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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD1262, RRT ERBIL: IMPROVING BUDGET EXECUTION IN THE KRG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAGHDAD1262 2009-05-14 05:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO3880
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1262/01 1340501
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140501Z MAY 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3051
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001262 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV EBUD IZ
SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: IMPROVING BUDGET EXECUTION IN THE KRG 
 
REF:  Baghdad 
 
This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) cable. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Acknowledging deficiencies in public finance 
management, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has committed to 
an ambitious UNDP-supported Public Finance Management Plan for 
improving transparency, planning execution and oversight.  While the 
project is aligned with the national Public Finance Management 
Action plan and has elements which link the KRG budget process more 
closely to the GoI budget, it does not specifically address the 
issue of late and unpredictable transfers from the GoI which are a 
significant obstacle to KRG budget planning and execution.  The KRG 
has committed $500,000 of its own resources to the $4.5 million 
project; the World Bank has also agreed to fund $2 million.  A 
budget gap of $2 million must still be met.  U.S. funding for this 
project would support an important step towards increasing 
transparency and accountability - important anti-corruption and good 
governance indicators for the Kurdistan Region.  End summary. 
 
Public Finance Management Action Plan 
-------------------------------------- 
2. (U) The KRG invited donors and other international organizations 
on May 6 to witness the signing of the KRG's Regional Public Finance 
Management Action Plan and the roll-out of UNDP's $4.5 million 
Budget Execution Support Project which underpins the Action Plan. 
 
3. (U) Described as a complement to the GoI Financial Management 
Plan (which has some overlap, but does not specifically address the 
needs in the the KRG), the three-year KRG PFM Action Plan 
acknowledges serious weaknesses in the current public finance system 
(see paras 6-12 for discussion) and aims to strengthen internal and 
external control systems and increase accountability over the use of 
public resources.  Areas addressed are budget policy, planning and 
formulation, budget execution, public procurement and payment 
systems, public finance reporting and controls and building 
sustainable capacity in public finance management. Donor countries 
will be invited to sit on a KRG PFM Advisory Board. 
 
GoI-KRG cooperation on Public Finance Management 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
4. (U) Mr. Adhmed Mahdi of the Baghdad Ministry of Planning 
Development and Coordination signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
between the GoI and the KRG in which both sides agreed to implement 
their respective PFM Action plans, collaborate to mobilize resources 
and technical assistance and establish a Joint PFM Working Group. 
In his comments Mr. Mehdi noted areas of convergence with the KRG, 
including the KRG's commitment to use the central government Budget 
Call Circular being developed and the KRG's commitment to implement 
the new GoI procurement law and regulations, which should be 
approved soon in the Council of Representatives. 
 
Funding from KRG and World Bank 
------------------------------- 
5. (U) The KRG announced that it would commit $500,000 of its own 
resources as well as additional in-kind contributions to the UNDP 
project.  World Bank country Director Jean Michelle Happi noted that 
a USD 20 million facility was funding the national PFMAP and 
announced that the World Bank would cover $2 million of the KRG 
project.  Mr. Happi stated that where elements of the KRG PFM's 
action plan overlapped with the GoI's PFM items, the World Bank 
would provide assistance, financial and technical, to ensure these 
items are fully integrated.  Other donors (France, Germany, Japan, 
Korea, US, Italy) expressed support for the project's aims, and 
promised to study the proposal.  (Note: UNDP has already committed 
Qpromised to study the proposal.  (Note: UNDP has already committed 
$850,000 "Trac-1" resources to the project preparation.) 
 
Weaknesses in KRG Financial Management 
-------------------------------------- 
6. (U) The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) derives over 97 
percent of its revenues from transfers from the Central 
Government and shares the GoI's vulnerability to fluctuating oil 
prices.  Transfers are made up of the Divisible Pool (the Region's 
17% share of the Federal Budget after deduction for in-kind 
transfers and sovereign expenditures), In-kind Expenditures (food 
basket, fuel, pharmaceuticals), the Regional Development Fund (of 
which the KRG receives only 11.3 percent of the total fund) and the 
Regional Development Banking Fund.  KRG authorities  claim that 
earmarked fuel subsidies and some food ration subsidies have been 
withheld. 
 
7. (U) The KRG collects revenues from customs at the borders of 
Turkey and Iran, and to a lesser extent from rent incomes and fees. 
Revenues were estimated at $162 million in 2007 and $177 million in 
2008 (less than 2.2 percent of transfer levels.)  In 2007 the 
Central Government deducted estimated customs revenues from the 
KRG's 17% transfer. 
 
Expenditures 
------------ 
8. (U) Wage bills and non-wage recurring expenditures accounted for 
over 65 percent of total KRG spending in 2007 - putting heavy 
 
BAGHDAD 00001262  002 OF 002 
 
 
pressures on fiscal sustainability and contributed to crowding out 
capital expenditures. (The urgent need to reform the civil service 
and provide an alternative "social safety net" is not addressed in 
the UNDP project, but has been highlighted elsewhere by KRG leaders 
as a priority.  ) 
 
Deficiencies in planning, execution and oversight 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
9. (U) Kurdistan Regional strategies and policies are not linked to 
KRG budget planning and execution, leading to mismatches between 
what is promised and what is affordable.  In addition, according to 
UNDP, capital budgets are subject to political priorities identified 
by the KRG Council of Ministers without clearly identified rules and 
priorities.  Execution is also heavily disadvantaged by the 
uncertainties of the timing and amounts of transfer and cash flows 
released to the KRG's Central Bank from the Central Bank of Iraq, 
making it difficult for ministries to effectively plan and implement 
programs.  The KRG Ministry of Finance has reported that average 
delays exceeded three months during 2008. The KRG Authorities have 
reportedly sought cooperation from the Central Ministry of Finance 
and the CBI to make cash flows available at the beginning of the 
month based on clearly defined policy, in order to be able to plan 
and execute the budget more accurately. 
 
10. (U) According to the UNDP analysis, the KRG operates a 
cash-based system of accounting which does not fully identify, 
capture and record commitments. Reporting is limited to preparation 
of trial balance which is essentially a book balancing tool. 
Oversight and internal controls are carried out within each spending 
unit by internal auditors. However, procedures are not clear, 
predictable or standardized. 
 
Board of Supreme Audit 
---------------------- 
11. (U) The KRG Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) provides overall 
guidance for maintaining a system of internal controls and conducts 
the external audits after the implementation of the budget. However, 
the BSA does not receive the consolidated financial statements 
transmitted to the Kurdistan Parliament by the KRG Ministry of 
Finance in a consistent and timely fashion, which has caused delays 
in auditing accounts.  Although plans are underway for unification, 
the existence of two BSA structures (one in Erbil and one in 
Sulaimaniyah) stand in the way of a unified procedure and auditing 
framework for the region.  Other challenges facing the BSA relate to 
the lack of qualified staff; the need to upgrade auditing practices 
in order to meet sound international standards; and the need to 
affiliate the BSA with regional and international auditing 
institutions, such as INTOSAI, ARABSAI and ASOSAI. 
 
Procurement 
------------ 
12. (U) Public procurement in KRG broadly follows Iraq's national 
standards.  According to UNDP, current procedures have a number of 
features that are not in line with generally accepted standards of 
good practice.  These range from inadequate requirement for 
registration of suppliers and contractors, an absence of adequate 
bidding documents to insufficiently transparent bid submission, 
opening and evaluation procedures, and contract award procedures as 
well as lack of effective bid protest mechanisms and publicity on 
contract awards.  However, a new procurement law and standard 
bidding documents are now being developed at the national level. 
The draft law and regulations (which the KRG will follow) were 
signed off by the Government of Iraq in 2008 and are under review by 
the Shura Council, before being submitted to Parliament for 
approval. 
 
Comment: 
QComment: 
------- 
13. (SBU) Like the rest of Iraq, the Kurdistan Region must adapt to 
the fact that oil price fluctuation will always impact planning, and 
must put in place mechanisms to "smooth out" year to year 
volatility.  But the region faces an additional challenge, the fact 
that cash transfers are late and unpredictable, and the region's 
budget must always wait on the final Baghdad budget numbers.  Most 
of these problems can be mitigated by preparing contingencies, and 
improving planning, but it is clear that discussion between Baghdad 
and Erbil on these issues needs to be deepened in order to put in 
place better mechanisms.  The MOU signed on May 5 may be a useful 
first step, but we note that the key player on these issues - the 
Ministry of Finance - was not present at the meeting. 
 
14. (SBU) The USG has provided relatively little support to the KRG 
to improve public finance management (primarily Brinkley Task 
Force-funded procurement support) and nothing to support 
anti-corruption activities.  Funding the UNDP project either 
directly or through in-kind contributions would support an important 
step towards greater professionalism, transparency and 
accountability in KRG budget execution - objectives which are key to 
larger USG goals of good governance for the region.  We strongly 
urge consideration of such support. 
BUTENIS