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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA658, BRAZIL AND THE MIDDLE EAST: FOREIGN MINISTRY ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA658 2009-05-22 20:51 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO1548
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0658/01 1422051
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 222051Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4359
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0401
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0172
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7516
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4926
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6217
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0083
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4381
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0087
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0016
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 6894
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4222
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7747
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2735
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0040
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0940
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0174
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0028
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9565
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7769
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4096
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000658 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA AND NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2019 
TAGS: PREL KPAL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL AND THE MIDDLE EAST: FOREIGN MINISTRY ON 
ITS ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, ASPA SUMMIT 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 0043 
     B. BRASILIA 0322 
     C. BRASILIA 477 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske.  Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C)  Summary: In an April meeting with CDA between two 
trips by President Lula to the Middle East, Brazil's senior 
diplomat for Middle East issues, Under Secretary Roberto 
Jaguaribe discussed Brazil's positive reactions to President 
Obama's moves on the Middle East and subtly rejected 
President Lula's comments criticizing the U.S. role as a 
peace broker in the region.  Jaguaribe was quite clear that 
Brazil saw a need for Israel to make concessions in order to 
achieve peace and the necessity of allowing greater 
involvement of all relevant players in the peace process, to 
include HAMAS.  He also expounded on Brazil's broader 
outreach to the Middle East, which in addition to playing an 
active part in Israel-Palestine peace discussions, involves 
acting as a bridge between Arab countries and Latin American 
countries through Brazil's leadership of the Arab South 
American Summit (ASPA) process.  Although Jaguaribe 
downplayed Brazil's importance in the Middle East peace 
process, Lula's second visit to the region in as many months 
confirms GOB interest at the highest levels in expanding its 
Middle East ties.  In light of the GOB's enthusiasm for the 
approach of the new U.S. Administration to Middle East 
issues, post continues to recommend that we seek ways to 
encourage closer cooperation toward common objectives.  End 
summary. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Israel-Palestine: Waiting for Godot 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) During an early April meeting with Charge d'Affaires, 
Itamaraty Undersecretary for Political Affairs II Amb. 
Roberto Jaguaribe offered his reaction to comments by 
President Lula in which he criticized U.S. peace efforts in 
the Middle East and called for and a broader set of 
countries, including India and South Africa, to play a bigger 
role in mediating the conflict.   Jaguaribe was quick to 
downplay their significance, noting that Brazil recognized 
that the only player with a decisive role in the negotiations 
was the United States.  While admitting that the Palestinians 
"can't get their act together," he focused his aim on Israel 
for the lack of a breakthrough, and, on the United States as 
the only player that could steer Israel in another direction. 
 Jaguaribe animatedly laid the blame for the lack of peace at 
Israel's feet, sharply criticizing Israel's settlement 
expansion, the conditions it perpetuates in Gaza, the 
security wall, as well as its attacks against Gaza. 
 
3. (C) According to Jaguaribe, the only way to resolve the 
thorny issues is to have all the players sitting at the 
table, including HAMAS.  The recent fighting in Gaza only 
strengthened HAMAS, not weakened it.  As long as conditions 
in Gaza continue as they are, HAMAS will remain strong. 
Asked if HAMAS should recognize Israel's right to exist, and 
whether Brazil could attempt to convince HAMAS to accept this 
condition, Jaguaribe noted that Brazil "could not convince 
anyone of anything; Brazil is only a peripheral player." 
 
4. (C) Jaguaribe added that there is great sense of 
anticipation in the Middle East to see what approach the 
United States will take.  He observed that the Egyptians, the 
"heart of the Arab world" and the Arab country with the most 
important role to play, are viewed with suspicion by the 
 
BRASILIA 00000658  002 OF 003 
 
 
Palestinians and other Arab countries, which has given an 
opportunity to Saudi Arabia and other players to step in. 
But in the end, according to Jaguaribe, 'everyone is waiting 
for Godot,' in reference to expectations of what U.S. policy 
will be in the Obama administration.  Jaguaribe argued that 
the fundamental problem for the United States is the 
perception that the United States and the Western countries 
are biased against the Arab and Muslim worlds.  Arab and 
Muslim countries see a double standard "when they see the 
United States do nothing when Israel blocks aid and conduct 
disproportionate attacks against the Palestinians, but see 
them condemn Arab countries."   That is why President Obama's 
message in Turkey was important but, he added, was only one 
element of what it will take to shift perceptions in the 
Middle East. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
ASPA: Brazil Doesn't Care About the Politics 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
5. (C) Regarding the March 31 ASPA summit, Jaguaribe 
described it as an effort to diversify relations from the 
standpoint of both Latin America and the Arab countries. 
Jaguaribe referred to various ministerials, such as the ones 
in Buenos Aires and Quito, in which many high-ranking Arab 
officials who had never before contemplated visiting a Latin 
American country came away with a new impression and a piqued 
interest in enhancing their presence in the region. 
Jaguaribe observed that from Brazil's standpoint, the 
politics of the summit and the final declarations, which he 
admitted contained polemical statements regarding issues 
outside of the objectives of the ASPA summit, are not the 
most important aspect.  What Brazil is seeking is a change in 
attitude on both sides.  Countries in the "periphery" should 
not have to rely on news media to learn and know about other 
countries in the "periphery."  ASPA has helped increase 
direct contacts between the two regions and has led to an 
"exponential" increase in the number of visits by high 
ranking Arab leaders. 
 
----------------------- 
Comment: Determined to Play 
----------------------- 
 
6. (C)  Consistent with Brazil's broader effort to expand its 
foreign policy reach in line with its overriding interest in 
a permanent UN Security Council seat, the GOB at the highest 
levels is engaging Middle Eastern countries.  Lula's recent 
visit to Saudi Arabia and Turkey is his second to the region 
in as many months.  It follows FM Amorim's visits to Syria, 
Jordan, Israel, and the West Bank (ref A), Egypt (to make a 
pledge at Sharm el Sheikh, ref B), and Iran (ref C). 
Brazil's engagement is being accompanied by a growing number 
of reciprocal visits from regional leaders.  Jaguaribe's 
downplaying of Brazil's role in the Middle East peace process 
notwithstanding, the GOB seems determined to keep the seat at 
the table it won in the Annapolis process.  Although GOB 
officials tout Brazil's ability to talk with all parties as 
potentially helpful in facilitating dialogue in the region, 
their effort to justify biased statements in the ASPA 
declaration and to separate their interest in the peace 
process from other activities in the region is indicative of 
the lack of an in-depth understanding of regional dynamics. 
In light of the GOB's determination to engage and its 
enthusiasm for the approach of the new U.S. Administration to 
Middle East issues, post continues to recommend that we seek 
ways to  encourage closer cooperation toward common 
objectives. 
 
BRASILIA 00000658  003 OF 003 
 
 
KUBISKE