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Viewing cable 09DAKAR787, GUINEA-BISSAU: AMBASSADORS TENTATIVELY AGREE TO SUPPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DAKAR787 2009-06-23 17:23 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXRO7063
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDK #0787/01 1741723
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231723Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0432
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0157
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0016
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 000787 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/EPS, AF/RSA, IO/UNP, PRM, DRL 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
FBI FOR DAD/OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS SEAN JOYCE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PREL PINR KDEM PHUM SG
SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU: AMBASSADORS TENTATIVELY AGREE TO SUPPORT 
UNSC HYBRID INQUIRY PROPOSAL 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a June 19 informal meeting of representatives 
of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members and other 
representatives of the international community, participants agreed 
that that the UNSC should support the creation of a "hybrid" 
commission of inquiry for Guinea-Bissau (GB), in which international 
technical advisors support the already established Bissau-Guinean 
national commission of inquiry which is currently investigating the 
March assassinations of the former president and former armed forces 
chief of staff.  The assembled diplomats also generally supported 
the notion of a security element for the hybrid commission to 
protect commission members and witnesses, while stressing the need 
for consent from the government of Guinea-Bissau (GOGB). 
Nevertheless, there was broad support for imposing some form of 
conditionality on the provision of international assistance as an 
additional means to support a transition to de facto civilian rule 
and ensure military cooperation in the security sector reform 
process.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Failed National Effort Leads to Request for Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
2. (SBU) In a May 22 letter, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior 
asked UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to deploy a UN-sponsored 
international commission of inquiry to Guinea-Bissau to take over 
the investigation into the March assassinations of Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff General Tagme Na Wai and President Joao Bernardo 
Vieira.  A domestic, inter-ministerial commission began 
investigating the crimes on March 12, thanks in significant part to 
technical assistance from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
However, in May, the head of the commission of inquiry, Attorney 
General Luis Manuel Cabral, complained publicly that the 
investigation had stalled due to the military's refusal to 
cooperate.  Cabral also pointedly criticized the Prime Minister for 
refusing (or being unable) to compel the military to cooperate with 
the investigation. 
 
3.  (SBU) On the heels of another round of military extrajudicial 
killings on June 1 (ref), UN Representative of the Secretary General 
(RSG) Joseph Mutaboba traveled to New York on June 16 to brief the 
Secretary General and to prepare for a June 23 briefing of the 
Security Council to propose, as an alternative to the requested 
international commission of inquiry, the creation of a hybrid 
commission through the provision of UN assistance and international 
experts and technical advisors to aid the national commission of 
inquiry's moribund investigation.  However, the responsibility for 
the inquiry, Mutoboba and the UN reportedly will insist, must remain 
with the GOGB. 
 
MEETING OF DIPLOMATS IN DAKAR 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) On June 19, 2009, Ambassador Bernicat convened in Dakar a 
meeting of representatives from UN Security Council country members, 
as well as nations and organizations with an active presence or 
interest in Guinea-Bissau.  The Ambassadors of Burkina Faso, Japan, 
and Turkey, the Chargs d'Affaires of Austria, Portugal, Spain and 
the United Kingdom, political officers from the European Commission 
(EC) and Russia, as well as a representative from the United Nations 
Office of West Africa (UNOWA) joined the meeting.  (FYI -Portugal, 
Russia and Spain in addition to the UN are present in Bissau.  End 
FYI)  PolCouns, DATT, LEGATT, and PolOff also participated.  The 
Ambassador noted the necessity of ending the long cycle of killing 
with impunity in Guinea-Bissau to ensure civilian rule and suggested 
that the international community should support Mutaboba's proposal 
as well as a possible international security force.  The 
force/presence could ensure the hybrid commission can work in 
security and increase the possibility of military cooperation in the 
investigation.  This presence could, perhaps be the first step to 
the establishment of a broader stabilization or intervention in 
support of security sector reform. 
 
Broad Support for Hybrid Commission of Inquiry 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) There was general support among the participants for 
providing international assistance to the national commission of 
inquiry and the creation of a hybrid commission as long as the GoGB 
supports the proposal.  Some, including the Austrian and U.K. 
Chargs, argued that an international presence in the inquiry will 
serve to give it added legitimacy and that it would help to 
strengthen the national commission's ability to obtain the 
cooperation of the military in the investigation.  The Austrian 
Charge also argued that protection for the commission as well as for 
 
DAKAR 00000787  002 OF 002 
 
 
witnesses will be necessary. 
 
Security for Commission 
----------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Participants were more cautious regarding the possible 
deployment of an international security element (which could 
conceivably take any form, from uniformed expert advisors to a 
formal intervention or stabilization force) for the hybrid 
commission.  The Portuguese Charg expressed support for such a 
presence, but only with the GOGB's concurrence.  This sentiment was 
echoed by the U.K. Charg, who added that any force would need 
"complete" Bissau-Guinean agreement, including that of the military, 
and argued that the objective of an intervention force remains 
unclear.  The Russian political officer added that any force would 
need consensus, both internationally as well as within 
Guinea-Bissau.  The Japanese Ambassador speculated that the GOGB 
would not accept an international peacekeeping force but expressed 
some hope that perhaps pressure at the Economic Community of West 
Africa States (ECOWAS) meeting on June 22 could persuade 
Guinea-Bissau to accept such a force.  Everyone agreed that the 
international community should condition any assistance provided to 
progress made by the GOGB's commission of inquiry. 
 
7. (SBU) Many participants, including the UNOWA Representative, the 
Turkish Ambassador and Portuguese Charg, expressed concern 
regarding election and post-election security.  The Austrian Charge 
questioned how free and fair any elections will be in 
Guinea-Bissau's current state and urged international assurances of 
protection.  The UNOWA Representative added that a new government 
will only be willing to enact reform if its members feel safe.  The 
Portuguese Charg responded that in return for protection, the GOGB 
will need to produce tangible outcomes.  The Spanish Charge opined 
that elections will not solve much on their own and that a 
duly-elected President would need to enact the necessary reforms. 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT: Post recommends against supporting the Prime 
Minister Gomes' request for the UN to establish an international 
commission of inquiry, given how time-consuming and costly in nature 
(as well as the fact it could allow the GOGB to shift the tough 
responsibility for identifying the assassins away from itself) it is 
likely to be.  The request and the ongoing threat of violence 
(however well-targeted) offers the international community a perhaps 
fleeting opportunity to help the government in Bissau take the first 
significant steps to rein in the military and its actions.  As such, 
the proposed deployment of international advisors may be the best 
alternative.  For the hybrid commission to work, however, Gomes' 
government must demonstrate the necessary courage and political will 
to overcome a military reluctant to cooperate.  They will need the 
backing of the international community to do so.  END COMMENT. 
 
BERNICAT