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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA725, BRAZIL - WARMING UP TO A COMPROMISE ON AMENDING NSG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA725 2009-06-08 17:52 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO3463
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0725 1591752
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081752Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4452
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4178
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7833
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9627
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6251
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0156
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019 
TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY NSG AR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL - WARMING UP TO A COMPROMISE ON AMENDING NSG 
GUIDELINES FOR ENR TRANSFERS 
 
REF:  A) STATE 49930, B) 2008 BRASILIA 1529, 
C) 2008 BUENOS AIRES 1661, D) 2008 STATE 120335 
 
Classified by: A/DCM Marie Damour. Reason 1.4a and b 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  There is positive movement in Brazil's position 
regarding the proposed non-proliferation initiative at the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group concerning transfers of enrichment and reprocessing 
equipment and technology, according to the Ministry of Exterior 
Relations' Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive 
Technology Santiago Mourao.  He thought that acceptable language 
could be reached on Paragraph 6 of the proposal, which included a 
requirement of an Additional Protocol for an ENR transfer, so long as 
an exception for Brazil and Argentina were included.  He also noted 
that others were concerned about the use of a "black box" approach 
for transfers of installations in Paragraph 7, but - even though 
Brazil would prefer something else - this would be acceptable. 
Paragraph 7 is "not Brazil's fight," he stated.  END SUMMARY. 
 
COMPROMISE POSSIBLE ON PARAGRAPH 6 AND ENR TRANSFERS 
 
2.  (C) Brazil's Ministry of Exterior Relations' (MRE) Director of 
the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technology (DDT) Santiago 
Mourao outlined the movement in Brazil's thinking about the proposal 
for a criteria-based approach to strengthening controls over 
transfers of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) equipment and 
technology being considered by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).  At 
a meeting on June 2 with Environment, Science & Technology, and 
Health (ESTH) Counselor and ESTH Officer he said that he sees more 
flexibility with his government's position.  He commented that now he 
sees a willingness to reach a compromise from the Ministry of 
Defense, as well as unspecified others, which have been wary of the 
proposed language in Paragraph 6 of the proposal including a 
criterion about an Additional Protocol for ENR transfers. 
 
3.  (C) Mourao said for Brazil an acceptable compromise would be an 
agreement on Paragraph 6 that had simple language, requiring an 
Additional Protocol and then creating a clear exception for Brazil 
and Argentina.  He added that something along the lines of the 
Netherlands proposal would be acceptable. 
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT PARAGRAPH 7, BUT "NOT BRAZIL'S FIGHT" 
 
4.  (C) Just as a solution seems in reach for Paragraph 6 and ENR 
transfers, Mourao commented that he was seeing concerns raised by 
others about Paragraph 7 and transfers of installations by means of a 
"black box" process.  He noted that with all the focus on Paragraph 
6, the NSG members had not given that much attention to Paragraph 7. 
He opined that while he would have preferred to have something other 
than the "black box" approach, in the end Brazil could live with it, 
provided that Paragraph 6 is acceptable.  For Brazil, he added that 
it was essential that the NSG abide by the decision taken in Oslo to 
consider Paragraphs 6 and 7 jointly, as a package. 
 
5.  (C) In the end, Mourao concluded that Paragraph 7 was "not 
Brazil's fight".  Brazil didn't expect to be involved in transfers of 
installations.  Thus, they could live with the language of Paragraph 
7 as long as the Additional Protocol language in Paragraph 6 was 
acceptable. 
 
6.  (C) COMMENT.  Mourao was the most optimistic the ESTH Counselor 
has seen about reaching a solution within the Brazilian government. 
It appears that Brazil can accept language in an international 
agreement requiring the use of an Additional Protocol, at least for 
ENR transfers, so long as Brazil's - and Argentina's - particular 
concerns are addressed.  This represents a positive development in 
Brazil's approach to non-proliferation measures.  Mourao also seemed 
upbeat about the NSG reaching agreement on the proposal.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
SOBEL