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Viewing cable 09COLOMBO383, EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING 04/01/2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09COLOMBO383 2009-04-02 10:57 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0383/01 0921057
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021057Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9737
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2863
UNCLAS COLOMBO 000383 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/RD/SCA, DS/IP/OPO/FPD, DS/C/PSP/DEAV 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CASC PTER
SUBJECT: EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING 04/01/2009 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 349 
     B. STATE 23498 
     C. COLOMBO 309 
     D. POST SECURITY PROGRAM REVIEW CLOSING REPORT MEMO 
        DATED 01/28/2009 
     E. 08 COLOMBO 489 
     F. 12 FAM 380 
     G. 12 FAH-6 H-522 
 
This message contains an action request (see para. 8) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: AmEmbassy Colombo convened an Emergency 
Action Committee (EAC) meeting on April 1, 2009.  The EAC 
discussed post's residential security policy and the 
provision of static guards at residences, as well as a 
newly-drafted armored vehicle policy. The EAC concurred that 
no specific threats to any embassy personnel existed that 
would put them at extreme risk. Therefore, no embassy 
residences needed static guards if the residences received 
mobile patrol services. The EAC approved the armored vehicle 
policy. The EAC recommended that RSO seek approval and 
funding for one additional roving patrol and that RSO request 
two additional armored vehicles. End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On April 1, 2009, AmEmbassy Colombo convened an EAC 
meeting.  Present for the meeting were the Deputy Chief of 
Mission, Regional Security Officer, Regional Affairs Officer, 
Political Officer, Economic Officer, Management Officer, 
Consular Officer, Public Affairs Officer, Acting USAID 
Director, Defense Attache', Marine Security Guard Detachment 
Commander, International Broadcasting Bureau Station Chief, 
Community Liaison Officer, General Services Officer, USAID 
Executive Officer, and the Medical Officer.  The agenda items 
for the meeting were: 
 
-- The provision of static guards at residences, in excess of 
residential security standards and requirements 
 
-- RSO's proposed armored vehicle (AV) policy 
 
3. (SBU) With reference to the static guard issue, the RSO 
advised the EAC that, absent the existence of a direct and 
credible threat to any particular Embassy officer, assigning 
static guards to a residence was not necessary and exceeded 
residential security standards. The RSO further noted that at 
post's threat levels (high for both political violence and 
crime), only the EMR, DCR and MSG BEQ (Marine House) receive 
residential security guard coverage, per applicable Overseas 
Security Policy Board standards. All other residences receive 
extensive physical security upgrades, have residential 
security alarms that notify a central alarm monitoring 
station, and receive mobile patrol services. The RSO 
counseled the EAC that these measures were more than 
sufficient to counter the actual threats (if any) to 
Americans and their residences. He added that three 
residences of International Broadcasting Bureau officers did 
have static guards because these residences were too far from 
the Embassy to receive mobile patrol coverage. 
 
4. (SBU) The RSO told the EAC that his police sources had no 
information leading them to believe that a threat existed to 
any American citizens, other than the possibility of being 
caught in proximity to an attack on a "traditional" target of 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In fact, RSO's 
police sources averred that the LTTE was too sophisticated 
and too concerned about its image with the international 
community to risk attacking American citizens (especially 
Embassy officers) intentionally. Other EAC members with 
sources within the host government security services agreed 
that they had no information regarding a specific threat to 
any Embassy personnel. The Defense Attache (DATT) asked to go 
on the record as opposing any decision to limit residential 
security services to the minimum that the standards require. 
The DATT averred that in an atmosphere of uncertainty over 
what the future holds, as regards to possible risks to 
Americans, the Embassy should provide residential security 
services that exceed standards, vice merely meet standards. 
The EAC concluded ultimately that the security environment 
did not warrant the provision of guards to any residences 
except for the residences described in para. 3 above. 
 
5. (SBU) POL commented that the patrols were sometimes unable 
to reach residences within a reasonable time frame (five to 
ten minutes) at night. POL recounted an incident during which 
he called for assistance late one night and the patrol unit 
had not arrived for more than 20 minutes. When the patrol 
finally arrived, the guards told him that Sri Lankan security 
personnel had stopped them at a roadblock and searched their 
vehicle, therefore delaying their arrival. The RSO advised 
the EAC that when he arrived in Colombo in 2007, one patrol 
operated during the day and three operated at night (one 12/7 
daytime, three 12/7 at night). The RSO said that since most 
attacks and criminal incidents had occurred during the 
daytime since his arrival at post, he assigned one night 
patrol to daytime duty (that is, RSO operates two patrols 
24/7). He acknowledged that the draconian security measures 
(hundreds of police and military mounting nighttime search 
operations and manning roadblocks) could cause problems, 
though not frequently, by stopping and searching the mobile 
patrols and delaying their arrival. The EAC recommended that 
the RSO request funding from DS to establish an additional 
mobile patrol at night. RSO will provide justification and 
costs septel to DS/OPO/FPD. 
 
6. (SBU) The EAC reviewed and approved RSO's draft AV policy. 
RSO distributed the policy in a Security Directive on April 
2. In addition to complying with refs F and G, the policy 
states: 
 
-- Whenever possible, Mission personnel should opt for routes 
that will minimize the likelihood of being in proximity to a 
GSL facility or similar potential LTTE target. 
 
-- Post will maximize the use of AVs during working hours, 
particularly when personnel attend meetings at GSL facilities. 
 
-- All agencies should make every effort to provide AVs for 
their employees' use for business purposes. 
 
-- Mission personnel should utilize AVs to the maximum extent 
possible for official travel outside of Colombo to the North 
and East (the restricted travel areas). 
 
-- Agencies that do not have AVs should coordinate with their 
respective headquarters elements to obtain AVs. 
 
-- Some Embassy officers conduct business at facilities and 
with government contacts that may be LTTE targets, and 
therefore should utilize AVs more often. 
 
7. (SBU) The USAID Executive Officer informed the EAC that 
USAID had obtained one AV and was hoping to obtain two 
additional AVs (Level C armor). The Embassy General Services 
Officer (GSO) informed the EAC that the motor pool normally 
had only four (4) AVs available, although the motor pool had 
a total of eight (8) AVs. The GSO said that post had one 
Level D AV for the Ambassador's use; two Level C AVs for the 
Marine Security Guards; and, one Level C for the DCM's use, 
leaving four (4) available for every day activities. The GSO 
was worried that using AVs for travel outside of Colombo 
would leave the motor pool with fewer AVs for use in Colombo 
(arguably where the greater threat to Embassy personnel 
exists). He added that two of the four currently available 
had already exceeded their service period and he was waiting 
for replacement vehicles. He added that AVs require more 
maintenance that unarmored vehicles and that the maintenance 
is more expensive, as well. The GSO suggested that post 
needed more AVs, and the EAC concurred. The EAC recommended 
that the RSO request two (2) additional Level C AVs from 
DS/C/PSP/DEAV. 
 
8. (SBU) Action request for DS/C/PSP/DEAV - AmEmbassy Colombo 
requests DEAV provide two (2) additional armored vehicles 
(Level C armoring minimum) as soon as possible. As required 
by refs F and G, the EAC concluded that current AV inventory 
is insufficient to provide safe transportation to adequately 
support Mission activities, given the random nature of 
violent LTTE attacks in Colombo and throughout Sri Lanka (see 
ref E for more details). 
 
9. (SBU) This cable addresses ref B, recommendation eight and 
ref C, recommendation 27 (Transportation Security Policy). 
Unless DS/IP instructs otherwise, RSO Colombo considers these 
recommendations resolved and closed. 
 
10. (U) Post will continue to monitor the security 
environment and will report further developments, if any, 
septel.  POC for this message is RSO Michael V. Perkins, who 
may be contacted at 94.11.249.8885, 94.11.249.8888 (MSG Post 
1 after regular business hours), or via the classified and 
unclassified email systems. 
BLAKE