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Viewing cable 09BELGRADE480, SERBIA/BOSNIA: INZKO VISIT UNDERSCORES OBSTACLES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BELGRADE480 2009-06-04 16:34 2011-05-11 19:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Belgrade
Appears in these articles:
http://balkans.blog.lemonde.fr
http://www.bivol.bg/wldodik.html
VZCZCXRO0739
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #0480/01 1551634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041634Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1340
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000480 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA/BOSNIA: INZKO VISIT UNDERSCORES OBSTACLES 
IN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
REF: BELGRADE 34 
 
Classified By: Deborah Mennuti, Political Chief; reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
1.   (U) This cable was cleared with Embassy Sarajevo. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
2.     (C) High Representative Inzko,s visit to Belgrade in 
early May refocused current challenges in bilateral relations 
between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In meetings with top 
Serbian officials, Inzko elicited Serbian support of Dayton 
and Bosnia,s territorial integrity, as well as a promise by 
Serbia to strengthen Bosnia,s central institutions. 
Meanwhile, disputes involving national boundaries and 
property succession remain unresolved and are unlikely to see 
progress absent leadership from Tadic himself.  In our view, 
a Tadic visit to Sarajevo affirming support for Bosnia,s 
state-level institutions would demonstrate that Tadic,s 
rhetoric in support of Bosnia and Herzegovina is more than 
mere words.  End Summary. 
 
Inzko Seeks Belgrade's Cooperation 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3.    (SBU) High Representative Valentin Inzko paid his first 
official visit to Belgrade on May 5 and received assurances 
from top Serbian officials that Belgrade would continue to 
support Bosnia's territorial integrity and constitutional 
reform only with the consensus of all three ethnic groups. 
President Tadic issued a statement noting Serbia's role as 
guarantor of the Dayton Agreement while reaffirming 
Belgrade's "principled and unambiguous" commitment to 
Bosnia's territorial integrity.  Prime Minister Mirko 
Cvetkovic echoed these sentiments, adding that Serbia 
respected completely Bosnia's sovereignty and the principle 
that every major agreement required consensus among the three 
ethnic groups.  Cvetkovic noted that Bosnia- Herzegovina and 
Serbia enjoyed "very good cooperation" in the realms of 
energy, tourism, and railroad infrastructure.  Deputy Prime 
Minister Bozidar Djelic and Inzko discussed European 
integration and regional cooperation issues, agreeing to 
consider joint projects in the energy, agriculture, and 
travel infrastructure sectors, according to a statement from 
Djelic's office. 
 
4.    (C) Foreign Ministry officials voiced satisfaction with 
the meetings and expressed Serbia's willingness to work 
constructively with the High Representative.  Nikola Rukic, 
an official in the MFA's European Integration office who 
participated in the Inzko meetings, told us that Inzko 
approached Zagreb and Belgrade to seek their support in 
encouraging BiH leaders to strengthen Bosnia's state-level 
institutions, calm nationalist rhetoric from Bosnia's 
leaders, and make greater efforts to achieve reconciliation 
among the three ethnic groups.  While downplaying the 
significance of Bosnian Republika Srpska (RS) PM Milorad 
Dodik's nationalist rhetoric and threats of secession ("He is 
only a politician, not a nationalist"), Rukic said that 
Belgrade supported strengthening Bosnia's central 
institutions and that Inzko could rely on Serbia's 
unconditional support in this regard because only strong 
central institutions would enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
achieve EU membership.  Rukic added that Inzko praised 
Serbia's support of Dayton and encouraged Belgrade to offer 
more assistance to central institutions. 
 
Little Progress on Bilateral Sticking Points 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5.    (C) Despite the positive rhetoric and Serbian promises, 
Inzko's visit did not result in any concrete changes in 
policy nor dislodge longstanding obstacles to developing 
state-to-state relations between Belgrade and Sarajevo. 
Bosnian Charge Amira Arifovic-Harms told us on May 11 that 
Inzko's visit was a charm offensive directed toward skeptical 
Serbs; it would not result in substantive pressure from OHR 
on Belgrade.  (Comment:  While Inzko clearly sought to 
highlight in interviews personal ties to Belgrade stemming 
from his diplomatic service here in the 1980s, it is unclear 
whether the "charm offensive" was successful.  One MFA 
contact, noting that Inzko is Slovenian by origin, told us 
that whatever pro-Serbian sentiments Inzko may have would be 
obviated by the demands of his office. End Comment.) 
Arifovic-Harms said that negotiations on longstanding border 
disputes (reftel) remain stalled since December and proposed 
 
BELGRADE 00000480  002 OF 002 
 
 
talks on property succession issues this spring were 
repeatedly postponed.  She voiced disappointment that Inzko's 
visit to Belgrade was not coordinated with the Bosnian 
Embassy, in contrast to the practices of previous High Reps. 
 
 
6.    (C) MFA Neighboring Countries Directorate official 
Vladimir Odavic downplayed the significance of stalled border 
and property talks and emphatically said that Belgrade was 
striving to bolster relations with the Bosniak-Croat 
Federation.  Odavic claimed that border disputes were ongoing 
because Serbia sought to negotiate a comprehensive solution 
to problems involving Serbian-built, Yugoslav-era 
hydroelectric dams on the border, while the Bosnians insisted 
on drawing administrative lines before further negotiation. 
Odavic ascribed the delayed property succession talks to the 
Easter holidays and said that the Serbian side had yet to 
receive a comprehensive list of Bosnian property claims. 
Regarding state-level relations, Odavic repeated the familiar 
refrain that Belgrade actively sought additional 
state-to-state contacts but was rebuffed by Silajdzic's 
associates.  Odavic said that one solution to overcoming 
strained relations was via economic issues, and he proudly 
pointed to the March 4 "Economic Forum of Serbia and BiH" in 
Belgrade as an example of how both sides could work together 
on economic issues.  The economic forum --organized under the 
auspices of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce and the Bosnian 
Embassy *- focused on increasing economic cooperation 
between Serbia and the Federation, and included state 
secretary-level representation from the Serbian and Bosnian 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.    (C) High Representative Inzko's visit to Belgrade 
yielded few surprises and again demonstrated that top Serbian 
officials believe that voicing support for Bosnia's 
territorial integrity excuses the de facto emphasis on 
entity-level relations and occasional unconstructive rhetoric 
partial to Dodik.  While the alleged agreement to Inzko's 
proposal that Serbia support strengthening Bosnia's central 
institutions is encouraging, we are skeptical there is much 
intention in following through with more than just words. 
Tadic met on May 25 with Bosnian Serb tri Presidency member 
Nebojsa Radmanovic in Belgrade and Bosnian-Croat 
tri-Presidency member Zeljko Komsic will visit Novi Sad in 
mid June.  The Serbian government's reactions to these visits 
by top Bosnia officials will provide the first clue as to 
whether the visits by Inzko and Vice President Biden will 
have prompted President Tadic to assume a more constructive 
position toward Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the substance 
of bilateral relations matches his rhetoric.  A good start 
would be for Tadic to increase his interaction with the 
tri-presidency members and pay a visit to Sarajevo to meet 
with state-level politicians of all three ethnic groups, 
thereby expressing Serbia's support for Bosnia's state-level 
institutions.  It would also be helpful if Tadic publicly 
endorsed any U.S.-backed constitutional reform initiative in 
BiH, and at the same time, signaled clearly and publicly to 
Dodik and the RS public that while Belgrade was prepared to 
support the RS's territorial integrity (as Biden did in 
Sarajevo), it would not back attempts by the RS to avoid or 
block the constitutional compromises necessary to create a 
functional and efficient Bosnian state.  Tadic is notoriously 
hesitant to tackle hard topics that he thinks will backfire 
by increasing reaction by the Radical-led Greater Serbia 
elements.  He needs to also be confident that any move he 
makes in this direction will be noted by the United States 
and Europe and that his statesman-like image will be enhanced 
by playing a constructive role in the region.  End Comment. 
MUNTER