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Viewing cable 09CHIANGMAI59, COMMUNITY RADIO STATIONS REMAIN OPEN; REDSHIRT LEADERS TURN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CHIANGMAI59 2009-04-30 03:34 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Chiang Mai
VZCZCXRO2770
PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0059/01 1200334
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 300334Z APR 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1030
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1112
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000059 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV SCUL PROP ECPS SOCI TH
SUBJECT: COMMUNITY RADIO STATIONS REMAIN OPEN; REDSHIRT LEADERS TURN 
THEMSELVES IN 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 1053 (LOCAL BROADCAST MEDIA) 
     B. BANGKOK 982 (BANGKOK CALM) AND PREVIOUS 
     C. BANGKOK 974 (SONDHI SHOT) 
     D. 08 CHIANG MAI 178 (PRO AND ANTI-THAKSIN GROUPS) 
     E. 08 CHIANG MAI 168 (POLITICAL TEMPERATURE) 
     F. 08 CHIANG MAI 147 (VIOLENT CLASH) 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000059  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Sensitive but unclassified; please handle accordingly. 
 
------------------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------------------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Though raided on April 17 and ordered to cease 
politically-charged broadcasts that could incite violence by the 
Provincial Government, pro-redshirt community radio stations in 
Chiang Mai continue to broadcast under the terms of an MOU 
negotiated with Provincial authorities.  In a separate 
development, several redshirt leaders in northern Thailand 
turned themselves in to police the week of April 20 in response 
to arrest warrants issued for them on April 18. 
 
2.  (SBU) Both the anti-government redshirts and their 
pro-government, yellowshirt counterparts, regularly used 
community radio to inform their members about upcoming events 
and rallies, and to encourage participation (Refs D-F).  Though 
the radio stations remain open, the terms of the MOU 
significantly restrict the content of their broadcasts, 
effectively preventing them from being used in this manner. 
These restrictions could have a significant impact on the 
ability of both groups to spread the word about their activities 
and incite violence.  Though they limit freedom of speech, the 
restrictions have the potential to curb the most hateful 
rhetoric and lower the political temperature in Chiang Mai, at 
least in the short-term.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------- 
Community Radio Stations Raided, Ordered Off the Air 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------- 
 
3.  (SBU) In the wake of large-scale protests by anti-government 
redshirts that began on April 8, and the violence that ensued in 
Bangkok and Pataya, Thai Ministry of Interior and Royal Thai 
Police officials raided pro-redshirt community radio stations in 
northern Thailand on April 17.  The targeted stations are in the 
provinces of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Lamphun, Lampang and 
Phayao.  The raids resulted in the seizure of some weapons and 
ammunition, broadcasting equipment, and documents inciting 
violence.  On April 18, provincial authorities ordered several 
pro-redshirt stations to cease politically-charged broadcasts 
that could incite violence, and provincial courts issued arrest 
warrants  for several redshirt leaders based in northern 
Thailand at the request of Provincial Governors.  Stations that 
failed to comply with these orders were threatened with closure 
by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), (Ref A). 
 
4.  (SBU) Despite the April 18 order, both pro-redshirt and 
pro-government, Peoples' Alliance for Democracy (PAD) stations 
in Chiang Mai remained on the air as of the afternoon of April 
20, though the redshirt stations noticeably lacked their normal 
rabble-rousing programming.  As of April 29, only one 
pro-redshirt station in Chiang Mai and one in Lampang were off 
the air due to the lack of broadcasting equipment  seized in the 
raids; the others remained open, as did the pro-PAD station in 
Chiang Mai.  Pro-redshirt stations in other northern provinces 
are also still on the air, having bought new transmitters to 
replace the ones that were seized on April 17.  (Comment: The 
operators of these stations and the provincial governments 
probably realized that the authorities lack the regulatory 
authority to force the stations to close.  According to the 2008 
Broadcasting Act, this power is reserved for the National 
Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission, which has yet to 
be established.  The NBTC's predecessor, the National 
Broadcasting Commission, which was established by the Act as a 
temporary body, could theoretically order the stations to close, 
but it has not done so (Ref A).  End Comment.) 
 
5.  (SBU) This regulatory vacuum is probably what led Chiang Mai 
provincial authorities to seek a negotiated solution, rather 
than take a hard-line approach.  On April 20, Chiang Mai Vice 
Governor for Security Affairs Pairot Saengpoowong met for 
several hours with the operators of the province's four redshirt 
and one pro-PAD community radio stations to hammer out an 
agreement that allows them to continue broadcasting, while 
seemingly preventing them from airing their more  hateful and 
provocative segments.  According to Vice Governor Pairot, other 
provincial governments issued orders mirroring the MOU he 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000059  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
negotiated. 
 
6.  (SBU) Under the terms of the MOU, all five radio stations 
must: 
 
-- not broadcast anything that could lead to illegal activities; 
 
-- not use broadcasts to destabilize the government or endanger 
national security; 
 
-- not broadcast language that could provoke people to take 
actions leading to disunity or chaos; 
 
-- not broadcast any programs via audio link from other 
stations, except news or documentaries; and 
 
-- not broadcast defamatory language or phone-ins containing 
provocative statements. 
 
The five stations must also avoid confrontation with one 
another.  (Note: Supporters of the stations have clashed with 
each other (Ref F) in recent past, with one such incident last 
year resulting in the murder of the father of the operator of 
Chiang Mai's pro-PAD station.)  At the meeting, the operator of 
the pro-PAD station objected to the MOU, saying it was not 
legally binding and that his station had not violated the law. 
On the other hand, the operators of the three pro-redshirt 
stations that chose to remain open agreed to abide by the MOU. 
 
7.  (SBU) We note that in contravention of the MOU, the pro-PAD 
radio station continues to broadcast programming from the AS 
television station, owned by PAD's founder Sondhi Limthongkul, 
who was recently the target of an attempted assassination (Ref 
C).  Furthermore, Vice Governor Pairot told us the "war of 
words" between the two groups via their respective stations has 
begun again, though it is not as harsh as before.  He admitted 
that in this instance, the pro-PAD station was the instigator. 
These broadcasts clearly contravene the MOU, but according to 
Pairot, the Chiang Mai provincial government lacks the authority 
to take any enforcement action. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Arrest Warrants Issued and Obeyed 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Many of the subjects of the April 18 arrest warrants 
have turned themselves in to the police.  They include two MPs 
from the leading opposition party (Puea Thai); the leader of Rak 
Chiang Mai 51, the main redshirt group in Chiang Mai; and two 
leaders of smaller redshirt groups.  A total of 34 arrest 
warrants were issued by provincial courts in five northern 
provinces, and very few of those sought have yet to report to 
the police.  So far, all who have turned themselves in have been 
released on bail.  Charges pending against them range from 
traffic offenses for road blockades, to unlawful assembly and 
inciting public disturbance.  According to Vice Governor Pairot, 
the authorities have collected plenty of evidence of criminal 
and lese majeste violations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Does Puea Thai Hold the Redshirts' Keys? 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
9.  (SBU) Both Vice Governor Pairot and the Lampang Provincial 
Police Commander told us they believe the situation in the North 
is under control for now, due to a commitment by the Central 
Government to enforce the law and decisive action by Provincial 
Police.  Pro-redshirt groups in both provinces are splitting, 
they also noted, mainly due to financial disputes.  However, 
they are both uncertain about the future, and see Puea Thai as 
the key player.  If Puea Thai can accomplish its agenda in 
Parliament, they opined that "street politics" would not be 
needed.  If, however, the party is unsuccessful, they expect to 
see redshirts back out on the streets in numbers.  The key to 
avoiding further instability on the government's side, they 
said, is equal treatment of redshirts and PAD yellowshirts for 
law-breaking acts. 
 
10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. 
MORROW