Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ABIDJAN382, GBAGBO INTERVENES TO STOP PORT STRIKE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ABIDJAN382.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ABIDJAN382 2009-06-19 14:31 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Abidjan
P 191431Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5209
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS ABIDJAN 000382 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB EWWT ECON PGOV IV
SUBJECT: GBAGBO INTERVENES TO STOP PORT STRIKE 
 
REF: ABIDJAN 366 
 
1. (U) Summary.  A three-week-long strike at the Port of 
Abidjan ended June 17 after President Gbagbo promised to 
resolve all of the striking dock workers' grievances and 
ordered the release of workers who had been jailed.  The 
strike resulted in some violence and a major disruption of 
port operations.  While a wage dispute triggered the strike, 
increased competition and jealousies among the groups that 
represent dock workers appear to be key underlying factors. 
The involvement of personalities close to the president, 
particularly Port Director Marcel Gossio, reflects the 
importance that revenue from the port plays in Cote d'Ivoire. 
 End summary. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2. (U) The employment status of 5,600 dock workers in Abidjan 
is rather tenuous.  While port operators, such as the Societe 
d'Exploitation du Terminal de Vridi (SETV), which manages the 
container terminal, hire a small number of full-time, 
permanent workers, the majority of dock workers are day 
laborers assigned to port jobs by an agency representing 
shipping companies known as the "Syndicat des Entrepreneurs 
de Manutention et de Transit des Ports d'Abidjan et San 
Pedro" (SEMPA).  While SEMPA makes decisions regarding which 
workers will have jobs on a day-to-day or month-to-month 
basis, many of the workers perform the same duties for the 
same operators for extended periods.  The various port 
operators pay SEMPA, which is resposible for setting wages 
and distributing salaries  SEMPA retains a percentage 
(reportedly 10-15 prcent) of the total paid to cover its own 
costs. 
 
3. (SBU) Some 11 unions represent Abidjan's doc workers.  A 
relatively new union, the CollectifNational des Dockers et 
Dockers Transit pour la Dfense de Leurs Droits (CNDD), 
created in 2007, hs become the primary dock-workers union. 
Some loal media have asserted--and post contacts have 
cnfirmed--that Gossio instigated the creation of CND with 
the intent of siphoning business and moneyaway from SEMPA. 
Many of the workers the CNDD hired are reportedly former 
members of the Young Patriots, a group that actively opposed 
the 2002 coup attempt and is not advese to the use of 
violence.  Some post interlocutrs believe the union gained 
popularity by makingunreasonable promises to its workers. 
 
4. (U) Sice the creation of CNDD, port managers have heard 
rumors of strikes, and workers have undertaken varous "spot 
actions," such as slow-downs.  Beginnig in late 2008, CNDD 
began to push for better pa.  Accounts vary, but post 
contacts generally agee that the union asked for an 
extraordinary wageincrease:  to an average wage of 
approximately UD 8.00 per hour rather than the existing wage 
ofapproximately USD 0.60 per hour for unskilled laboers. 
(The minimum wage in Cote d'Ivoire is CFA 3,500 per month, 
or roughly USD 0.40 per hour.)  Te union also asked for 
payment of bonuses for peformance of certain specific 
duties. 
 
5. (U) I May 2009, following mediation by the Interior 
Mnistry (which dock workers reportedly preferred asa 
mediator over the Transportation Ministry or Laor Ministry, 
given the previous failed attempts f Transportation and 
Labor to resolve the issues, SEMPA agreed with the CNDD to 
increase certainbonuses, but SEMPA did not agree to an 
increase n hourly wages, which are tied to Cote d'Ivoire's 
minimum wage and could only be changed through GOC action. 
(Note:  Interior Minister Desire Tagro s a member of the FPI 
and a very close advisor t President Gbagbo, whereas 
Transportation Minister Albert Toikeusse Mabri leads one of 
the small opposition parties.  End note.) 
 
---------- 
THE STRIKE 
---------- 
 
6. (U) The strike began at midnight on the night of June 1-2. 
 While CNDD leaders based the strike on SEMPA's alleged 
failure to pay the agreed-upon bonuses, most workers were 
effectively striking for a significant pay hike on which 
there was no agreement between SEMPA and CNDD. 
 
7. (U) On June 4, port authorities threatened to fire all the 
dock workers and replace them with new recruits from SEMPA. 
On June 5, as the strike continued, port authorities started 
recruiting new workers.  On June 8, strikers positioned 
themselves in front of the port to prevent the new recruits 
from working.  The confrontation turned violent, and police 
used tear gas to disperse the dock workers.  Some dock 
workers were arrested, and at least three strike-breakers 
were hospitalized.  Gendarmes and police later implemented 
increased security at the port. 
 
8. (U) Port activity initially continued, with actual 
employees of the port-operating firms and monthly workers 
from SEMPA carrying out port functions, but the strike had 
the expected effects on port business:  a variety of firms 
reported that delays in moving goods through the port created 
rising stocks, client complaints, and losses of contracts. 
The timing of the strike--at a low point in the cocoa harvest 
and export cycle--probably lessened the delays in moving 
goods through the port.  In recent days, however, activity 
slowed to a standstill, increasing the cost to private 
industry as well as to the government. 
 
9. (U) President Gbagbo met June 16 in Touba with Yves 
Colibu, Secretary General of the National Workers Union, and 
Guei Plike, the recently designated spokesman for the CNDD 
union.  The president reportedly agreed to help resolve all 
of the dock workers' grievances and gave orders for (a) the 
release of imprisoned workers; (b) the dismissal of 
complaints filed against the union; and (c) the re-hiring of 
workers who went on strike. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (U) The port is a critical element of the Ivoirian 
economy.  In 2008, exports of goods and services represented 
approximately 49 percent of GDP, and imports of goods and 
services were the equivalent of about 40 percent of GDP. 
Some 90 percent of Cote d'Ivoire's total trade passes through 
the Port of Abidjan.  Additionally, the port is the point of 
entry for many goods bound for Cote d'Ivoire's landlocked 
neighbors.  An estimated 65-70 percent of GOCI revenue comes 
from the port, a fact that helps explain President Gbagbo's 
interest in averting a lengthy shutdown of operations. 
 
11. (U) It appears that although wage complaints were the 
proximate cause of the strike, the CNDD's interest in flexing 
its muscle was a key underlying factor.  Some have suggested 
that port management may have actually encouraged the strike 
as part of a plan to break SEMPA's monopoly.  Others have 
suggested that the strike is the result of a split between 
Ivoirian and foreign workers or between workers of different 
political parties.  Post cannot corroborate this information; 
however, it is clear that political calculations played an 
important role in this strike. 
 
12. (U) Post interlocutors close to the situation do not feel 
that the strike was a symptom of general economic conditions 
or a sign of widespread labor discontent.  In fact, a top 
SETV executive reported that overall port activity for 
January through May 2009 (prior to the start of the strike) 
was ten percent above port activity for the same period last 
year (a surprisingly positive figure, given the global 
economic downturn).  Although exports decreased during the 
first five months of 2009 compared to the same period last 
year (primarily because of declines in exports of cocoa beans 
and timber), imports were at roughly the same level as last 
year, and transshipment operations increased significantly. 
 
13. (U) Although officials have not released any estimates of 
the strike's costs to the port, Ivoirian businesses, or the 
economy in general, the strike's effects almost certainly 
included a decrease in GOCI revenue, diminished corporate 
profits, and increases in the cost of critical consumer 
goods, such as rice, most of which is imported from Asia. 
These are consequences that Ivoirians can ill afford right 
now and also help explain President Gbagbo's eagerness to 
help resolve the strike. 
 
 
NESBITT