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Viewing cable 09BOGOTA1624, DAS SCANDAL REIGNITES URIBE-COURT FEUD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BOGOTA1624 2009-05-22 20:04 2011-03-13 12:30 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles:
http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #1624/01 1422004
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 222004Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8829
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8919
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2286
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY 0138
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7593
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 8294
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0873
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001624 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM KJUS CO
SUBJECT: DAS SCANDAL REIGNITES URIBE-COURT FEUD 

REF: A. 09BOGOTA1506 
     B. 08BOGOTA3359 

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer 
Reasons 1.4 (b and d) 


SUMMARY 
------- 
1. (C) The longstanding feud between Colombia's judicial and 
executive branches reignited on May 14 after media reports 
claimed a former Department of Administrative Security (DAS) 
official had testified about high-level GOC involvement in 
the illegal surveillance and monitoring of Supreme Court 
Justices.  Relations between the branches had warmed slightly 
after a May 11 meeting in which President Uribe promised to 
provide information to the Courts on alleged DAS surveillance 
of magistrates.  Still, the positive feelings dissipated 
quickly after the GOC failed to deliver on Uribe's 
commitment, and Uribe allies suggested some magistrates are 
tied to criminal groups.  The Courts continue to press Uribe 
to publicly address the surveillance issue, and are also 
seeking UN involvement. Most observers see no end to the 
conflict.  End Summary. 

BRIEF INTERBRANCH THAW 
FREEZES OVER AGAIN 
---------------------- 
2. (C) Relations between the judicial and executive branches 
warmed slightly after Uribe's May 11 meeting with the 
presidents and vice-presidents of Colombia's four highest 
judicial bodies (ref A).  Uribe reportedly pledged to quickly 
provide the Courts with the information DAS had developed on 
magistrates and their family members, while DAS director 
Felipe Munoz claimed that Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran
had said there was no evidence linking presidential advisors 
to the surveillance.  Iguaran later clarified that the 
Fiscalia investigation is ongoing, and that he remained quiet 
at the meeting. 

3. (U) This detente ended after various media outlets 
reported on May 13 that former DAS deputy counterintelligence 
chief Jorge Lagos--who resigned February 22 due to the 
scandal--had testified that former senior presidential 
advisor Jose ObdulioGaviria and Secretary of the Presidency 
Bernardo Moreno were involved in the DAS's illegal 
surveillance and harassment of Supreme Court Magistrates 
(septel).  In addition, Constitutional Court magistrate and 
former Uribe legal advisor Mauricio Gonzalez told us the GOC 
had dissipated any goodwill it had earned from the meeting by 
failing to follow through on Uribe's promise to provide clear 
information on the DAS' actions to the magistrates. 

4. (U) The Courts reacted with strong words--on May 14 the 
Supreme Court issued a public letter once again demanding a 
clear statement from the President on what had happened, 
swift identification of those responsible for the 
surveillance, and a "fixed date" for a visit by the UN's 
Special Rapporteur for Judicial Independence.  Rafael Lafont, 
president of the Council of State (one of the other four high 
courts), publicly said members of the judicial branch were 
"scared" and "worried" by the revelations that the DAS had 
"flagrantly broken the law."  The Council publicized a May 14 
letter to Uribe that demanded clarity from the 
administration, arguing that the GOC explanation to date has 
been insufficient and its pledge to curtail future 
surveillance "ineffective." 

5. (U) The feud deepened on May 18 after the GOC sent a 
report on the status of the investigation to the 
Interinstitutional Commission of the Judicial Branch 
(ICJB)--composed of the leaders of the four top courts.  ICJB 
president Maria Mercedez Lopez complained publicly that the 
report was merely a collection of projects, plans, and 
resolutions to reform the DAS and did not provide any 
substantive information on the investigation.  After a full 
ICJB meeting, Lopez sent Uribe a letter on May 20 signed by 
the presidents and vice presidents of all four high courts 
voicing their dissatisfaction with the information, most of 
which Lopez said was available on the internet.  Gonzalez 
told us the GOC's decision to play "petty political games" 
with the Courts exacerbated Court-executive tensions. 

NOBODY LOOKING FOR COMPROMISE 
----------------------------- 
6. (C) The interbranch feud shows no sign of abating. 
Gonzalez told us on May 19 he sees "no end" to the battle, 
adding that the Supreme Court in particular wants to see 
Uribe's reelection bid fail and several GOC officials jailed 
for the DAS's illegal activities.  Gonzalez holds out little 
hope that more talks could lower tensions, noting that the 
dispute is driven by the Fiscalia's investigation--which is 
not subject to negotiation. Former DAS director Andres Penate
told us separately the same day that he feared that the 
Supreme Court was looking for scapegoats, and that the 
magistrates would not be happy until senior GOC 
officials--ideally Jose ObdulioGaviria--are in prison. 

7. (C) The executive branch itself also turned up the heat, 
with "U" Party president Luis Carlos Restrepo renewing his 
formal request that Congress investigate alleged links 
betweennarcotraffickers and some Supreme Court magistrates,. 
He noted that extradited paramilitary chief Salvatore Mancuso 
had claimed to have influence in the Court.  Such suspected 
links were the alleged basis for the investigation of the 
magistrates in the first place, although the investigation 
turned up no criminal wrongdoing.  For his part, Gaviria
denied involvement, telling reporters the opposition had 
infiltrated the DAS to embarrass the GOC (see septel). 

UN VISIT UNCLEAR 
---------------- 
8. (C) TheFiscalia and the Procuradoria (Inspector General) 
publicly rejected the Supreme Court's request that the UN 
Special Rapportuer for Judicial Independence visit the 
country, arguing that international involvement was 
unnecessary.  Still, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Adriana 
Mejia told us the GOC had invited Special Rapporteur for 
Judicial Independence Leandro Despouy (and three other 
rapporteurs on extrajuducial killings, indigenous issues, and 
human rights defenders) in January to visit Colombia as part 
of its Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights 
Council. She reached out to the Procuraduria to explain that 
a visit would not signify that Colombia has a judicial 
independence problem. 

9. (SBU) Mejia added that no date has been set yet for the 
Judicial Independence Rapporteur's visit since Despouy will 
step down in June and a replacement has not been identified. 
Despouy angered Uribe during a September 2008 visit to 
Colombia by voicing public concern over judicial-executive 
branch conflict in Colombia.  Still, he later met with Uribe 
and other top GOC officials and said Colombia's institutions 
were healthy enough to resolve the issue without UN 
intervention (ref B). 

Brownfield