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Viewing cable 09DARESSALAAM363, TANZANIA BY-ELECTION: CCM WINS, CHADEMA RISING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DARESSALAAM363 2009-06-03 11:04 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dar Es Salaam
VZCZCXRO9283
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHDR #0363/01 1541104
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031104Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8567
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 2900
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3431
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 1356
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1293
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA//J3//
RUEWMFC/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHLMC/MCC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 000363 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E JLIDDLE; INR/RAA FOR FEHRENREICH 
STATE PASS USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIA BY-ELECTION: CCM WINS, CHADEMA RISING 
 
REF: a: Dar es Salaam 340, b: 2008 Dar es Salaam 722 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000363  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. Summary: Opposition Chadema mounted a serious challenge to ruling 
CCM in the May 24 by-election in Busanda, but was unable to overcome 
CCM's traditional strength in rural areas.  The by-election results 
suggest growing support for Chadema as the primary opposition in 
mainland Tanzania, in particular in urban and semi-urban areas. 
Chadema's rise is at the expense of CUF, the other major opposition 
party, which saw its vote tally drop by 90 percent since 2005 in the 
district.  Embassy Political Assistant and MCC Deputy Resident 
Country Director led a small observer mission, with representatives 
from the UK, Netherlands, and the European Community.  Overall the 
election appeared well-organized, although Chadema complained about 
CCM campaign tactics.  End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2. The Busanda seat came open after the death (of natural causes) of 
its MP, Faustine Rwilomba, a CCM back-bencher of no particular 
distinction.  Busanda constituency is a primarily rural agricultural 
area in Mwanza region, south of Lake Victoria.  The nearest town is 
the gold-mining center of Geita, site of one of Tanzania's most 
productive mines; there is also some small-scale mining in the 
district.  Infrastructure is generally poor, especially in the rural 
sections.  (Note: Busanda, which currently has no connection to the 
national electrical grid, is slated to receive transmission lines 
under the Millennium Challenge Compact.) 
 
CANDIDATES 
---------- 
 
3. CCM's candidate, Lolensia Bukwimba, beat out 11 other party 
candidates in a contested nominating process.  Some locals told us 
she had been chosen for her professional qualifications and 
educational attainment, although she was not the best-connected or 
popular among CCM leaders in the district.  CCM campaigned 
vigorously, with numerous MPs from the region, the Ministers of Home 
Affairs and Energy and Minerals, and other top party leadership 
visiting the district.  Based on news reports and the final day's 
rally, the candidate ran a generally positive campaign, promising to 
uphold the CCM manifesto and bring development to the constituency. 
CCM's main rally the day before the election turned out a few 
hundred supporters and other observers. 
 
4. As in other recent by-elections, the opposition failed to unite 
around a single candidate; however, only Chadema seriously 
challenged CCM.  Chadema candidate Fineas Magessa ran on a platform 
of attacking CCM for incompetence, corruption, and failure to 
improve the lives of the district's people.  Like CCM, Chadema 
brought its senior party leadership to the campaign.  Its final 
rally, in the urban area of Katoro, drew an audience of more than a 
thousand.  In the weeks before the election, numerous commentators 
predicted either a Chadema victory or a very close race. 
 
5. Two other opposition parties, CUF and UDP, also ran candidates. 
Both parties failed to properly register their polling agents.  As a 
result, they were not represented at any of the polling stations 
during the voting and the counting of the ballots.  Although CUF 
national Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba represented the party during the 
campaign, it appears the party as a whole paid more attention to the 
by-election on Zanzibar (ref a), where its candidate had a more 
realistic chance at winning. 
 
RESULTS 
------- 
 
6. The final tally showed a clear but not overwhelming margin for 
CCM (29,000 votes, 54 percent) over Chadema (22,800 votes, 42 
percent).  Chadema won two urban wards by significant margins but 
was swept in the rural areas.  CUF registered just under 1,000 votes 
and UDP less than 300.  By contrast, in the 2005 elections, the CCM 
candidate took nearly 80 percent of the vote, with CUF and Chadema 
taking 11 and 4 percent, respectively.  Only 41 percent of 
registered voters came to the polls, about average for by-elections. 
 The new MP will bring the number of elected women MPs to eighteen, 
all but one from CCM.  (Note: CCM has pledged to increase its female 
representation in parliament to 50 percent, but the mechanism for 
doing so remains unclear.) 
 
CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN AND VOTING 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000363  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. A five-member diplomatic mission met with regional and local 
officials, including the Returning Officer in charge of election 
management, as well as the CUF and CCM candidates and party 
officials.  We observed party rallies the day before the election 
and visited about ten percent of the 380 polling stations on 
election day. 
 
8. According to news reports and discussions with party and 
electoral officials, the campaign was generally orderly.  There were 
some reports of violence (allegedly by CCM against Chadema 
supporters).  Electoral officials told us that Chadema allegations 
of CCM vote-buying (a common opposition theme in by-elections) and 
CCM assertions that Chadema had acted provocatively by burning a CCM 
flag had not been substantiated. 
 
9. The balloting was generally well run.  The election officials 
appeared to be knowledgeable and had the necessary supplies to 
conduct the vote.  Some of the polling stations were makeshift and 
cramped, especially in the more rural areas.  CCM and Chadema party 
agents were present in each of the stations.  Urban voters tended to 
have a longer wait to vote but were otherwise unimpeded.  We 
encountered several groups of youth in urban areas - Chadema 
supporters - who claimed they had registered but could not find 
their names at any polling station.  Police presence was clearly 
increased in the district.  Each cluster of polling stations had one 
unarmed officer, while the armed Field Force Unit conducted roving 
patrols.  There were no reports of violence.  We once saw a brief 
confrontation between a Field Force patrol and one of the groups of 
dissatisfied youth, but the incident resolved peacefully. 
 
10. The final vote compilation was held up because the Chadema 
candidate failed to appear at the electoral office.  After the 
results were announced, he rejected his loss and proclaimed his 
intention to take legal action.  Chadema party leaders subsequently 
said the party would not join any legal challenge to the results, 
though they continued to criticize CCM campaign tactics.  (Note: The 
candidate's unwillingness to concede echoed the outcome of the 
Tarime by-election [ref b], with the party roles reversed.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. Chadema's strong showing in a district formerly safe for CCM 
suggests that it will pose a serious challenge in an increased 
number of mainland constituencies in 2010, especially in urban 
areas, although CCM's hold on a substantial parliamentary majority 
and the presidency seems secure. The result in Busanda further 
suggests that Chadema has momentum on the mainland compared to CUF, 
which increasingly risks being seen as a Zanzibar party.  Chadema 
will have a further opportunity to test its appeal as the mainland 
opposition vanguard on July 5.  The final by-election before the 
2010 general election will take place in Biharamulo, Kagera region, 
for a seat won by a formerly strong but now barely functioning 
opposition party, TLP. 
 
HANNAN