Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BELFAST30, NORTHERN IRELAND POLICE BRIEF CONSULATE ON DISSIDENT KILLING

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BELFAST30.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BELFAST30 2009-05-01 15:05 2011-06-01 18:30 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Consulate Belfast
Appears in these articles:
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/wikileaks-bbc-report-prompted-angry-orde-to-complain-to-the-prime-minister-16005993.html
O 011505Z MAY 09
FM AMCONSUL BELFAST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1485
INFO NSC WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL BELFAST
C O N F I D E N T I A L BELFAST 000017 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
EUR FOR WE, NSC FOR FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/9/2019 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL EI UK
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND POLICE BRIEF CONSULATE ON DISSIDENT KILLING 
OF SOLDIERS 
 
REF: A) BELFAST 00014 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Henry Bisharat, Acting Consul General , US 
Consulate Belfast. 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY. The Acting Consul General and Management/Post 
Security Officer met with Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) Paul 
Leighton and briefly with Chief Constable Sir Hugh Orde on March 
9 for a briefing on the security situation following the March 7 
the dissident republican attack, which left two soldiers dead. 
Leighton confirmed that the killings were the work of the Real 
IRA (RIRA), likely with participation by experienced former 
members of the Provisional IRA (PIRA).  He noted that Sinn Fein 
was internally divided on how to respond to the attack.  While 
Sinn Fein leaders had condemned, this had taken some time, and 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) still needed more 
complete Sinn Fein cooperation with the investigation.  Leighton 
asked that U.S. Administration officials make this point to Sinn 
Fein leaders visiting for St Patrick's Day.  Leighton was also 
worried about other possible attacks and indicated the 
dissidents might use the publicity surrounding the March 7 
incident as a recruitment tool.  He said the policing efforts 
would have to be stepped up in order to deal more effectively 
with the situation and the possibility of further violence.  In 
a separate meeting, Orde praised the U.S. administration 
condemnation of the attack and noted he still planned to travel 
for St Patrick's Day because he believed it important to let USG 
officials know about the PSNI's work in building cross community 
support for policing.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
PSNI BRIEFING ON DISSIDENT REPUBLICAN ATTACK 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) In a meeting at PSNI headquarters March 9, Acting Consul 
General Bisharat and Management/Post Security Officer Gupta 
(notetaker) met with Deputy Chief Constable Paul Leighton for a 
briefing concerning the recent attack on soldiers by dissident 
republicans (reftel).  Leighton indicated that Chief Constable 
Orde had provided a similar briefing to representatives from all 
the main political parties.  Leighton showed a series of 
time-lapse photographs from cameras mounted near the entrance to 
the Masserene Barracks, where the attack took place.  The 
photographs revealed that two cars driven by Dominos Pizza 
deliverymen had pulled up to the barracks. Five unarmed soldiers 
in fatigues emerged from the barracks to pick up their orders. 
At that moment, two gunmen armed with AK-47s drove up in a car 
and opened fire.  They walked towards the soldiers, shooting at 
them even as they lay on the ground.  They returned to the car, 
but came out again and fired more shots before finally returning 
to the car, which then sped away.  As a result of the shooting, 
two soldiers were killed, and two soldiers and both pizza 
delivery men were injured.  One soldier, who hid in front of the 
pizza delivery vehicles, was unhurt.  The entire attack lasted 
only 36 seconds.  Police uncovered 62 shell casings, which 
appear to date from the early 1980s and were likely once 
property of the Provisional IRA.  As soon as the attack started, 
the only security guard in the nearby guard house immediately 
pressed an alarm button, but armed soldiers arrived only as the 
car drove away. 
 
3.  (C) There was no continuous-video recording of the event, 
and the resolution of the photographs was not sufficient to 
indicate the registration number or make or model of the car. 
The photographs have been sent to laboratories in London for 
enhancement.  Meanwhile, the police have recovered a partially 
burnt Vauxhall Cavalier that may have been the car used in the 
shootings.  Police speculate that the attackers tried to burn 
the vehicle in order to obliterate their traces, but parts of 
the car was only charred and blackened in the process, and the 
police are hopeful that there may be useful information to be 
recovered from the vehicle. 
 
 
ATTTACK DONE BY EXPERIENCED KILLERS 
----------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Leighton stated that given the lack of expertise 
displayed in previous attacks by the RIRA, the degree of 
slickness and callousness demonstrated in this attack points to 
the possibility that more experienced members of the "old-school 
Provisional IRA" may have been involved.  However, previous 
intelligence on dissident activity gave no indication of the 
possibility of this attack. 
 
 
RIRA HAS NO BACKING 
------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Leighton estimated RIRA numbers at about 70-80 out of a 
total of about 200-300 active dissidents in Northern Ireland. 
The RIRA are seeking new members, and it is possible that the 
success of this attack will help draw more to their cause. 
However, the DCC pointed out that the RIRA has no real cause 
backed by current community support; they only have resentments 
from a long time ago. 
 
 
MORE HELP FROM SINN FEIN NEEDED 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Leighton noted Sinn Fein was slow to condemn the attack; 
the police had hoped for stronger condemnation from Sinn Fein. 
The DCC was cognizant of internal dissent within Sinn Fein and 
that it was difficult for their leaders to provide an immediate, 
unified response.  He pointed out that one of the intentions of 
such an attack might be to embarrass Sinn Fein, but that Sinn 
Fein must recognize that their position and interests were 
closely aligned with those of the police.  He added they had no 
choice now but to cooperate fully with the police.  Leighton 
made a strong pitch for U.S. administration officials who meet 
with Sinn Fein during St. Patrick's Day to encourage Sinn Fein 
to cooperate fully with the police investigation. 
 
 
ATTACK PREMEDITATED/NOT CONNECTED TO SPECIALIST REQUEST 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
7.  (C) Leighton confirmed that given the nature of the planning 
needed for an attack such as this, the recent news report of 
Army specialists being asked to help monitor dissident activity 
could not/not have been a provocation for the attack.  These 
specialists are few in number (less than ten) and are providing 
only "back-room support." 
 
 
IMPACT ON DEVOLUTION 
-------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Leighton pointed out that the devolution of policing and 
justice to Northern Ireland was hamstrung by lack of funding. 
One possible outcome of this tragedy, in his view, might be to 
facilitate the funding needed to accelerate the devolution 
process.  He also noted, however, that if Sinn Fein was 
perceived as being slow to provide complete cooperation with the 
investigation, Unionists could use that to express reservations 
about moving forward on devolution. 
 
 
CHIEF CONSTABLE ORDE PRAISES U.S. STATEMENT CONDEMING ATTACK 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
9.  (C) After the meeting with Leighton, Chief Constable Orde 
requested to see Acting Consul General.  Orde deeply appreciated 
the U.S. Government's condemnation of the attack and statements 
of support by U.S. politicians, notably Congressman Neal. Orde 
indicated that he would still travel to Washington for St. 
Patrick's Day, though only for a shorter period, because he 
wanted to be sure the U.S. understood the efforts being made to 
ensure cross-community support for policing. 
 
10.  (C) Orde also criticized the BBC for its inaccurate report 
of his use of a small number of military specialists to help 
obtain intelligence concerning dissidents.  The BBC had 
inaccurately asserted that military patrols and Chinooks would 
be used.  Orde said he complained directly to Prime Minister 
Brown that morning about the BBC's unhelpful reports, and that 
Brown had agreed with him. 
 
 
BISHARAT