on paying for or otherwise supporting the 
elections, labeling them a "fraud."  (COMMENT: after the 
meeting Van Kesteren confided to ZAO that 
his Embassy was requesting The Hague to re-assign an officer 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000385  002 OF 002 
 
 
in the Dutch Embassy's political section to perform as a 
"Zanzibar Affairs Officer," "along the lines of the 
U.S. Embassy model," he said.  END COMMENT). 
 
6. (U) UN Resident Coordinator Fernandez-Taranco said that 
there was a difference between the political and technical 
aspects of an election, and that 2010 would be a vast 
improvement over previous elections on the technical side. 
The UN has had successful outreach with security forces and 
the youth wings of the respective parties.  The by-elections 
over the past months showed tangible results of those 
encounters.  Meanwhile, registration and contestation by 
political parties were the core issues for elections 
anywhere.  Donors should build on recent successes and 
continue to build trust with ZEC and with the parties.  The 
UN Country Director also cautioned the group to ensure their 
election observers follow internationally recognized codes of 
conduct.  He said ZEC had made some informal complaints to 
the UN with respect to the Magogoni observers; delegations 
should be careful they don't compromise the process. 
 
7. (SBU) EC Ambassador Tim Clarke said that he, too, saw no 
change in the overall political atmosphere in Zanzibar over 
the years, but that there was still time to work on "leveling 
the playing field."  Training for international observers and 
common talking points among the donors was a good first 
start.  The UK High Commissioner said that any common theme 
repeated by donors should have at its core the message that 
we supported the Union of Tanzania and instability in 
Zanzibar reflected on the nation as a whole.  The French 
Ambassador said "the problem with drawing a line in the sand 
was that it often was washed away at high tide."  Finland 
recalled that after the failed, violent 1996 elections in 
Zanzibar, the Finnish Government reduced its support for 
Tanzania, a position that was hard to sustain over time given 
the real humanitarian issues facing the country.  Japan said 
it hoped to join any consensus that emerged within a UN 
framework. 
 
8. (SBU) Sweden concluded that "Kikwete holds the key" toward 
any broad-based change of tone in the islands.  Norway agreed 
to circulate draft points to use as a common 
basis of engagement with political actors in the run-up to 
2010 and asked for input by June 12. 
 
9. (SBU) Embassy proposes to offer language along the 
following lines to serve as basis for a common position on 
Zanzibar among donor nations: 
 
-- Our assistance is for the people of Tanzania, not any 
particular political party.  On Zanzibar, we implement our 
assistance in cooperation with whatever government Zanzibaris 
choose to elect. 
 
-- Any political instability in Zanzibar damages the 
international reputation of Zanzibar as a whole. 
 
-- Given historically thin pluralities between Zanzibar 
political parties, a system with no avenue for the losing 
party to influence change is a recipe for continued tension. 
Political tension impedes development. 
 
-- Development partners expect transparent, free and fair 
elections in 2010, held in a climate of civility and 
security.  Our continued engagement at current levels is 
based on that assumption. 
MUSHINGI