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Viewing cable 09BOGOTA1595, ERADICATION OF COCA -- GOOD NEWS FROM MANY FRONTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BOGOTA1595 2009-05-20 20:16 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #1595/01 1402016
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 202016Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8782
INFO RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2/SCJ3/SCJ5//
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC//ICE/CNO//
RUMIJTF/DIRJIATF SOUTH KEY WEST FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF STATE AIR WING PATRICK AFB FL
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 7569
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY KABUL 0245
UNCLAS BOGOTA 001595 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR INL/LP AND INL/RM 
DEPT FOR WHA/AND 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV KCRM PTER CO
SUBJECT: ERADICATION OF COCA -- GOOD NEWS FROM MANY FRONTS 
 
REFS: A)SEP 2008 ONCDP PRESS RELEASE ON COLOMBIA COKE PRODUCTION 
      B)NOV 2008 USG PUBLICATION, ILLICIT DRUG PRODUCING NATIONS 
      C)BOGOTA 673, ERADICATION WRAP UP 2008 
      D)FEB 2009 DEA LATEST STRIDE DATA ON PRICE AND PURITY 
      E)APR 2009 DEA PUBLICATION ON DECREASING COCA PRODUCTIVITY 
      F)08 BOGOTA 1921, ERADICATION HURTS FARC FINANCES 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  In the last year numerous surveys, studies, and 
serious field reports have come out touting the success of 
eradication in reducing the amount of cocaine produced, the funding 
available to narcoterrorists, the amount of coca leaf available, and 
the amount of coca under cultivation.  This reporting has been 
especially positive in pointing to the major contribution of aerial 
eradication.  The most recent report from DEA Breakthrough says, 
"Sustained eradication is necessary to reduce financial incentives 
to grow coca."  The information in this cable is from multiple 
sources.  It is very positive and confirms that aerial eradication 
is making a difference, and that it should be considered an 
important component of our consolidated counternarcotics policy in 
Colombia, along with manual eradication, alternative development, 
judicial reform, and police/military assistance.  END SUMMARY 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
ERADICATION WITHERS PRODUCTION OF COCA 24 PERCENT 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2.  (U) In September 2008, the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP), using the latest scientific information from DEA and 
the Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC), published a press release (REF 
A) stating, "...eradication pressure is withering the productivity 
of existing coca fields."  The press release also stated that, 
"Based on our new understanding of the impact of eradication, we can 
now calculate that Colombia's maximum potential production of pure 
cocaine has fallen fully 24 percent since its high point in 2001." 
The study's basic findings are that continued aerial and manual 
eradication reduce the productivity of coca fields by reducing the 
number of plants in a field and forcing replanting with immature 
plants that are less productive than mature plants.  Recent data not 
included in this analysis suggestS that the cocaine production 
potential for Colombia will keep falling as long as the eradication 
pressure continues. 
 
3.  (U) The November 8 USG publication (REF B) entitled, "Illicit 
Drug Producing Nations" addressed cultivation of illicit crops 
throughout the world.  Regarding Colombia, the report said, "New 
field studies show that aerial eradication in Colombia has caused a 
decline in yield."  The study also reported, "The field surveys 
indicate that sprayed herbicide can reduce productivity by killing 
some plants in the field or causing harvests to be lost even if the 
entire field is not destroyed.  NOTE: Aerial spray aircraft 
typically do not completely spray a field due to security 
constraints.  They will normally only pass over a field once or 
twice, leaving unsprayed coca on the edges, or between spray 
swaths. 
 
------------------------------ 
PRICE IS UP AND PURITY IS DOWN 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (U) Working together, aerial and manual eradication potentially 
eliminated hundreds of metric tons of cocaine from the world market 
in 2008 (REF E) and arguably contributed to the encouraging trends 
in price and purity of cocaine in the U.S. and Britain.  In the DEA 
STRIDE report (REF C) from February 24, 2009, DEA Washington 
reported that the price of cocaine has increased by 105 percent and 
purity decreased by 35 percent from January 2007 to December 2008. 
Similarly, British authorities reported this month that the 
wholesale per kilo price of cocaine in the UK has increased by 
nearly 30 percent from 2007 to 2009 and purity is down.  Certainly 
law enforcement successes in recent years, including record seizures 
in Colombia in 2008 and significant seizures in the transit zone, 
played a role in producing an increase in the price and a reduction 
in purity of cocaine in the U.S. and Britain, but eradication also 
played a role in restricting supply. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
MAJOR GROWING REGIONS, LESS COCA DUE TO ERADICATION 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5.  (SBU) The April 30, 2009 DEA report "Coca Eradication Proves to 
be a Team Marathon, not a Solo Sprint" (REF D) uses new field 
studies not available when REF A was published.  This report's 
latest coca yield studies "have documented that average coca leaf 
yields in three major growing regions have dropped by an average of 
10 percent per year over the last 2 to 5 years."  The report also 
states that, "Sustained eradication is necessary to reduce financial 
incentives to grow coca, while credible alternative development 
options are required to create income for buying necessities that 
cannot be produced by the farmer.  Without sustained and concurrent 
eradication and alternative development, farmers are unlikely to 
permanently abandon coca farming."  NOTE:  The Narcotics Affairs 
Section (NAS) in Colombia has long advocated that the Carrot and 
Stick approach to eradication is the best strategy to achieve 
long-term success. NAS, USAID, and the Embassy Military Group are 
all working together on the Colo40nSwith the Embassy that coca 
productivity in several major coca growing regions is down sharply 
compared to previous years.  This coincides with the DEA findings in 
REF D.  Field teams from the GOC, the UN, and the USG have reported 
encountering severe coca field damage attributable to aerial 
eradication, difficulty locating live, productive fields and that 
aerial spraying was a major contributor to the reduction in coca 
field productivity.  Sustained eradication and other law enforcement 
pressures have contributed to as much as a 50 percent reduction in 
coca productivity in select growing areas over the last several 
years.  Coca yield experts concluded that the long-term, cumulative 
impact of aerial eradication is effective in reducing coca 
production and may pressure coca farmers to abandon coca 
cultivation. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
UN SURVEY GOING TO SHOW 18 PERCENT LESS COCA 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) While not public yet, preliminary UN reports, citing heavy 
eradication pressure during 2008, indicate that coca cultivation in 
2008 is down by an estimated 18 percent compared to 2007.  This 
reduction verifies reports from USG program managers and spray 
pilots who are reporting difficulties in finding coca.  When found 
it is less healthy, less dense, and in smaller fields.  The 2008 USG 
coca cultivation survey prepared by the CNC will not be released 
until later this year. 
 
8.  (SBU) The Colombian Antinarcotics Police (DIRAN) performs an 
annual coca monitoring exercise to track and measure coca 
cultivation countrywide.  This information is used by the DIRAN for 
targeting and is not considered the official GOC cultivation number. 
 The GOC uses the UN cultivation numbers as its official numbers. 
Data collected during overflights conducted in January 2009 reveal 
that coca cultivation is down by over 20 percent compared to 
February 2008 overflights of the same area.  While DIRAN coca 
cultivation data are used solely for planning eradication activities 
and are not as rigorous as USG or UN cultivation figures, they show 
that coca cultivation in Colombia is trending downward. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
AERIAL ERADICATION HURTS FARC FINANCES 
-------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Post reporting (REF F) and GOC reports, based largely on 
documents recovered from the laptop computers of two Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Secretariat members killed in 2008, 
indicate that coca eradication efforts have caused financial 
hardship for the organization.  Communications from FARC field 
commanders reveal that aerial eradication has impacted the FARC's 
ability to generate revenue from drug trafficking activities.  In 
one communication, a FARC leader cited that massive aerial 
eradication has reduced revenues from coca cultivation and 
production and that funds were dangerously low for maintaining 
FARC-run radio stations, workshops, and schools and for buying 
weapons and other war material.  Recently, the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (INR) did a classified report dealing with 
such issues. 
 
10.  (U) Document analysis and interviews with FARC deserters 
conducted by the Colombian Ministry of Defense paint a compelling 
picture of a FARC in serious decline, in large part to 
de-capitalization as a consequence of sustained eradication, 
military pressure, and interdiction efforts.  FARC deserters report 
that the formerly robust Eastern Bloc, concentrated in southeastern 
Colombia, has seen revenues from drug trafficking decline 
significantly and that some FARC fronts have gotten out of the drug 
trafficking business altogether.  According to deserter accounts, 
aerial eradication has impacted a key source of FARC revenue by 
cutting coca cultivation and reducing the FARC's ability to obtain 
sufficient amounts of coca leaf to process into cocaine.  Lack of 
logistical support, including food, is one of the deserter's primary 
reasons for leaving the FARC, although not the primary one. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
FIELD STUDY AND INTERVIEWS FIND ERADICATION WORKS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
11.  (SBU) The NAS hired an experienced field researcher in conflict 
zones to do a study of a specific part of Colombia that has 
historically seen significant coca cultivation, serious violence, 
and a lack of GOC presence.  The area has also received significant 
aerial eradication, as well as alternative development and military 
assistance.  The researcher was asked to assess the effectiveness of 
Plan Colombia's illicit crop reduction efforts in this area of 
Northern Colombia.  The region has long been fought over by 
insurgents and paramilitary groups who sought to gain control of 
lucrative coca production and marketing.  Based on research and 
hundreds of field interviews, the contractor estimated that aerial 
eradication has reduced coca cultivation in Catatumbo by over 60 
percent compared to 2001 and he also concluded that aerial spray has 
forced many farmers to abandon coca cultivation, reduced the 
profitability of the cocaine trade and led to a decrease in income 
for the FARC groups operating in the area.  This de-capitalization 
has allowed the GOC public forces to significantly reduce the FARC 
presence in the area. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
VERIFICATION MISSION SAYS SPRAYING IMPACTS COCA 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
12.  (SBU) The NAS works with the GOC and other USG agencies to 
perform a ground-truthing verification mission for aerial 
eradication twice a year.  The report for the 19th verification 
mission is not complete, but preliminary results indicate that 
aerial eradication is accurate and effective.  The efficacy rate 
continued to be above 85%, which is the historical average.  The 
lead USG Scientific Advisor, and retired USDA Soil Scientist said, 
"Results of the 19th Coca Verification Mission continue to show that 
aerial spraying strongly impacts coca, both directly and by forcing 
growers to replant or prune plants.  The net effect must be 
significant loss of coca leaf and cocaine productivity." 
Observations from other USG and GOC raters were consistent with this 
statement. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
MANUAL ERADICATION HAS PLAYED A BIG ROLE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
13.  (SBU) Many of the studies and observations in this cable deal 
with aerial eradication.  This is because they were either directly 
looking at aerial eradication, or they were using data going back 
many years before there was significant manual eradication. 
However, manual eradication has clearly played a role in the 
successes mentioned in this cable and is an important component of 
our consolidated counternarcotics strategy in Colombia.  In 2008, 
the GOC manually eradicated almost 100,000 hectares, a new record. 
Together, manual and aerial eradication eradicated almost 230,000 
hectares, also a new record.  Unfortunately, the GOC is having 
trouble funding manual eradication.  The goal for 2009 is 70,000 
hectares and year-to-date the GOC has manually eradicated only about 
15,000 hectares. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
ERADICATION IS IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF STRATEGY 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
14.  (SBU) As we have learned since the beginning of Plan Colombia, 
aerial eradication is not the panacea for the complex problem of 
illicit coca cultivation in Colombia; however, studies and reports 
over the last year indicate that it is effective and serves as an 
important tool in the fight against narcoterrorism.  Post's CSDI 
will incorporate aerial eradication, alternative development, 
judicial reform, police/military assistance, and human rights 
assistance in a concerted fashion to try and break the cycle of drug 
trafficking, violence, poverty, and impunity that has plagued 
Colombia for decades.  No single one of these tools can do the job 
alone, but working together, we believe they will make a 
difference. 
 
BROWNFIELD