Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09CAIRO1204, Economic and financial leaders debate Egypt's economic

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09CAIRO1204.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CAIRO1204 2009-06-28 12:40 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #1204/01 1791240
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281240Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/ECSTATE WASHDC 2990
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASUR WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0444
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001204 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/RA 
USAID FOR ANE/MEA MCCLOUD AND RILEY 
USTR FOR FRANCESKI 
TREASURY FOR PARODI AND BAYLIN 
COMMERCE FOR 4520/ITA/ANESA 
 
REF:  CAIRO 2436 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV EG
SUBJECT:  Economic and financial leaders debate Egypt's economic 
future 
 
CAIRO 00001204  001.5 OF 002 
 
 
Sensitive but unclassified.  Please handle accordingly. 
 
1. (SBU) Key Points: 
* At the Ambassador-hosted Economic Roundtable, leading economic 
minds in Egypt believe that sound macroeconomic policies have 
contributed to Egypt's 7% growth the last several years. 
* The Roundtable believed that Egypt will weather the current 
economic downturn better than most regional peers. 
* The Roundtable expressed concern that the reform mentality of the 
government of Egypt has begun to wane. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary: Continuing with recent practice (reftel), the 
Ambassador invited a diverse group of financial business leaders and 
economic thinkers to an Economic Roundtable to discuss Egypt's 
current economic situation and its future.  The group included the 
World Bank's Chief Economist for Egypt, three banking CEOs, an 
economics professor from Cairo University, the executive director of 
a leading think tank, an advisor to the investment authority, and a 
partner at a law firm who is also a former AmCham President.  While 
all felt secure in noting that Egypt would continue to weather the 
current global recession, the deeper the discussion progressed, the 
more vocally participants expressed real concerns about Egypt's 
investment climate, the deterioration of the reform agenda, and the 
deeper structural problems which persist. End Summary. 
 
3. (SBU) There was general agreement that the global crisis is 
easing and that the situation is improving in Egypt as well.  The 
group generally agreed that the 4.7% GDP growth target for the year 
was feasible and that Egypt's financial system remains as sound as 
it has ever been.  All acknowledged some of Egypt's basic economic 
indicators had suffered during the global recession, particularly 
noting the reduction in: FDI, trade, tourist arrivals, and Suez 
Canal receipts.  The group emphasized that Egypt is not in crisis, 
but that the priority for Egyptian policy makers should be the 
longer-term structural problems that constrain growth and which have 
plagued Egypt for years. 
 
4. (SBU) The group was generally complimentary of the Central Bank 
of Egypt's (CBE) handling of monetary policy, pointing to the 
generally stable foreign exchange rate.  Several pointed out that 
while net international reserves have fallen (from about $35 billion 
at their peak last year to about $32 billion now), they remain 
healthy and it is reasonable for the reserves to deteriorate 
somewhat in the given circumstances.  Most felt that the CBE 
intervention had been modest and warranted.  None expressed concerns 
that a run on the currency was likely or that there was risk of a 
precipitous fall in the level of gross international reserves. 
World Bank Chief Economist Santiago Hererra, however, noted that 
monetary policy has suffered from a lack of transparency.  He cited 
the CBE's selling of some of its holdings at commercial banks as an 
example of the CBE's opaqueness in monetary dealings.  (Note: Given 
the lack of significant movement of the Egyptian pound in recent 
months vis a vis other emerging markets, the pound is stronger than 
its regional competitors, therefore making Egyptian exports less 
competitive.) 
 
5. (SBU) The discussion of the Egyptian fiscal stimulus was wide 
ranging.  Several felt that the 15 billion LE (US$ 2.7 billion) 
which was approved several months ago has not been enough.  Several 
argued that to truly be counter-cyclical, Egypt should be buying as 
much as possible now and investing into infrastructure at a much 
faster rate if it was to truly "benefit from the crisis."  Yet, at 
the same time, no one in the room could point to anything specific 
that the stimulus money had done or any data on jobs created or 
saved as a result of government interventions.  Further, there did 
not seem to be any expectation that the government would provide any 
accounting for its stimulus spending.  While the group generally 
wanted more money spent, most seemed to believe that the GOE is 
relatively inept at spending its infrastructure investments, and 
that the GOE cannot build any public good quickly, thus largely 
defeating the purpose of stimulus spending. 
 
6. (SBU) The World Bank Chief Economist reminded the group that the 
GOE has a budget deficit of 8%, so to significantly increase 
spending on poorly and slowly implemented infrastructure projects 
would only exacerbate that problem and may not result in the desired 
increase in demand.  He reminded the group that subsidies and public 
sector wages still dominate the government's budget so there is very 
little room to spend more, without running up the deficit.  Other 
participants seemed less concerned about the high deficits and were 
willing to take on higher debts to fund such extraordinary spending. 
 
 
*********************** 
* Missing Section 002 * 
***********************