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Viewing cable 09DAMASCUS384, RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DAMASCUS384 2009-06-03 13:23 2011-08-03 20:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Damascus
Appears in these articles:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/08/03/119333/wikileaks-bush-obama-passed-on.html
VZCZCXRO9472
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0384/01 1541323
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031323Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6431
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000384 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018 
TAGS: PREL SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA:  DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY 
 
Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (S/NF) Summary:  As the U.S. continues its re-engagement 
with Syria, it may help us achieve our goals if we understand 
how SARG officials pursue diplomatic goals. Syrian President 
Bashar al-Asad is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his 
father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a 
level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any 
direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his 
judgment.  Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel: 
the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to 
some degree affects the prospects for a successful meeting. 
The SARG foreign policy apparatus suffers from apparent 
dysfunctionality and weaknesses in terms of depth and 
resources but the SARG punches above its weight because of 
the talents of key individuals.  SARG officials generally 
have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are 
sufficiently professional to translate those instructions 
into recognizable diplomatic practice.  But in a diplomatic 
world that is generally oiled by courtesy and euphemism, the 
Syrians don't hesitate to be nasty in order to achieve their 
objectives.  The behaviors they employ as diplomatic 
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic 
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal. 
End Summary. 
 
------------------- 
Gaming Out the SARG 
------------------- 
 
2.  (S/NF) As the U.S. moves forward to re-engage Syria, we 
are well aware that Syrian officials have long been famous 
for their abilities as tough negotiators.  The late President 
Hafiz al-Asad could wear down his interlocutors through sheer 
staying power in 10-hour meetings without breaks; the wealth 
of detail and historical perspective he brought to those 
discussions also tested the mettle of those who were 
attempting to persuade him to a course of action he 
questioned.  His son Bashar is neither as shrewd nor as 
long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage 
diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed 
to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by 
extension, his judgment.  Bashar's presentations on world 
affairs suggest that he would prefer to see himself as a sort 
of philosopher-king, the Pericles of Damascus.  Playing to 
Bashar's intellectual pretentions is one stratagem for 
gaining his confidence and acquiescence; it may be 
time-consuming but could well produce results.  Bashar's 
vanity represents another Achilles heel:  the degree to which 
USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects 
the prospects for achieving our goals.  Every interaction we 
have with the SARG is, in fact, a transaction and the better 
equipped we are to understand the dynamics of our 
negotiations the better able we will be to achieve our 
objectives.  Post has assembled the compendium below in an 
attempt to reflect our experience in dealing with the SARG in 
the hope that Washington-based interlocutors will find it 
useful. 
 
------------------------------------ 
A Compendium of Diplomatic Behaviors 
------------------------------------ 
 
3. (S/NF) Capacity:  SARG scope of action is limited the 
President's span of control.  He is generally able to monitor 
 the activities of his foreign minister, political/media 
advisor, intelligence chiefs, and brother Maher.  At various 
times, his vice president and national security advisor are 
also active and therefore under his direct supervision. 
While communication flows between him and his subordinates, 
it appears not to be formalized and information is highly 
compartmented.  Subordinates' portfolios are not clearly 
delineated; overlapping areas create tension and competition. 
 There is no "interagency" policy development process that 
lays out advantages and disadvantages of policy choices. 
There are, as far as we know, no briefing or decision memos. 
The bench is not deep; beyond the principals lie only a few 
trusted staffers.  Bashar and his team also find it difficult 
to juggle more than one major foreign policy issue at a time. 
 
 
4. (S/NF) Protocol:  SARG officials are sticklers for 
diplomatic protocol, although they are not experts on the 
international conventions from which it is derived.   The 
SARG places a high value on protocolary forms that ensure 
respectful treatment of state officials (despite bilateral 
differences) because such forms guarantee that the President 
and his representatives are shown proper courtesies by a 
world that is often at odds with Syria.  (This focus on 
protocol underlies the continuing Syrian unhappiness over the 
absence of a U.S. ambassador.)  Protocol conventions also 
reinforce the notion of equal relations between sovereign 
states and the SARG insists that communications between it 
and foreign embassies comply with traditional diplomatic 
practice.  The MFA receives a flood of diplomatic notes from 
Damascus-based foreign missions daily which are apportioned 
out to various offices for action.  The diplomatic notes, 
translated into Arabic by the senders, become the paper trail 
for SARG decisions.  The MFA bureaucracy does not appear to 
generate cover memoranda that provide background to requests 
or recommendations for decisions.  Many such notes, possibly 
all notes from the U.S. Embassy, are sent to the Minister 
himself for review.  The MFA does not have internal email, 
only fax and phone.  Instructions to Syrian missions abroad 
are often sent by fax; sometimes the MFA fails to provide 
instructions at all. 
 
5. (S/NF) The Suq:  In dealing with the U.S., the Syrians see 
every encounter as a transaction.  The level and composition 
of the Syrian side of any meeting is carefully calculated in 
terms of protocol and the political message being sent; a 
lunch invitation must be interpreted as more than just the 
Arab compulsion to hospitality ) who hosts the lunch is as 
important as who attends the meetings.  When it comes to 
content, the Syrians seek to gain the highest value 
deliverable for the lowest price or no price at all.  During 
the re-engagement process, the SARG has attempted to extract 
high profile USG gestures in exchange for relief of 
operational constraints on the Embassy.  The SARG has been 
uncharacteristically forward-leaning in allowing discussions 
on a New Embassy Compound site to develop as far as they 
have; actual closure on a land deal, however, is probably 
contingent on U.S. delivery of a SARG desirable, e.g., the 
announcement that a U.S. ambassador will be sent to Damascus. 
 The SARG's focus on embassy operations is in part rooted in 
their paranoia over USG intelligence collection and 
penetration of Syrian society but the imposition of 
constraints on mission activities has also conveniently 
created an embassy list of desiderata that the SARG seeks to 
use as cost-free concessions.  FM Muallim candidly 
acknowledged this approach when he commented in February to 
Charge that he had not yet decided what he needed in exchange 
for permission to reopen the American School in Damascus. 
 
6.  (S/NF) Vanity and Self-preservation:  The President's 
self-image plays a disproportionate role in policy 
formulation and diplomatic activity.   Meetings, visits, 
trips abroad that enhance his respectability and prestige are 
pursued; encounters that may involve negotiations or 
difficult debate are declined or delegated to subordinates. 
The President responds with anger if he finds himself 
challenged by visitors, but not until after the meeting.  He 
seems to avoid direct confrontation.  When engaged in summit 
diplomacy, he often seeks to include allies to bolster his 
confidence (e.g., Quadripartite Summit in September 2008, 
Riyadh Summit in April 2009).   His foreign policy 
subordinates are all "employees" without constituencies or 
influence independent of the President's favor.  Their 
overriding concern when engaging foreigners is to avoid the 
appearance of overstepping or violating their instructions. 
They are particularly cautious in the presence of other 
Syrians; requests to meet one-on-one often yield more 
expansive and candid responses. 
 
7. (S/NF) Deceit:  SARG officials at every level lie.  They 
persist in a lie even in the face of evidence to the 
contrary.  They are not embarrassed to be caught in a lie. 
While lower level officials often lie to avoid potential 
punitive action from their own government, senior level 
officials generally lie when they deem a topic too 
"dangerous" to discuss (e.g., Al-Kibar, IAEA) or when they 
have not yet determined whether or how to respond (FFN, 
Hezbollah arms supplies, etc).  When a senior SARG official 
is lying, the key challenge is not demonstrating  the lack of 
veracity but discovering the true reasons for it. 
 
8. (S/NF) Passivity:  SARG foreign policy is formulated in 
response to external developments (changes in regional 
leadership, initiatives from the West, etc).  The SARG does 
not launch initiatives and generally seeks cover from allies 
when exploring new courses of action.  The SARG is much more 
confident on the Arab level than on the international level. 
SARG policy responses are generally tactical and operational, 
exploratory rather than decisive, oblique instead of direct. 
Strategy, to the extent it exists, emerges from a series of 
tactical choices.  The lack of initiative appears rooted in 
an underlying sense of diplomatic powerlessness.  Every 
foreign policy embarrassment in Syria's history lies under 
the surface of a generally false projection of assertiveness. 
 That assertiveness is sometimes read as arrogance. 
 
9.  (S/NF) Antagonism:  Every Syrian diplomatic relationship 
contains an element of friction.  There is some current 
friction, for example, in the Syrians' relations with the 
Turks and the French.  The Syrians are not troubled by 
discord; they seek an upper hand in any relationship by 
relying on foreign diplomats' instinctive desire to resolve 
problems. By withholding a solution, the SARG seeks to 
control the pace and temperature of the relationship.  SARG 
officials artificially restrict their availability  and can 
engage in harsh verbal attacks to intimidate and rattle 
foreign diplomats.  SARG officials delight in disparaging 
their interlocutors behind their backs for allowing 
themselves to be cowed.  On the international level, the 
President has indulged in personal criticisms of foreign 
leaders; unlike his father, he deliberately makes enemies 
when he doesn't necessarily have to.  FM Muallim can behave 
similarly but he probably does so on the President's 
instructions. 
 
10. (S/NF) Complacency:  SARG leadership genuinely believes 
that SARG foreign policy has been, is being, and will be 
vindicated by events.  They also genuinely believe their 
foreign policy is based on morally defensible and 
intellectually solid principles, although it is usually 
reactive and opportunistic.  Existing policy choices are 
immutable unless the President decides to change them, in 
which case, his new policies, despite any appearances to the 
contrary, are consistent with "traditional" principles. 
Baathism infuses foreign policy principles (Pan-Arabism) but 
pragmatism is more important.  More recently, Bashar's like 
or dislike of other leaders plays a role in policy 
formulation. 
 
11. (S/NF) The Non Sequitur:  When Syrian officials don't 
like a point that has been made to them, they frequently 
resort to an awkward changes in subject to deflect perceived 
criticism.  Syrian officials seem to think they've scored a 
verbal hit by employing a facile non sequitur, usually in the 
form of a counter-accusation.  When the SARG's human rights 
record is raised with Muallim, for example, he often raises 
Israel's December-January Gaza operation or, more recently, 
asks if the U.S. will accept the 1300 Al Qaeda sympathizers 
in Syrian jails.   The non sequitur is intended to stop 
discussion of the unwelcome topic while subtly intimidating 
the interlocutor with the threat of raising a subject that is 
putatively embarrassing to him or her.  When the non sequitur 
is deployed, it is clear that the SARG official is on the 
defensive. 
 
12.  (S/NF) Comment:  Given the apparent dysfunctionality of 
the SARG foreign policy apparatus and its weaknesses in terms 
of depth and resources, the SARG's ability to punch above its 
weight internationally is noteworthy.  Much of its strength 
appears to lie in the talents of key individuals and their 
ability to collaborate with each other, despite tensions and 
rivalries.  SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical, 
guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional 
to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic 
practice.  But the behaviors they employ as diplomatic 
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic 
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal.  At 
the end of the day, there are few who really like to deal 
with the Syrians.  The SARG, well aware of its reputation, 
however,  spends much of its energy ensuring that we have to. 
 
CONNELLY