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Viewing cable 09BAMAKO375, STRIKE OUT! MALI'S MAGISTRATES RETURN TO WORK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAMAKO375 2009-06-09 16:29 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bamako
VZCZCXRO4504
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0375/01 1601629
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091629Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0433
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000375 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KJUS ML
SUBJECT: STRIKE OUT!  MALI'S MAGISTRATES RETURN TO WORK 
 
1.(SBU) Summary: During the month of May, a long-running 
dispute between the Malian government and the two magistrate 
labor unions SAM and SYLIMA threatened to paralyze the Malian 
legal system.  One union, and then the other, launched 
strikes of unlimited duration to protest the government's 
failure to implement new pay schedules.  The two magistrate 
unions were joined in their strike by the members of the 
clerks of court union, SYNAG.  While the larger and more 
moderate Autonomous Union of Magistrates (SAM) returned to 
work on May 18, members of the Free Union of Magistrates 
(SYLIMA) and of the clerks of court union only resumed their 
duties on June 2, after the government threatened to find 
replacements for the striking magistrates.  In meetings with 
the Embassy on June 5, the leaders of both SAM and SYLIMA 
claimed their strikes were a complete success, and denied 
that the unions were attempting to delay the certification of 
the April 26 election results.  The strike by judges and 
prosecutors, who are already perceived by Malians as 
extremely well-off, is not likely to increase Malians' faith 
in the judicial system.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
A Tale of Two Unions 
-------------------- 
 
2.(SBU) The Autonomous Union of Magistrates (SAM) - 
representing Mali's judges and public prosecutors - was 
created in 1992.  In 1997, SAM's founder, Daniel Tousseini, 
accepted a post with the Ministry of Justice and stepped down 
from leadership in the labor union. From 1997 to 2003, two 
figures -  Hameye Foune Mahalmadane and Fodie Toure - 
dominated the leadership of the union. In 2003, Fodie Toure 
was elected President of SAM.  Mahalmadane, then the 
Secretary General, contested the results of the election. 
After losing his battle for leadership, Mahalmadane left SAM 
and created the Free Union of Magistrates (SYLIMA).  In a 
meeting with the Embassy on June 5, Fodie Toure, former 
President of the National Independent Election Commission 
(CENI) and still at the head of SAM, indicated that both 
unions serve the same clientele and essentially have the same 
objectives.  A magistrate has the option of belonging to 
either one, although to date SAM remains considerably larger, 
with approximately 250 members to SYLIMA's 100. 
 
3.(SBU) Although SAM and SYLIMA often pursue identical 
objectives, the tone of the unions is markedly different. 
The Malian press invariably compares Fodie Toure's "dove" to 
Hameye Mahalmadane's "hawk."  In the June 5 meeting, Toure 
indicated he doesn't care much for the comparison, but that 
it is essentially accurate.  He prefers to say that while SAM 
is "respectful," SYLIMA is more "violent."  It was plainly 
evident at the June 5 meetings that there is no love lost 
between the two union leaders. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
They Never Promised to Keep their Promises 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5.(SBU) The strikes in May were the culmination of years of 
failed negotiations between the magistrate unions and the 
government.  As early as 2006, SAM produced a memorandum for 
the government outlining concerns, which were resubmitted in 
the form of negotiating demands in 2007.  SYLIMA, likewise, 
provided a list of negotiating demands to the government in 
June 2007.  The two labor unions demanded that magistrate 
salaries, which have not changed since 2000, be brought into 
line with increases in the cost of living.  Other demands 
included updating court infrastructure, providing magistrates 
with greater access to work related technology like law books 
and computers, and revising the magistrate code to eliminate 
anomalies where junior magistrates might receive higher pay 
than more senior magistrates assigned to other locales. 
 
6.(SBU) During extensive negotiations with the government 
during 2007, full agreement was reached on the majority of 
the unions' demands.  The government agreed to implement a 
new payscale effective January 1, 2008, which would provide 
magistrates a salary ranging from 200,000 to 250,000 CFA 
(approx. 400-500 USD) per month based on seniority.  Before 
the new payscale was budgeted, however, the government 
approached the unions and requested a delay in the 
implementation of the agreement, due to fiscal shortfalls. 
Both SAM and SYLIMA acquiesced, and a new date of August 1, 
2008 was agreed upon.  A second delay later postponed the pay 
increases to January 1, 2009. 
 
7.(SBU) In December 2008, the unions approached government 
representatives to remind them of the government's 
engagement.  Although assured by the government that the new 
payscales had been duely budgeted, 2009 arrived with no 
change in the magistrates' salaries.  Further negotiations 
followed, whereupon the government agreed to implement the 
new payscale as of October 1, 2009.  According to the 
 
BAMAKO 00000375  002 OF 003 
 
 
magistrate unions, the government also agreed during those 
negotiations immediately to sign decrees codifying the 
increase into law, presumably limiting the government's 
ability to reneg on its agreement.  In April 2009, when the 
government failed to prepare the appropriate decrees, both 
unions submitted the legally required notice of intent to 
strike. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
The Spoiled Children of the 3rd Republic 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8.(SBU) On May 4, SYLIMA and the clerks of court union went 
on an unlimited strike.  SAM followed suit on May 13.  The 
two simultaneous strikes left the Malian judicial system 
completely paralyzed, with up to 80% of courts closed 
nationwide according to SAM leader Toure.  In addition to 
delaying all court trials scheduled during the strike period, 
the clerks of court strike left Malian citizens unable to 
obtain legal documents such as passports or birth 
certificates.  Many suspects in criminal matters were held 
without charge for far longer than the 48 hours provided by 
the law, simply for lack of judges before whom to appear. 
Some Malian newspapers reported isolated cases of individuals 
completing jail sentences but remaining behind bars because 
there was no way to process their release. 
 
9.(SBU) SYLIMA leader Mahalmadane claimed, in his June 5 
meeting with the Embassy, that the strike was as successful 
in pulling public opinion to the magistrates' side as it was 
in putting pressure on the government.  In fact, the opposite 
is true.  Notwithstanding the government's utter inability to 
keep its agreements with the unions, the majority of the 
press accounts of the strike were hostile to the unions, 
focusing on the inconvenience caused Malian citizens.  The 
Malian people are highly suspicious of judges and 
prosecutors, perceiving the judicial system as hopelessly 
corrupt.  Malian magistrates are widely proclaimed to be the 
"spoiled children of the 3rd Republic," and the strike was 
generally perceived as resulting from greed rather than 
legitimate grievances. 
 
10.(SBU) In addition, allegations surfaced from some quarters 
that the magistrates were attempting to "take the April 26 
election results hostage" in order to improve their 
bargaining position.  Malian electoral law requires that 
election results be certified by the Constitutional Court 
after the courts have disposed of all challenges to election 
results.  Critics charged that the Malian magistrates' strike 
would keep the election results in an untenable and 
unacceptable limbo, and that this was precisely the unions' 
intent.  SAM leader Toure dismissed this idea as ridiculous, 
noting that Mali has never in the past had difficulty seating 
municipal councils while election result challenges are 
pending.  Toure also noted that such challenges usually take 
two months, so at worst, the strike would only add one month 
to an already time-consuming process. 
 
11.(SBU) On May 15, less than 72 hours after SAM had gone on 
strike, the union agreed to return to work on May 18. 
According to Toure, SAM abandoned its strike because the 
President of the Supreme Court had secured a promise from 
President Amadou Toumani Toure personally that the government 
would adopt decrees necessary to implement the magistrates' 
pay increases effective October 1, 2009.  SAM leader Toure 
indicated to the Embassy that President Toure had never 
broken a personal promise to the union since he took office 
in 2002, and that the union had greater faith in him than in 
the government representatives they had dealt with 
previously.  Toure and the SAM leadership also reasoned that 
if the union had already agreed to postpone payment until 
October 1, there was no need to strike 5 months in advance. 
 
12.(SBU) By contrast, SYLIMA did not abandon its part of the 
magistrates' strike until June 2, 2009, almost a month after 
the strike began.  The SYLIMA decision came almost 
immediately after the government implemented decrees hiring 
"temporary" replacements for the striking magistrates. 
SYLIMA leader Mahalmadane insisted that the government's 
action had absolutely nothing to do with their decision to 
abandon the strike, telling the Embassy instead that the 
union backed off because a large number of "big 
personalities" from civil society asked it to do so. 
 
--------------------------- 
Can the Government Deliver? 
--------------------------- 
 
13.(SBU) Both Toure and Mahalmadane claimed the strikes were 
a success, although neither received any additional 
concessions from the government.  Moreover, neither Toure nor 
Mahalmadane doubt the ability of the government to keep its 
word and implement the new payscale as of October 1. 
 
BAMAKO 00000375  003 OF 003 
 
 
Mahalmadane noted cynically that if one examines the money 
the government spends on itself, there is no doubt it 
possesses the resources to keep its word should it choose to 
do so.  Toure, more optimistically, noted that a special 
commission, comprising members of the bar, the High Council 
of Islam, and retired judges, are witnesses to the 
government's agreement and will be able to apply appropriate 
pressure.  It should be noted, however, that this commission 
has been in place since the negotiations began and has done 
nothing to inspire the government to keep its word up to this 
point.  Both unions, however, insist their return to work is 
contingent upon the government keeping its word, and that if 
decrees authorizing their pay increases are not signed by 
October 2009, they reserve the right to strike again. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Comment: Another Blow to the Rule of Law 
---------------------------------------- 
 
14.(SBU) Unfortunately, Malian magistrates seem to have 
compounded the mistrust and resentment of the Malian people 
by holding hostage the judicial system until their own 
demands are met.  Recent allegations that some magistrates 
have released decisions favoring the wealthy and politically 
well connected in spite of the evidence against them have 
further cast doubt on the impartiality of the judiciary. 
Thus, even though the magistrates today are victims of unkept 
government promises, the Malian people have perceived the 
magistrates' strike not as an act to gain redress for 
legitimate grievances, but as another example of judicial 
greed at the expense of Malian society.  End comment. 
 
MILOVANOVIC