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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA796, BRAZIL'S EXPORT CONTROLS ON MILITARY SALES: HOW THEY WORK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA796 2009-06-22 17:44 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXYZ0025
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #0796/01 1731744
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADX7E2784 MSI7611 - 648)
R 221744Z JUN 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4551
INFO RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7904
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4249
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000796 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY - PARA 1, 2, 6 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, PM/DDTC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019 
TAGS: PREL ETTC MASS PARM BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S EXPORT CONTROLS ON MILITARY SALES: HOW THEY WORK 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 34 
     B. STATE 11869 
     C. BRASILIA 613 
 
Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske.  Reason: 1.4(d) 
 
1.   (C)  SUMMARY.  Brazilian policy supports increasing 
Brazil,s exports of military goods and technology as part of 
the development of Brazil,s own defense sector.  Brazil 
currently has a system of export controls that has been 
effective in ensuring that Brazil,s limited military exports 
do not fall into the wrong hands.  Brazilian controls are 
based on policies aimed at not contributing to conflicts and 
observing UN and other international standards.  The GOB is preparing 
new regulations that set procedures into code and enhance the 
role of Ministry of Defense licensing authorities.  Brazilian export 
control authorities are open to dialogue on U.S. practices, 
particularly electronic licensing.  END SUMMARY. 
2.  (C)  Brazil's December 2008 Defense Strategy (ref a) 
mandated efforts to revitalize Brazil's defense industry by 
promoting exports of Brazilian defense products.  While 
Brazil had a niche as a supplier of armored vehicles and 
other low-end military products, primarily to fellow 
non-aligned nations, during the Cold War, defense exports 
have since remained relatively low, at a rate of only about a 
thousand per year, according to Ministry of External 
Relations (MRE) Director for Commerce Promotion (responsible 
for export controls) Norton Andrade.  The largest number of 
these cases are for export of ammunition and small arms. 
Brazil's current system of export controls has effective procedures 
but lacks a formal set of regulations with legal force similar to the 
U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and reflects 
the limited volume of exports and the relatively low level of 
technology involved. 
3.  (C)  The Brazilian export licensing process currently 
begins when an exporter has an opportunity to sell a product 
outside of the country and consults the MRE and other 
relevant Ministries about the proposed sale.  This process, 
referred to as &prenegotiation,8  is a key to the Brazilian 
system of control.  In effect, the GOB will tell the exporter 
if the proposed export is likely to be approved leading to an 
approval rate of almost one hundred percent on the actual 
applications.  Andrade likened the process for licensing to a 
&gentlemen,s agreement8 and said that most Brazilian 
exporters had a good idea of what exports would normally be 
approved and over what items the GOB will exercise greater 
control .  Brazil,s Ministry of Industry has published a 
code of what items require export licensing (equivalent to 
the USML).  Once an application is submitted, it undergoes a 
process of interagency consultation that normally takes about 
a week, then is forwarded to the MOD for approval.  Cases 
involving higher technology, for example anti air missiles, 
can take up to two months for interagency review. 
4.  (C)  Brazilian export control policy is based on two 
principles: not contributing to existing conflicts and 
upholding UN standards.  Brazil requires end user 
certifications for all military exports and will block those 
it believes will not go to legitimate military organizations. 
 For example, in 2008, Brazil turned down an export of small 
arms ammunition to Chad because of concerns it would either 
contribute to internal conflict or be diverted across the 
border to Sudan.  Although Brazil,s role in Africa is 
expanding, it still treats exports of military items there 
with caution.  One exception has been the training Brazil has 
provided to the Mozambique army for African Union 
peacekeeping operations.  As of April 2009, however, this 
training did not include equipment or weaponry.  Brazilian 
policy is to support all UN restrictions on arms transfers, 
although where specific UN measures do not exist, Brazil 
generally will approve sales.  Brazil,s 2005 attempt to sell 
Super Tucano aircraft to Venezuela, a sale blocked by USG 
refusal to agree to retransfer of U.S.-origin items on the 
aircraft provided a case where Brazilian and U.S. policies 
diverged.  Brazil argued that such a sale would give Brazil 
more influence with Chavez, military that could be a 
moderating force and complained that the denial of the 
turboprop Super Tucano trainers led to Venezuela,s decision 
to procure advanced jet fighters from Russia.  It is likely 
that Brazil,s desire to market the Super Tucanos was driven 
by the plane,s manufacturer, Embraer, putting pressure on 
the GOB to approve in order to protect industrial jobs in the 
runup to the 2006 elections rather than any Brazilian policy 
toward Venezuela.  Recently, Brazil received protests from 
India for a proposed sale of anti-radiation missiles to 
Pakistan. 
5.  (C)  COMMENT.  As Brazil,s economy and technological 
base keep growing, so will its role as an exporter of 
military items.  Both President Lula and Defense Minister 
Jobim have stated that developing strong defense industries 
that thrive on exports will enhance Brazil,s security.  It 
is therefore probable that governments and non-government 
actors seeking access to military technology will 
increasingly turn to Brazil.  This year,s Latin American 
Aerospace and Defense Exposition LAAD (ref c) was notable for 
the high profile given to Brazilian products.  Brazil,s 
current system of export controls, with its emphasis on 
informal consultations and understanding that &all our 
exporters know what they should do,8 while sufficient for 
the present, could become inadequate.  The GOB is working on 
elements for greater controls through a technology transfer 
working group and possibly adding a process for adjudicating 
which exports require licensing as defense products. 
According to Andrade, Brazil also hopes to make greater use 
of technology in its export licensing process. 
6. (C) These changes create an opportunity for the USG to offer to 
share our best practices with Brazil.  Andrade indicated informally 
that he would be interested in "the American system" with 
particular attention to State Department experiences with 
e-licensing and USG interaction with the U.S. export 
community.  Post recommends seeking an opportunity to 
establish contacts between Brazilian licensing authorities, 
both from the MRE and MOD, and PM/DDTC.  In addition to the 
above topics, the Brazilians could benefit from information 
on the USG Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) process and on 
compliance issues.  The October 2008 visit of a Blue Lantern 
team (ref b) gave an overview of licensing and compliance 
issues, but an exchange of information on trends in arms 
trafficking in Latin America would serve to sensitize Brazil 
to the need for developing a compliance program of its own. 
SOBEL