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Viewing cable 09BRAZZAVILLE180, FRAUD SUMMARY - BRAZZAVILLE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRAZZAVILLE180 2009-06-12 12:45 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Brazzaville
VZCZCXRO7607
RR RUEHBZ
DE RUEHBZ #0180/01 1631245
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121245Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1417
INFO RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 1706
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRAZZAVILLE 000180 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CMGT ASEC CF
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - BRAZZAVILLE 
 
1.  Embassy Brazzaville is an unclassified post. 
 
2.  Full scale NIV and ACS consular services are now available 
at Embassy Brazzaville. On 18 February, the Consular Section 
issued its first NIV. This was the first NIV issued in the 
Republic of the Congo in 12 years. Prior to the opening of the 
New Embassy Compound on 20 January, consular services for the 
ROC district were based out of Embassy Kinshasa in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. IV operations for Brazzaville 
continue to be run in cooperation with Embassy Kinshasa. At 
present, IV applicants from the ROC must travel to Kinshasa for 
their medical exams and IV interviews. The vice consul at 
Embassy Brazzaville travels to Kinshasa on an as needed basis to 
perform IV interviews for applicants from the ROC. Preparations 
are underway to resume IV operations in Brazzaville. Post 
expects full scale IV operations including medical exams to be 
available in the ROC by September 2009. 
 
------------------ 
Country Conditions 
------------------ 
 
3.  The Republic of the Congo (ROC), commonly called 
Congo-Brazzaville to distinguish it from the DRC, is 
geographically slightly larger than the State of New Mexico. The 
country is bordered by Cameroon and the Central African Republic 
to the north, Angola (the Cabinda enclave) to the south, the DRC 
to the east and the Republic of Gabon and Atlantic Ocean to the 
west. ROC remains a post-conflict country and the years of 
conflict have had a devastating impact on the economy, 
educational system, infrastructure, health and medical systems, 
and welfare of its people. However, since the signing of peace 
accords between the government and the last remaining rebel 
forces the peace trend has been progressively consolidated. 
ROC's sparse population, estimated at nearly 3.8 million, is 
concentrated in the southwestern portion of the country, with 
about 70 percent of its total population living in Brazzaville, 
Pointe-Noire or along the 332-mile railway connecting the two 
cities. Years of mismanagement, neglected infrastructure, 
corruption, and conflict have left the ROC with per capita 
income of about USD $1,100 per year, widespread unemployment, 
and an economy dominated by the informal sector. In fact, the 
2007/8 United Nations human development index ranked the ROC 
139th out of a total of 177 countries. 
4.  All these factors create a strong recipe for fraud in ROC, 
as people seek to flee the rampant poverty, ingrained corruption 
and low standards of living. Thus, widespread fraud is found 
among all categories of visa applicants, albeit typically at a 
low or rudimentary level. Genuine birth certificates and other 
forms of identity are easily obtained using fictitious 
biographic information and the attestation of three witnesses, 
thereby facilitating the issuance of multiple passports with 
different names and dates of birth. Names continue to pose a 
problem for current fraud detection algorithms, as passports are 
frequently issued with different variations of family or first 
names (with first names either omitted or included as part of 
the surname in subsequent passports). 
--------- 
NIV Fraud 
--------- 
 
5.  Approximately 60% of B1/B2 applicants present fraudulent 
documents such as fake bank statements or letters of 
introduction. The fraudulent documents are usually of poor 
quality and most fraud is easily detected. West African 
(primarily Malian and Senegalese) merchants who control retail 
trade in the ROC represent about 20 percent of B1/B2 
applications received at post. This applicant pool is more 
likely to present fraudulent documents and the refusal rate is 
approximately 70 percent. About 25 percent of post's NIV 
applicants are official or governmental travelers and a larger 
concern is the noted increase over the past several years in the 
instances of official passports and government travel orders 
issued to mala fide applicants. Documents are rarely relied upon 
for the B1/B2 traveler, with the officer instead relying upon 
the applicant's interview behavior and responses. Student visa 
fraud consists mostly of fraudulent school records and 
fictitious financial support documents. Reflecting the country's 
poor educational system, most applicants are simply unprepared 
academically for study in the United States. 
--------- 
IV Fraud 
--------- 
 
6.  Follow-to-join asylee beneficiaries continue to make up the 
bulk of post's IV cases. Many cases have been pending several 
years, after post's IV operations were suspended in 1997 and 
only resumed in 2005. As ever, a loose definition of family - 
with cousins, uncles and so on considered part of the nuclear 
family - combined with a critical lack of reliable civil 
documentation make IV cases challenging. ROC still has no 
standard format for documenting the major life points - birth, 
 
BRAZZAVILL 00000180  002 OF 003 
 
 
death, marriage, adoption or divorce - and civil law regarding 
issuance of these documents is unevenly applied. DNA testing is 
recommended in the majority of cases involving children. 
Marriage fraud exists in asylum cases as well as IR petitions 
and while post has not yet found evidence of payment for 
marriages, most applicants have a very difficult time 
demonstrating an ongoing relationship. Age fraud is common among 
IV applicants and post has uncovered through interviews married 
children attempting to pass as unmarried sons and daughters. 
--------- 
DV Fraud 
--------- 
 
7.  Post finds instances of fraud in the vast majority of its DV 
cases, typically via falsified diplomas and other "supporting" 
educational documentation. Pop-up marriages also are common, 
with applicants fraudulently claiming as a spouse someone with 
whom they cannot prove a legitimate relationship. Children are 
frequently discovered, via DNA testing, to be biologically 
unrelated to the applicant. Post relies upon FPU investigations 
and strategic interviews with applicants to discern fraud, 
drawing also upon previously established contacts within the 
GRoC. 
--------------------------- 
ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  With a small-sized, resident American citizen community, few 
tourists, and a solid fraud prevention program in place, post 
has had no cases of ACS or U.S. passport fraud since October 
2007. 
--------------- 
Adoption Fraud 
--------------- 
 
9. Adoption cases are historically rare in ROC, with few cases 
in the last six years. Thus, post has had to deal with some 
adoption cases related to IV visas issuances. The cases were 
proven to be conformed to the local procedures although it was 
somehow difficult to establish the relationships.  But post will 
remain vigilant on these issues. 
------------------- 
Use of DNA testing 
------------------- 
 
10. In some cases, post recommends DNA testing as a means of 
verifying claims of parental/child relationships in IV cases, 
predominately for Visas 92/93 applicants but also increasingly 
for DV cases as well. 
-------------------------------------- 
Asylum (and other DHS benefits) Fraud 
-------------------------------------- 
 
11.  As with DV fraud, most of post's asylum fraud is related to 
false relationship claims. 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------ 
Alien smuggling, trafficking, organized crime, terrorist travel 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------ 
 
12.  ROC was added to the Tier 2 Watch list in the 2008 
Trafficking in Persons Report and is a source and destination 
country for persons being trafficked. Post continues to follow 
details of a case involving the wife of a former ROC government 
official, who was arrested in Canada on trafficking in person 
charges after successfully applying at post for NIV visas for 
her family. Although she used her correct identity when 
qualifying for the NIV, the woman was detained by Canadian 
authorities when she tried to use falsified ID documents to 
enter that country. Canadian authorities say she had with her 
several youths who are not the children interviewed and verified 
at post during the NIV process. Post has had no cases of 
suspected terrorist travel or organized crime, dating back 
several years. 
--------------------------------- 
DS criminal fraud investigations 
--------------------------------- 
 
13.  The RSO office provides excellent support for the Consular 
office regarding fraud investigation. However, there were no 
cases to report since the last fraud report. 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
Host country passport, identity documents, and civil registry 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
14.  New machine-readable, computer-generated passports in 
circulation since February 2008 have vastly improved the quality 
and security of previous ROC passports. The new passports 
include such security features as holograms, and come in three 
types: diplomatic (maroon), official (blue) and regular (brown). 
In 2007, ROC ran out of its supply of regular passports and 
began using a system of annotated official passports, with the 
"Code ETR" denoting official travelers and "Code A" denoting 
 
BRAZZAVILL 00000180  003 OF 003 
 
 
regular travelers. Those annotated passports will remain in 
circulation through their expiration dates, meaning a mixture of 
valid ROC passports will be in use for the next several years to 
come. As always, there are no indications that the lax passport 
issuance controls of the past have been improved and post 
continues to watch for instances of passport fraud. Genuine 
birth certificates and other forms of identity are easily 
obtained using fictitious biographic information and the 
attestation of three witnesses, thereby facilitating the 
issuance of multiple passports with different names and dates of 
birth. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
--------------------------------------------- 
15.  The level of cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the immigration authority remains excellent and, 
through post's RSO and security staff, relations with police and 
law enforcement officials are good. Local capacity, however, is 
limited. Local officials do not see visa or passport fraud as a 
priority but have been willing to pursue cases developed by 
post. Post has enjoyed strong cooperation with the head of the 
ROC inter-police agency, Interpol, and notes he was sent last 
year by the GROC on a months-long training to Italy, Canada and 
the US to learn passport and visa fraud detection techniques. 
Now he is back and still willing to work with post. 
---------------------------- 
Areas of Particular Concern 
---------------------------- 
 
16. Brazzaville is resuming full scale operations after a twelve 
year hiatus. Most consular operations including Fraud Prevention 
must be rebuilt from the ground up. This reconstruction project 
is being led by a first tour junior officer and three locally 
engaged staff. 
 
--------------------- 
Staffing and Training 
--------------------- 
 
17.  Brazzaville is a one officer post. Consular operations were 
re-launched under the supervision of a TDY WAE Consul. The 
entire operation was turned over to a first tour junior officer 
10 days after arrival at post. Three locally engaged staff work 
in the consular section. Two of the three LES joined the Embassy 
in December 2008. The other LES has worked for the Embassy for 
five years, but only began working in the consular section full 
time in January 2009. 
 
18.  The limited experience of the section makes training a 
priority for all staff. The LES have all completed PC 102, PC 
103, and PC 104. The LES in charge of fraud investigations is 
also enrolled in the online Fraud Prevention course. The 
Consular Officer has not had any additional fraud prevention 
training beyond ConGen. 
EASTHAM